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 Intrusive memories (IMs) are repetitive, unwanted memories, characterised by their 
disruptiveness and often distressing content. They are most widely known as a feature of 
clinical conditions such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but have 
also been shown to occur in non-clinical populations. The majority of research on naturally 
occurring IMs has recruited clinical populations, and relied on questionnaires and interviews 
(i.e. retrospective reports). Most research with non-clinical populations has focused on 
analogue IMs that are induced following exposure to distressing film content (the so call 
“trauma film paradigm”), which participants are then asked to record in a simple diary.  
 The principal aim of the present thesis was to develop diary and laboratory methods –
previously used to research Involuntary Autobiographical Memories (IAMs) – and apply 
them to the study of naturally occurring and analogue IMs in non-clinical populations. These 
methods have proven useful for understanding the frequency, phenomenology and triggers of 
IAMs, and exploration of these variables with regard to IMs was another key aim of the 
present thesis. A final aim was to examine the therapeutic benefit of interacting with the 
content of IMs using these methods.  
 Overall, results suggest that IMs in non-clinical populations are common and 
frequent. This was clearly demonstrated by the results of an initial online questionnaire 
(Study 1) in a general student population, and further supported by a naturalistic diary study 
(Study 2) which showed the frequency of IMs to be comparable to some retrospective studies 
in clinical populations. Finally, results of two studies using a novel laboratory method 
(Studies 3a and 3b), showed that it is possible to capture naturally occurring IMs reported by 
non-clinical participants under controlled conditions.  
The triggers for naturalistic IMs show some key similarities with IAMs. For example, 
the IMs captured under laboratory conditions in Studies 3a and 3b were highly susceptible to 
 4 
verbal cuing, as is the case with IAMs. Furthermore, personalisation of those verbal cues 
(based on an IM reported at screening) resulted in a greater frequency of reported IMs than 
was the case with non-personalised cues in Study 3b.  
 Results also suggest some key differences in the triggers for naturalistic IMs, 
analogue IMs, and IAMs. For all three types of cognition, environmental triggers were the 
most frequently reported, but analogue IMs registered a slightly higher proportion of ‘no-
trigger’ reports. In addition, results suggest that writing about and rating naturalistic IMs in 
the lab can yield differences in subsequent diary reports of abstract/verbal versus 
sensory/perceptual triggers, with in-person disclosure resulting in relatively equal proportions 
of each trigger-type (similar to IAMs) and non-disclosure resulting in many more 
abstract/verbal trigger reports. By contrast, analogue IMs consistently showed a significantly 
higher proportion of sensory/perceptual riggers. These findings have implications for 
theoretical understanding of the relationship of analogue IMs to naturalistic IMs, as well as 
the relationship of the latter to IAMs.  
 Finally, results suggest that in-person disclosure of IMs may have the greatest 
therapeutic benefit, but that this may be augmented by a future oriented task such as keeping 
a diary of involuntary prospective memories. These results, however, differed from 
participants’ subjective assessment, suggesting that both objective and subjective measures 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
Once thought to be a rare phenomenon, involuntary memories are increasingly 
considered to represent a basic mode in which human cognition operates in everyday life 
(Berntsen, 2010; Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019; Hintzman, 2011). Although a variety of 
different terms have been used to refer to them (Krans, de Bree, & Moulds, 2015; 
Kvavilashvili, Niedźwieńska, Gilbert, & Markostamou, 2020) the phenomenon of 
Involuntary Autobiographical Memory (IAM) is of greatest relevance to the present thesis. 
As the name suggests, these are memories from our personal past that come to mind 
spontaneously without any deliberate intention to recall them, often in response to some 
incidental internal or external cues in the environment. For example, hearing a name of a 
particular park, may elicit a memory of “going to the park with my nan, and feeding the 
ducks with my cousin”, or thinking about baking an apple crumble, may suddenly bring back 
a memory about how “during a cooking class a student asked me to put her apple crumble in 
the oven because she was ‘scared’ and I accidentally dropped it”.  The content of these 
memories can vary greatly and may refer to specific one-off events from recent or distant 
past, or more general repetitive events (Berntsen, 2009; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). 
Although their emotional valence is predominantly positive or neutral, they can also refer to 
negative events that happened in the past. Despite this diversity, one key feature that such 
memories share is that they often occur just once and then leave consciousness without 
coming to mind again (Berntsen, 2009). 
Intrusive memories (IMs), in contrast, can be defined as involuntary recollections of 
mostly negative life events (though not exclusively), which repeatedly intrude upon 
consciousness. They can be difficult to control and are often disruptive to ongoing activities 
(Kvavilashvili, 2014). They are most widely known as one of the key diagnostic criteria for 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) – as well as Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) – but have 
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also been found to occur in depression (e.g. Brewin, Hunter, Carroll, & Tata, 2009; Brewin, 
1998; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999) as well as in non-clinical populations following distressing 
or traumatic events (Brewin, Christodoulides, & Hutchinson, 1996; Bywaters, Andrade, & 
Turpin, 2004; Yeung & Fernandes, 2020). This has bolstered the increasingly prevalent view 
that IMs are more than an expression of psychopathology, and are in fact a common feature 
of human cognition (Marks, Franklin, & Zoellner, 2018). 
A diverse set of experiences can precipitate IMs.  These can range from events which, 
according to the American Psychiatric Association's (2013) Fifth Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM-V), fulfil Criterion A for a PTSD diagnosis (e.g. an automobile accident, an 
assault)1 to those that most, if not all, people will experience at some point in their lives (e.g. 
the breakdown of a relationship, the death of a loved one, a personal failure). By some 
estimates, however, nearly 70% of us will experience an event in our lifetimes which fulfils 
DSM-V Criterion A, though IMs must be experienced along with other symptoms (e.g. 
avoidance, fluctuations in cognition and mood, or in arousal and reactivity) for at least one 
month for a PTSD diagnosis to be made (Kessler et al., 2017). Although many people will 
experience IMs during that initial month, and beyond, they may not meet the criteria for a 
diagnosis of PTSD. Evidence indeed suggests that whilst memories can persist for long 
periods of time, the overall symptoms can remain below the threshold for a clinical diagnosis 
(e.g. Newby & Moulds, 2011).  
The study of IMs therefore has high clinical relevance, and much of the research on 
IMs has been conducted with the aim of illuminating the features of PTSD (and more 
recently depression), whilst also offering insight into possible treatment. But given the 
 
1 Defined as “Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence, in one (or more) of the 
following ways: 1. Directly Experiencing the traumatic event(s); 2. Witnessing, in person the event(s) as it 
occurred to others; 3. Learning that the traumatic event(s) occurred to a close family member or close friend. 
In cases of actual or threatened death of a family member or friend, the event(s) must have been violent or 
accidental; 4. Experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic event(s)…” 
(DSM-5, American Psychological Association, 2013, pp 271-272).  
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apparent prevalence of IMs in daily life, the imperative for studying them extends beyond 
this. In addition to contributing to our understanding of the clinical conditions with which 
they are associated, research into IMs also enhances our understanding of them as a feature of 
everyday cognition (Marks et al., 2018). This raises a methodological question, however, of 
how best to study this phenomenon in a way that illuminates both its clinical and non-clinical 
manifestations. A key proposal of the present thesis is that researching IMs in non-clinical 
populations, but incorporating methods borrowed from IAM research, will offer the greatest 
insight into their frequency, phenomenology and triggers. In addition to contributing to our 
understanding of IMs, it will be argued that the use of these methods – in particular a diary – 
have the potential to yield some therapeutic benefit as well.  
What will follow in this chapter is an overview of research to date on IMs, with a 
primary focus on methods, and what these have revealed about the frequency of this type of 
cognition, but also how they are experienced by the individual, including the detection of 
triggers. The majority of such research has been conducted either on naturally occurring IMs 
using questionnaires or retrospective reports, or on ‘induced’ IMs using analogue laboratory 
methods (the so called ‘trauma film paradigm”). The contribution and limitations of each 
approach will be discussed.  
 The present chapter will also include an overview of IAM research, again with a 
particular focus on methods used and what these have revealed about IAM frequency, 
phenomenology and triggers. This is done with the aim of laying the foundation for later 
demonstration of how IAM methods can be fruitfully applied to IM research. Of particular 
note, the diary has been a key methodological tool in this research area. Given the transitory 
nature of this type of cognition, and the concomitant difficulty of capturing it, this has been 
an indispensable innovation. Laboratory methods have also been developed which have 
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replicated and extended findings about the conditions under which IAMs tend to occur. These 
methods have also facilitated more targeted exploration of the nature of triggers of IAMs.  
 In order to further explore the relationship of IMs to IAMs, theoretical accounts of 
each type of memory will be reviewed. Opinion has diverged primarily on how best to 
account for the occurrence of IMs, and whether they result from a particular breakdown in 
the functioning of an autobiographical memory system, or if they are an understandable 
product of such a system. It has been argued that some of the empirical basis for these 
differing theoretical accounts may be an artefact of different methods (Brewin, 2014). Whilst 
the primary aim of the present thesis is not the testing of one or another of these theories, it is 
nonetheless the case that some findings have theoretical implications, namely, findings 
related to the triggers for IMs.  
 Finally, the present chapter will include an overview of research into the therapeutic 
benefits of engaging with distressing memory content, including monitoring, questionnaire 
completion and expressive writing. It has been found that such engagement can improve 
measures of psychological and physiological health. This has been perhaps most widely 
demonstrated with regard to the expressive writing paradigm, whereby participants engage in 
time-limited but detailed writing about contents of distressing memory (James W 
Pennebaker, 1997). It has also been found, however, that even just monitoring of thoughts 
over a period of days or weeks can yield such benefit, and indeed often used as part of 
cognitive-behavioural therapy (Cohen, Edmunds, Brodman, Benjamin, & Kendall, 2013). 
Similarly, a one-off completion of a questionnaire about memory content has also been 
shown to improve scores on measures of distress associated with that memory (Boals, 
Hathaway, & Rubin, 2011; Rubin, Boals, & Klein, 2010). The chapter will end with the 
rationale for the studies included in the present thesis, in terms of how they build upon and 
depart from research conducted to date on IMs.  
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1.2 Overview of Intrusive Memory Research 
 
Within the literature on IMs, there has been a lack of clarity around the terminology 
used, although more recently there have been efforts to rectify this situation. Thus, the terms 
‘intrusive memory’ and ‘flashback’ have been used interchangeably at times, despite the 
apparent qualitative differences of each (Kvavilashvili, 2014).  Flashbacks are normally 
accompanied by a heightened sense of dissociation from the present, and feeling of re-
experiencing the event, on which the memory is based, in the present. They are often 
accompanied by more acute bodily sensations, which match the physical experience from 
original event (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Hellawell & Brewin, 2002). By contrast, IMs can be 
accompanied by bodily sensations and a sense of re-experiencing (Brewin, 2018; Hackmann, 
Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004), but perhaps not as consistently or acutely, particularly 
when they are reported by people without a diagnosis of PTSD (Kleim, Graham, Bryant, & 
Ehlers, 2013). Because of these qualitative differences, it has been suggested that these 
memories might be most usefully plotted on a continuum, with IAMs at one extreme, 
flashbacks at the other, and IMs in the middle (Kvavilashvili, 2014; see Figure 1.1).   
    
Retrieval Spontaneous  Spontaneous Spontaneous 
Repetition Low to none High to very high High to very high 
Valence Positive, negative, neutral Negative, positive Negative 
Vividness Low to very high Very high Very high 
Avoidance None High  High 
Disruption None or minimal Significant Significant to extreme 
Distress None to moderate Moderate to high High to very high 
Re-experiencing 
event now 
No No Yes 
Population Normal and clinical Normal and clinical PTSD only 
Figure 1-1: Schematic representation of different types of involuntary memories presented on 





Evidence has shown that involuntary remembering in general is a more vivid 
experience that its voluntary counterpart, and this appears to be particularly the case with 
repetitive, distressing IMs. Indeed, IMs are thought to be primarily image-based, especially in 
clinical samples (Ehlers et al., 2002), which fits with theories about the neurological basis for 
such memorises as relying on amygdala rather than hippocampal activation (Brewin, 2001). 
However, in some cases intrusive images can refer to a broader temporal category of 
cognition oriented toward the present or the future, whilst remaining related to the traumatic 
event on which the intrusion is based. In these cases, the mental imagery is driven more by 
the individual’s appraisal of the memory content (e.g. a patient with PTSD following an 
accident experiencing intrusive images of himself in a wheelchair as a manifestation of 
feelings of helplessness; Ehlers et al., 2002).   
In addition, with regard to different forms of psychopathology and depression in 
particular, IMs may overlap with other intrusive cognitive processes such as rumination 
(Watkins & Roberts, 2020). For example, Pearson, Brewin, Rhodes, and McCarron (2008) 
asked 22 depressed participants to report on the frequency and content of their ruminative 
thoughts. They found that 21 of these participants reported ruminating every day, across 56 
different reported topics, the majority of which (n=21) were about the past. By its nature 
rumination is a repetitive pattern of thought, therefore, rumination about the past might be 
considered a process akin or identical to the experience of IMs. Indeed it has already been 
pointed out that these processes are closely related, and that rumination as a cognitive style 
can be predictive of the experience of IMs, as well as other symptoms of PTSD (Newby & 
Moulds, 2012; Steil & Ehlers, 2000; Wild et al., 2020).  
But is the susceptibility to involuntary cognition a critical feature of poor mental 
health in general? This question is important for research into involuntary cognition and 
psychopathology, and resonates with findings from the literature on mind-wandering. Mind 
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wandering has been defined as a shift of attention from the here-and-now to internal thought 
processes, which might include current concerns or personal goals (Klinger, 2009; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), but also autobiographical memories and thoughts about the 
future (Plimpton, Patel, & Kvavilashvili, 2015). It has been found that people in low or 
dysphoric mood show an increased propensity for mind-wandering (e.g. Smallwood, 
O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007) and, in particular, mind wandering about the past 
(Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). However, when the frequency and nature of IAMs was 
studied in dysphoric (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011) and depressed (Watson, Berntsen, 
Kuyken, & Watkins, 2012) participants using a laboratory and a diary method, respectively, 
this relationship was not found, i.e., dysphoric and depressed participants did not report more 
frequent IAMs than control participants. Such discrepancies in findings can be explained 
either by differences in the types of phenomena studied (i.e., mind wandering vs. IAMs) or 
by different methods used across these different fields of research. There is, however, 
increased realisation that various manifestations of involuntary processes, studied across 
diverse fields of enquiry, have many overlapping features (Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019; 
Kvavilashvili et al., 2020), which may lend support to a broader approach to investigating 
involuntary cognitions more generally (Krans et al., 2015).  
To date, the majority of IM research has been conducted either via retrospective 
reports or laboratory-based analogue methods. Retrospective reports have consisted primarily 
of questionnaires or interviews, and been used in studies of naturally occurring IMs in both 
clinical and non-clinical populations. The primary focus of these studies has been on the 
content of IMs, their frequency and characteristics (e.g. vividness, disruptiveness), as well as 
predictive factors for the development of PTSD and depression (see Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, 
& Burgess, 2010). By contrast, analogue studies have relied on the so-called trauma-film 
paradigm, whereby participants are asked to watch a brief film that includes distressing 
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content, and then record any instance of film-based images (i.e., IMs of the film content) 
spontaneously coming to mind over the subsequent days (Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James, 
Lau-Zhu, Clark, et al., 2016). Many of these analogue studies have sought to explore how 
certain tasks (often visuo-spatial or language based) administered at different points before, 
during or after the film might disrupt the encoding of distressing content, and result in a 
reduced number of IMs reported in the days following the laboratory session (James, Lau-
Zhu, Clark, et al., 2016). Each approach has its particular strengths and limitations in terms of 
what has been revealed about the nature and frequency of IMs.  
1.2.1 Questionnaires and Interviews  
The majority of the available evidence for the content, frequency and phenomenology 
of IMs (including their triggers) is based on retrospective reports. Many studies on naturally 
occurring IMs have recruited participants with depression or PTSD and asked them to report 
the frequency and experience of their intrusions during the course of a semi-structured 
interview or via a questionnaire (see Brewin et al., 2010). This method has also been 
frequently used to study IMs in non-clinical populations. Due to the transient and 
idiosyncratic nature of IMs it is understandable that an interview or questionnaire method 
would be used, particularly in a clinical context, given the additional burden that it can place 
on participants (Schneider & Stone, 2016). However, the potential for inaccuracies and errors 
regarding the frequency and experience of intrusions in such retrospective reports is clear 
(and a limitation that is often acknowledged by researchers). 
For example, in other research domains such as smoking cessation and relapse, there 
is evidence that retrospective reports can diverge sharply from real-time, ecological 
momentary assessments (EMA; Shiffman, Hufford, Hickcox, Paty, & et al, 1997; Shiffman, 
Stone, & Hufford, 2008). It has been suggested that these reporting errors might be based on 
particular cognitive biases, whereby participants report the most extreme symptoms 
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experienced in a given time period (Schuler et al., 2019). Similarly, direct comparisons of 
retrospective and diary reports of patient pain suggest that the former tend to be higher on 
average than the latter (Stone et al., 2003). In addition, higher pain level variability (as 
evidenced by diary reports), resulted in higher pain level reports via retrospective report 
(relative to participants reporting low variability in the diary; Stone, Schwartz, Broderick, & 
Shiffman, 2005).  
Despite these potential biases, retrospective reports have nevertheless offered useful 
insights into the content of IMs. For example, retrospective studies have shown that there 
may be some qualitative differences in the IM content as a function of diagnostic group or 
symptom presentation. For example, Birrer, Michael, and Munsch (2007) compared three 
groups of participants: those with PTSD, with depression and experience of a traumatic 
event, and those with depression and without the experience of a traumatic event. Given that 
it forms part of the Criterion A for a PTSD diagnosis, it is perhaps unsurprising that PTSD 
participants most often reported that their IM was based on a traumatic event. By contrast, 
depressed participants without trauma reported their IMs as primarily based on critical life 
events (as assessed on the Post-Traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS); e.g. chronic insomnia, 
birth of a first child, loss of a job etc). Depressed patients with trauma reported just over half 
of their IMs as based on a traumatic event, with the remainder based on critical life events. 
This demonstrates the range of events upon which IMs can be based even when an individual 
has experienced a traumatic event that meets Criterion A (though this is perhaps particularly 
the case with depressed as opposed to PTSD patients).  
Researchers have tended to code IM content into categories, to examine different 
reporting patterns within populations. In a sample of participants with depression, Patel et al. 
(2007) found that 28 IMs reported by 17 participants could be classed into 4 categories, with 
the majority (46%) relating to death, illness or injury of a family member or loved one, 
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followed closely by assault (or threat of assault) against the patient (24%). Threat of 
illness/injury to the patient, and interpersonal problems each accounted for 14% of the IMs 
reported. In a study with depressed and non depressed cancer patients, Brewin, Watson, 
McCarthy, Hyman, and Dayson (1998) found that 24 of 41 participants reported IMs (59%) 
that fell into the category of illness, injury or death to a relative or friend, whilst nearly half 
of these (46%) related to cancer. When memories regarding the self were taken into account, 
76% of all reported IMs related to illness, injury or death, with 44% of these relating 
specifically to cancer. 
Researchers have often distinguished the number of IMs reported by participants in 
general (often at a screening stage) and the specific frequency with which they experience 
these on a day to day basis (e.g., in the past week). Evidence in relation to this distinction 
suggests that the number of reported IMs (as distinct from their day to day frequency) does 
not necessarily differ according to the clinical diagnosis. For example, Birrer et al. (2007) 
found no group differences in the number of reported IMs among participants with a PTSD 
diagnosis, a depression diagnosis with a traumatic experience, and a depression diagnosis 
without a traumatic experience.  Evidence regarding the specific frequency of IMs, however, 
can vary. Patel et al. (2007) found that, of 39 patients with depression, 17 (44%) reported 
having experienced at least one particular intrusive memory in the previous week. The 
majority of these (11) reported experiencing their IMs once/twice or several times a week, 
with a significant minority (3) reporting that they experienced the memory every day.  
It is clear that IMs have a particular phenomenology that is distinct from other types 
of memory. They are rated as more vivid than standard IAMs, associated more strongly with 
negative emotions (e.g. anger and sadness) and are given relatively high ratings of re-
experiencing (Patel et al., 2007). Although there are often high rates of comorbidity between 
depression and PTSD, questions remain about the degree to which the phenomenology of 
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IMs may differ in each. A recent meta-analytic review by Mihailova and Jobson (2018) found 
that depression correlated with distress associated with IMs, as well as avoidance, 
rumination, and maladaptive appraisals, but also found an insufficient number of studies to 
conduct meta-analytic comparison with PTSD along these variables.   
Examination of individual studies suggests some convergence in ratings for these 
variable among different diagnostic categories, but not consistently. Birrer et al. (2007) found 
no group differences in IM-related distress reports between participants with PTSD, those 
with depression and experience of trauma, and those with depression alone. Similarly, 
Reynolds and Brewin (1999) found no group differences in distress reports when comparing 
participants with PTSD to those with depression, though Parry and Kearney (2014) found 
that participants with PTSD reported higher distress than depressed participants. In addition, 
the two studies that compared PTSD and depressed samples based on vividness scores found 
no group differences (Birrer et al., 2007; Parry & Kearney, 2014), as was the case with the 
two studies that compared groups based on avoidance scores (Parry & Kearney, 2014; M 
Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Birrer et al (2007), however, found that participants with PTSD 
reported higher ratings of ‘here-and-now’ quality for their IMs compared to depressed 
participants with and without trauma. 
There have been inconsistent findings with regard to the relationship between 
measures of psychopathology and the number and frequency of IMs. For example, Birrer et 
al. (2007) reported that there was no correlation between Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
and Diagnostic Inventory for Depression (DID) scores, and the frequency with which 
participants reported experiencing IMs. A study that involved interviewing depressed patients 
and asked them to complete a number of scales did not find any correlation between the 
number of IMs reported and score on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAD). 
They did, however, find that among participants who reported an experience of childhood 
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abuse or assault, greater depression scores did correlate with a higher number of IMs 
reported. In addition, length of depressive episode was related to a greater number of IMs 
reported (Brewin, Hunter, Carroll, & Tata, 2009).  The above-mentioned meta-analysis by 
Mihailova and Jobson (2018) found a positive, significant correlation between depression and 
IM frequency. They also found that people with PTSD reported higher frequency of IMs than 
people with depression alone (Mihailova & Jobson, 2018).   
 The retrospective data on triggers has also resulted in some contradictory findings. 
For example, in a questionnaire study by Birrer et al. (2007), the most frequently reported 
trigger was participants’ own thoughts. By contrast, Elhers et al. (2002) reviewed a number 
of studies and, in line with their ‘warning signal hypothesis’, concluded that the content of 
IMs was often related to triggers that shared key perceptual features with the stimuli at the 
time of greatest emotional impact of the traumatic event (e.g. oncoming headlights in the case 
of an automobile accident). In other words, triggers for the IMs were reported to align closely 
with these features (e.g. bright sunlight on the lawn as a reminder of headlights). This 
warning signal hypothesis has since received some further empirical support. After 
administering an interview about the content of participants’ IMs, Hackmann, Ehlers, 
Speckens, and Clark (2004) coded that content into one of seven categories: 1) stimuli 
present before the traumatic event; 2) stimuli present after the event; 3) the moment before 
the event when everything seemed fine; 4) the moment when the meaning of the event 
improved; 5) participants’ wish that they had acted differently during the event; 6) intrusions 
from a previous traumatic experience; and 7) response to a dissociative experience. They 
found that a majority of the events fell into the first two categories, and that 83% of reported 




1.2.2 Analogue Methods: The Trauma Film Paradigm 
 
Because of the difficulty of capturing and studying naturally occurring IMs, the 
trauma film paradigm has become one of the most widely used methodologies for studying 
IMs. It involves recruiting participants from the general population and asking them to view 
distressing film content, and during the following days recording the number of images from 
the film, that come to mind, in a diary (analogue IMs). Across the literature, the films vary in 
length and content, as have the number of days during which participants are asked to keep 
the diary. The primary aim of research using this paradigm has been to test which pre-peri-
and post-traumatic factors seem to predict subsequent occurrence of IMs (James, Lau-Zhu, 
Clark, et al., 2016; Marks et al., 2018).  
In line with this focus, much of this research has been studying the effects of different 
cognitive tasks completed before, during or after viewing the film, on the number of IMs in 
the subsequent days.  Brewin and Saunders (2001) were first to report that completing a 
tapping sequence whilst viewing the scenes of a road traffic accident resulted in a reduction 
in film related IMs reported by participants in a diary during the following two weeks after 
viewing the film. The aim of introducing the task had been to approximate the experience of 
peri-traumatic dissociation, but in fact the results lent empirical support to the dual 
representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, 2001; 2003; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; 
Brewin et al., 2010). This finding has since been replicated, and interpreted to mean that 
completion of a visuospatial task (e.g. keystroke patterns or sequences, the computer game 
Tetris) during viewing of such images may interrupt the encoding of intrusive memories (e.g. 
Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; Stuart, Holmes, & Brewin, 2006).  
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It is argued that engaging in visuo-spatial processing whilst viewing the distressing 
content interrupts the encoding of the sensory detail, thereby reducing the number of IMs 
experienced. As a result, the memory content is better contextualised within autobiographical 
narrative, is verbally accessible, and much less likely to intrude upon consciousness in a 
repetitive and disruptive manner. While this effect has been demonstrated with concurrent 
visuo-spatial tasks, it has also been found with tasks completed after exposure to the 
distressing film content (Deeprose, Zhang, Dejong, Dalgleish, & Holmes, 2012). This has not 
been shown to be the case, however, with tasks completed before viewing the film (James, 
Lau-Zhu, Tickle, Horsch, & Holmes, 2016).  
Conversely, verbal tasks (e.g. counting aloud backwards) completed during the 
presentation of such images have increased the frequency of intrusive thoughts (e.g. Bourne, 
Frasquilho, Roth, & Holmes, 2010; Holmes et al., 2004), though not as consistently as the 
completion of visual-spatial tasks seems to interrupt them (e.g. Deeprose et al., 2012; Krans, 
Becker, & Holmes, 2009). It has been argued that engagement in such a task interrupts the 
contextual encoding that normally integrates memories within a larger autobiographical 
narrative. What is left is sensory content that is devoid of the narrative context and verbal 
accessibility. This results in an increase in subsequent film-related IMs, which in this respect 
approximates naturally occurring IMs (Holmes et al., 2004).  
These findings have offered useful insight into the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
IMs. It has been noted that perhaps the interruption of IM encoding is due more to the 
cognitive load imposed by the task, rather than the particular modality (verbal or visuo-
spatial) (Kvavilashvili, 2014). Indeed, there is some evidence that Eye Movement 
Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) – a widely employed therapeutic technique for 
treating PTSD (Shapiro, 2001) – may be effective due to its taxing of working memory 
capacity (Gunter & Bodner, 2008; Van den Hout et al., 2011). This conclusion is echoed in 
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results that are inconsistent or contrary to prediction (according to the dual representation 
theory) for verbal tasks performed during or after viewing distressing content (Brewin, 2014; 
Kvavilashvili, 2014; Pearson & Sawyer, 2011). There is also evidence from clinical research 
that asking PTSD patients to hold their traumatic memory in mind whilst counting out loud 
resulted in reduced reports of fear, shame and anxiety associated with that memory (Isaacs, 
2004).  
In addition, a criticism levelled against this method related to its ecological validity, 
and the comparability of film-related to naturally occurring IMs (Marks et al., 2018). That 
said, the primary focus of researchers using this method has not been to make inferences 
about the phenomenology of naturally occurring IMs. Rather, as noted, it has been used to 
explore the cognitive mechanisms which would seem to either supress or increase IMs 
following exposure to distressing images.  Given these research objectives, the diary that has 
been given to participants after they viewed the aversive content (either film or static images) 
is aimed primarily at detecting frequency, and sometimes one or two other variables (e.g. 
distress, vividness; Ball & Brewin, 2012; Segovia, Strange, & Takarangi, 2016).  
As a result, most trauma analogue studies reveal very little about the phenomenology 
of these analogue IMs, or information about ongoing tasks (e.g. what activities participants 
are engaged in at the time the IM comes to mind). This, along with reported triggers for film 
related IMs, would seem to be an important variable in terms of assessing how these 
analogue IMs compare to naturally occurring IMs and even IAMs. The latter, for example, 
have been found to occur most often when participants are engaged in an undemanding task 
that requires few executive resources (e.g. washing the dishes, walking to the bus stop; 
Schlagman, Kvavilashvili, & Schulz, 2007). Whilst a minority of these diaries have asked 
participants to record distress associated with the IM, and perhaps vividness, the attention 
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given to analysing these other variables has been minimal overall, and arguably represents a 
key oversight in this research area (Marks et al., 2018).   
1.2.3 Diary Studies of Naturally Occurring IMs 
 
Finally, there have been a small number of diary studies of naturally occurring IMs in 
both clinical and non-clinical populations (Berntsen, 2001; Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Kleim et 
al., 2013; Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011; Williams & 
Moulds, 2007). This has represented a convergence of ecologically valid sampling and diary 
methodology, in that people have been recruited on the basis that they experience (naturally 
occurring) IMs rather than analogue, and asked to record their IMs in a manner that increases 
the likelihood of it accurately reflecting the frequency and experience of such memories. 
These studies have yielded intriguing findings on the nature and frequency of IMs in the daily 
lives of both clinical and non-clinical populations, and represent a method that is gaining 
increasing traction due to the potential for cognitive bias in retrospective reports (Schuler et 
al., 2019). 
Williams and Moulds (2007) employed a mixture of laboratory-based interview and 
follow up diary to examine basic content and characteristics of IMs in dysphoria, as well as 
determine if factors which appear to contribute to the maintenance of intrusions in PTSD are 
also present in depression. They recruited 250 undergraduate students who underwent an 
interview regarding an IM they had experienced in the previous week. The mean frequency 
of IMs (negative, positive and neutral) per week reported at screening was 3.49 (SD=6.41). 
Of the 147 participants who reported a negative IM over the previous week, 60% could 
identify a trigger. Of the original sample, 62 returned a diary they had kept for one week (a 
modified version of the IM interview) which they had been asked to complete each time 
when the IM reported at the screening phase came to mind. Of the participants only reporting 
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negative IMs (n=40), the mean frequency over the course of the week was 5.92 (SD=9.56). 
This did not, however, correlate with levels of distress or dysphoria.  
Much of the subsequent diary research on IMs conducted by cognitive psychologists 
has been for purposes of testing new and existing theories of the functioning of IMs in PTSD 
(and more broadly). For example, Rubin et al. (2008; Study 2) had 89 undergraduate students 
(divided into high and low PTSD symptomology groups based on PTSD Check List2 scores) 
complete a 7-day diary of involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories. To alleviate 
the burden on participants, they were instructed to record a maximum of 4 involuntary 
memories per day. They were not specifically instructed to record IMs but were asked if any 
of the reported involuntary memories aligned with highly distressing or traumatic memories 
reported earlier via the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (e.g. were they about the 
reported traumatic event, related to the event, or unrelated to it). Overall, 3% of involuntary 
memories were about one of participants’ reported negative events, and 14% were about or 
related to those events. There were, however, group differences, with participants in the 
higher scoring PTSD Check List group reporting more involuntary (and voluntary) trauma 
memories than the lower scoring group. Whilst interesting, these results give an incomplete 
picture of the frequency of IMs in a non-clinical sample, albeit with differing levels of PTSD 
symptomology. Indeed, in line with their focus on testing theory, the authors compared 
involuntarily and voluntarily retrieved memories for highly distressing or traumatic events 
(isolating participants that recorded at least one of each in the diary) and argued that they did 
not differ along measures of mood change, rehearsal, negative valence, or intensity. The 
difference, they claimed, lies between memories of such events (whether voluntarily or 
 
2 The 17-item scale used to assess PTSD symptom severity. Responses to each question are on a scale of 1 to 5 
with greater responses indicating greater symptom severity (Weathers, Litz, Huska, & Keane, 1994). The total 
scores can range from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 85.   
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involuntarily retrieved) and memories of other life events, thereby lending support to a “basic 
mechanisms” theory (see below) and contradicting prevailing clinical theories.   
These results were largely replicated in a study by Rubin, Dennis and Beckham 
(2011; Study 2) in which 86 participant who had experienced a traumatic event (59 meeting 
the diagnostic threshold for PTSD and 27 control) were asked to record their involuntary 
autobiographical memoires (of any experience and/or emotional valence), as they occurred in 
daily life, with an electronic device for a period of 2 weeks. For each involuntary memory 
recorded, participants were asked to record a voluntary memory from around the same period 
of time. The diary format was an abbreviated version of the Autobiographical Memory 
Questionnaire (AMQ)3. Participants in the PTSD condition recorded an average of 35.72 
(SD=25) pairs of memories over the two weeks, whilst participants in the control condition 
recorded an average of 31.26 (SD=27.84). Across the sample, 37% of involuntary and 36% of 
voluntary memories related to IMs reported at screening. Again, they detected little 
difference in the phenomenology (e.g., emotional valence, intensity, mood change, rehearsal) 
of the voluntarily versus involuntarily retrieved memories for these events. The difference in 
these variables was between trauma related and trauma unrelated memories, not in the mode 
of retrieval for trauma related memories alone.  
To examine differences between IMs and non-trauma IAMs, Berntsen (2001; Study 
2) recruited 12 students who met diagnostic criteria for PTSD according to their responses on 
the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1995). They were given a paper diary and 
asked to record 50 involuntary memories (related to any experience or of any emotional 
valence) for an open-ended period, with no more than 2 entries per day. Recording was done 
in two parts, with initial keyword responses to a brief set of questions shortly after noticing 
 
3 A self-report measure designed to assess the phenomenological properties of an autobiographical memory. 
Item responses are made on a 7-point scale (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003).  
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the memory had come to mind, and later completion of a more comprehensive questionnaire. 
It was found that 22% of memories recorded in the diary related to the IM reported at 
screening. Of these, 5.2% related directly to the IM reported at screening, 1.8% were 
considered to be flashbacks (if given maximum ratings for vividness, high impact on mood 
and physical reactions) and 17.2% were coded as trauma-related (not clearly a memory for 
the same event but perhaps causally or thematically related). Trauma memories were rated 
more highly than non-trauma memoires along all the variables recorded in the diary (except 
for “distinctiveness”).  
A diary method has also been used to test the so called “reappearance hypothesis” (a 
term coined by Neisser, 1967/2014) that IMs represent the same memory content each time 
they come to mind. This is a position derived from more clinically oriented research (Ehlers, 
Hackmann, & Michael, 2004) though runs counter to reconstructive (cognitively oriented) 
accounts of autobiographical memory (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). To 
test this theory (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Study 3) examined data for 9 of the 12 students 
recruited for the diary study reported in Berntsen (2001). All trauma and trauma-related 
memories reported in the diary were then scored by two judges according to the degree to 
which the contents overlapped with the memory reported at screening. Berntsen and Rubin 
(2008) reported that the majority of trauma memories recorded in the diary were of different 
time slices and details to the originally reported memory, suggesting that IMs do not repeat in 
a fixed fashion, but are reconstructed in a manner reminiscent of non-traumatic 
autobiographical memories.  
A very small amount of research has been conducted with clinical samples, a notable 
exception being a study by Kleim et al. (2013). For their study, they recruited assault and 
motor vehicle accident victims who experienced at least one IM per week, some of whom 
met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD (n=20) as well as those that did not (n=24). Participants 
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were asked to record as many of their IMs as possible, but entries in the electronic diary were 
restricted to one per hour over the week of diary keeping. The study also incorporated an 
experience sampling element, in that 10 times over the course of the week, participants were 
also prompted by the electronic diary device to record their most frequent IM (voluntary 
retrieval). Participants recorded a total of 294 IMs (range 0-41). In 61% of cases participants 
indicated a trigger for their IM, and 48% of these triggers were identified as perceptual and 
sharing features with the content of the trauma memory (e.g. stimulus, person, situation; see 
Table 1). Whilst participants with PTSD reported marginally more IMs over the week, there 
were no differences in the frequency of triggers reported. There were reported differences in 
phenomenology, however, with PTSD participants reporting that they experienced their IMs 
as significantly more ‘intrusive’ and with a greater quality of ‘nowness.’ Further analysis 
showed this to be the case with both voluntary and involuntary trauma memoires in the PTSD 
group as compared to the non-PTSD group.  
 
Table 1-1: Percentage (frequency) of trigger reports as a function of diagnostic group and 
overall (from Kleim et al., 2013) 
Trigger Type Total Sample PTSD Non-PTSD 
Perceptual, similar situation, 
stimulus or person 
47.7 (38.7) 45.7 (35.2) 49.4 (42.0) 
Physiological 6.9 (19.6) 9.2 (24.5) 5.0 (14.4) 
Actual Trauma Scene 2.8 (11.8) 0.4 (2.0) 4.7 (15.7) 
Newspaper or TV reports 10.0 (20.2) 8.4 (14.2) 11.4 (24.4) 
Trauma-related conversations 7.4 (14.7) 8.3 (14.8) 7.0 (15.0) 
Trauma-related thoughts 4.1 (9.5) 2.4 (4.6) 5.6 (12.2) 
Study-related cues 12.1 (21.1) 12.2 (18.7) 9.7 (21.2) 
Others 8.9 (21.2) 10.6 (21.1) 7.4 (21.7) 
No triggers perceived 2 (4.5) 0 2 (8.3) 
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Other clinically oriented applications of the diary method have directly examined the 
relationship of data collected in this fashion to that collected retrospectively. Most have 
focused on broader PTSD symptoms (and comorbidities) rather than IM frequency per se, 
and used once-a-day reports for the diary (Campbell, Krenek, & Simpson, 2017; Naragon-
Gainey, Simpson, Moore, Varra, & Kaysen, 2012; Westermeyer et al., 2015). More recently, 
Schuler et al. (2019) recruited 202 first responders from the World Trade Centre disaster to 
an Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) study, and asked them to report their PTSD 
symptoms three times per day for seven days on an electronic device. Participants were 
prompted to do so at times designated as most suitable by each participant. Symptoms were 
reported via a modified version of the PCL-5 (reduced to eight items from the standard 20), 
which participants also completed at the end of the seven days of diary-keeping. Schuler et 
al., (2019) found that the retrospective reports aligned most closely with the day on which 
symptoms were the worst.  
With regard to frequency, evidence shows that diary reports are higher when 
compared (within subjects) to retrospective reports. Priebe et al. (2013) focused on 
comparing IM frequency as reflected in electronic diary reports (which participants were 
prompted to complete every two hours between 8 am and 8 pm for one week) to retrospective 
reports for the same period. They found that participants reported significantly more IMs via 
the diary (75) than retrospectively (50). Evidence also suggests, however, that recording 
intervals can impact frequency reports. Using a within-subjects design Kleindienst et al. 
(2017) recruited 66 participants experiencing IMs related to interpersonal violence and asked 
them to engage in two different methods of diary keeping using a smartphone. For three days 
they were asked to report each instance when their IM came to mind (Event Based Sampling 
– EBS) and for seven days they estimated the frequency of their IMs over the previous two 
hours, but were only asked to do so once during the day (Time Based Sampling – TBS). 
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These methods were counterbalanced. Results showed significantly higher frequency of 
reports for the TBS than the EBS.  
Of the diary studies reviewed, Rubin et al. (2011), Williams and Moulds, (2007) and 
Kleindienst et al. (2017) placed no restrictions on the frequency of reporting (in at least one 
condition). Another notable study that sought to measure the frequency of IMs through EBS 
was a one-week diary study by Kvavilashvili, Sari, Fong, and Brewin (in preparation). 
Participants nominated up to 3 IMs at screening, and over the following week were asked to 
make an entry in a paper diary each time one of their nominated memories came to mind. If 
they did not have time to make a full entry, participants were told they could record their IM 
by ticking in a grid printed in the inner front page of the diary. The mean number of 
combined memories and ticks was 23.00 (SD=24.25).  
The study conducted by Kvavilashvili et al. was unique in its focus on the context in 
which IMs came to mind, and the triggers for the same. Results showed that 70% of IMs 
were reported when participants were engaged in monotonous, ‘automatic’ tasks that required 
few cognitive resources. In addition, 46% of diary entries included reports of an external 
trigger, 22% internal thoughts as a trigger, and for 32% of entries participants were unable to 
report a trigger. These findings offer unique insight in the frequency and phenomenology of 
IMs in daily life and merit replication using similar methods. In order to best achieve this, it 
is important to review the particular way that a diary – along with key laboratory-based 
innovations – have been used in the study of IAMs, and how these have contributed to our 
understanding of the frequency, phenomenology, and triggers of this particular cognitive 
phenomenon.  
1.3 Overview of Involuntary Autobiographical Memory Research  
 
Before 1996, IAMs were a largely neglected area of research within cognitive 
psychology, despite their early identification as a key mode of remembering (Ebbinghaus, 
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1885/1964). Indeed, research was focused almost exclusively on voluntarily retrieved 
autobiographical memories which – due to the methodological challenges of studying IAMs 
– may have seemed a more realistic endeavour (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2011). Whilst a great 
deal of research on voluntarily retrieved autobiographical memories has been conducted in a 
laboratory environment (using a cue word method), the elusive nature of IAMs meant than 
initial (and ongoing) research in this area was well suited to a diary method (e.g. Berntsen, 
1996). When research on IAMs was brought into the lab, it was largely for purposes of 
examining cuing and retrieval times (e.g. Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). 
1.3.1 Diary method for studying IAMs 
 
As the name would suggest, IAM are memories from a personal past that are retrieved 
spontaneously. Because of this, research into IAMs has benefited greatly from the use of a 
structured diary, which allows participants to record their IAMs as they occur in day to day 
life, indicating ongoing activities, cues that triggered the memory and rating memories in 
terms of different phenomenological characteristics (e.g., vividness, emotional valence, etc.). 
This research has yielded interesting findings not only about the frequency of IAMs, but also 
the other important variables. However, although the diary method has the potential to offer 
greater insight into the frequency of IAMs, studies have not always been designed in a way to 
obtain this information. For example, some studies have placed limits on how frequently 
participants are asked to record their IAMs in the diary (similar to some above-mentioned 
diary studies of IMs), an approach which is argued to eliminate time pressure and task 
demands. Participants are therefore asked to record a fixed number of IAMs over an 
undefined period of time with a maximum of two entries per day (e.g. see Berntsen, 1996; 
Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Johannessen & Berntsen, 2010).  
Other studies have aimed to address this by asking that participants record their IAMs 
in the diary as soon as they occur, with no specified limit on number of entries over a 
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particular time period (Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; Schlagman, Kliegel, Schulz, & 
Kvavilashvili, 2009; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). In these studies, participants are 
usually instructed to make entries as soon as possible after noticing the memory coming to 
mind and if, by the time they can make a recoding, they have already forgotten some aspects 
of the experience, then they are given an option to acknowledge the occurrence of the 
memory by placing a tick in the inner front cover page of the diary. In one study, this method 
yielded a mean frequency of 10.05 IAMs (full entries) over 7 days (SD=5.46, range=1-25) 
and a mean of 7.16 tick entries (SD=10.91, range=0-44) (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). 
Another adaptation of a diary method asked participants to record the frequency of their 
IAMs and voluntary memoires over the course of a day with a mechanical counter, and then 
respond to a series of summary questions at the end of that day regarding triggers, ongoing 
activities and emotional impact. Results showed a mean IAM frequency of 22.13 (SD=16.74) 
per day (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2011). Whilst these different results may be a function of a 
method used, they could also be attributable to a shorter recording period (7 days vs. 1 day). 
For example, recent findings from a study by Laughland and Kvavilashvili (2018) suggest 
that the shorter periods of diary keeping may result in higher frequencies of IAM report.  
The diary method has also provided replicable results concerning other key aspects of 
IAMs. For example, in comparison to voluntarily retrieved memories, IAMs tend to be more 
vivid, refer to more specific (time limited) events (Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004) 
and tend to have greater impact on mood (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). It has also been 
reliably found that IAMs are more likely to occur when people are in diffuse states of 
attention (i.e. engaged in cognitively undemanding tasks or no task in particular; Berntsen, 
1998; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008;  Johannessen & Berntsen, 2010; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 
2004; Schlagman, Kvavilashvili, & Schulz, 2007).  
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In addition, numerous diary studies have shown that that a high proportion IAMs have 
identifiable triggers (Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). The majority of these are identified as 
environmental (37% to 56%), though a sizable minority are triggered by internal thought 
processes (24% to 26%), or a mixture of the two. The proportion of reported IAMs for which 
there is no identifiable trigger varies considerably (7% to 28%), and may be an artefact of 
method, and with older adults a function of age (Berntsen, 1996, 2001, 2007; Berntsen & 
Hall, 2004; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; Schlagman, Kvavilashvili & Schultz, 2007).  
Mace (2004) built upon the internal/external classification to test the then-common 
Proustian view that IAMs were primarily triggered by sensory/perceptual cues. For this 
study, 20 participants were asked to keep a diary of their IAMs for 14 days. They reported at 
total of 811 IAMs, but 10% of these had no identifiable cue, and were removed from further 
analysis. Of the remaining IAMs, participants identified 37% of cues as internal, 49% as 
external and 14% as mixed (though the latter two were combined for purposes of analysis - 
following Berntsen (1998) – resulting in a significant difference with the proportion of 
internal cues). However, participants were also asked to indicate whether the identified 
trigger for their IAM was abstract and language based (a category which would by definition 
also include internal thoughts), sensory perceptual (taste, smells, sounds, images etc), or was 
an emotional or physiological state (e.g. feeling hungry or sad). Of all internal cues, 95% 
were abstract (thought based) and only 5% an emotional or physiological state. Of the 
external/mixed cues, 51% were abstract and language based, whilst 49% were 
sensory/perceptual. Therefore, across all reported cues, 68% were abstract, 30% were 
sensory/perceptual, and only 2% were state. In Mace's (2004) assessment, these results 
showed that “direct retrieval of recollective information is more likely to occur with cues that 
are more cognitively elaborate” (p. 898). 
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Another study that examined the frequency of these cue classifications in a sample of 
younger and older adults found that they occurred in relatively equal proportions. Schlagman 
et al. (2007) recruited 11 younger (between 20 and 28 years of age) and 10 older (between 64 
and 80 years of age) adults and asked them to keep a diary of their IAMs for seven days. 
Among other variables, participants were asked to report if they could identify a trigger for 
their memory, and if so whether it was internal or external (they were also asked to describe 
the trigger in their own words). In contrast to Mace (2004), two researchers coded all 
reported triggers as abstract/verbal, sensory/perceptual, state or undecided (for those that 
could not be categorised). They found that across the entire sample, 47% of reported triggers 
were abstract and 44% were sensory/perceptual (with state and undecided cues representing 
only 4 and 5% respectively). There were no differences as a function of age, though 
differences between proportions reported in this study and Mace (2004) could be a function 
of researcher coding versus participant coding. There could also be differences as a function 
of the population accessed (Mace, Bernas, & Clevinger, 2014).  
Whilst important contributions to the study of IAMs, some key limitations of the 
diary method prompted some researchers to develop laboratory techniques to study them 
under controlled conditions. This has resulted in ecologically valid methods that offer greater 
insight into the nature of cuing in IAMs, mood congruency effects, and retrieval times in 
particular.  
1.3.2 Laboratory-based research on IAMs 
 
A key laboratory technique for the study of IAMs was developed by Schlagman and 
Kvavilashvili (2008).4 Drawing from the literature on mind-wandering and task-unrelated 
 
4 The vigilance task developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) has become widely used in laboratory-
based IAM research.  It was preceded by methods developed by Mace (2006) and  Ball (2007) who employed 
the concepts of memory-chaining and “semantic memory chaining”, respectively, in their development of tasks 
to elicit IAMs in the lab.  
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thoughts (TUT) (e.g. Giambra, 1989, 1995) they developed a monotonous, computer-based 
vigilance task to engage participants for an extended period of time in an undemanding task 
requiring minimal cognitive resources.  Participants were required to detect infrequent target 
slides (featuring arrangements of vertical lines) from a continuous stream of hundreds of non-
target slides (with arrangements of horizontal lines). Slides were presented for 1500 
millisecond each, with no interstimulus interval between consecutive slides. In addition, this 
method simultaneously exposed participants to a steady stream of verbal cues, which were 
balanced for positive, negative and neutral valence, and appeared in the centre of each slide 
(e.g. ‘friendly boss,’ ‘missed opportunity,’ or ‘crossing the road’). Participants were told that 
they could ignore the cue phrases and just concentrate on the lines, and that a different condition 
was being asked to read the phrases. Whilst the phrases are peripheral to successful completion 
of the vigilance task, the minimal cognitive resources required by the task means that 
participants almost inevitably read the cues. These cues have been shown to reliably trigger 
IAMs, and participants were asked to interrupt the task to report these if they arose during the 
vigilance task (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
The first published paper, based on this laboratory method, yielded several novel 
findings. Firstly, retrieval times for IAMs were found to be much faster than for voluntary 
memories. This comparison was made possible by calculating the number of slides that had 
appeared from the occurrence of trigger (cue phrase), reported by participants for their IAMs, 
to the point where the participant stopped the presentation to report the memory. In addition, it 
was discovered that significantly more IAMs were triggered by negative as opposed to positive 
or neutral cue words. That being said, there was overall congruence between the emotional 
valence of cue phrases reported as triggers, and participants’ own rating of the valence of their 
memory (e.g. negative cues triggered negative memories and positive cues triggered positive 
memories), although this did not differ according to retrieval methods (voluntary versus 
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involuntary). The study also replicated important findings from diary research into IAMs, 
particularly that they tend to be more specific than voluntarily retrieved memories (Schlagman 
& Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
This method has since been adapted in a number of ways that has facilitated further 
exploration of the properties of IAMs. For example, a subsequent adaptation - to remove 
demand characteristics - incorporated a probe-caught (as opposed to self-caught) method, 
whereby participants were stopped at fixed points during the vigilance task and asked to report 
the contents of their minds. Whilst this resulted in reports across the temporal spectrum, the 
majority were autobiographical memories (Plimpton et al., 2015). A similar study manipulated 
the instructions given to participants and the method of thought collection, such that half 
received an explanation of IAMs and half did not, and half were told to stop the presentation 
when an IAM came to mind, and half were advised that the presentation would stop them and 
they should record their thoughts in that moment (4 experimental conditions). Results indicated 
a main effect of instruction type and method of thought collection, but no interaction between 
the two (Vannucci, Batool, Pelagatti, & Mazzoni, 2014).   
Two further adaptations of this vigilance task demonstrated the impact of abstract cuing 
on eliciting IAMs, as well the role of cognitive load. Mazzoni, Vannucci, and Batool (2014) 
had participants complete a shortened version of the same vigilance task, but exposed 
participants in one condition to a selection of “highly imaginable and concrete verbal cues” 
which were drawn from a pool of 800 used in previous version of the task. In the other 
condition, participants were exposed to matched colour photos for each of the cue phrases. 
Analysis of participants self-caught (and coded) thought probes showed that those in the verbal 
cue condition reported almost twice as many IAMs as participants in the pictorial cue 
condition. This finding was replicated with simple object words and matched photographs, 
demonstrating the overwhelming impact of abstract verbal cues on IAM triggering. It has been 
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suggested that this level of abstraction increases the likelihood of perceived overlap between 
the phrase and the memory content, which is difficult to achieve in the case of a photographic 
image, some details of which will inevitably be different to the memory (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000).  
In terms of the effects of cognitive load, whilst verbal cues are particularly effective at 
eliciting IAMs, there is a point at which it seems possible for verbal information to overwhelm 
the retrieval system. Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski, Mazzoni, and Paccani (2014) 
compared three conditions – 450 trials with 90 cue phrases, 300 cue phrases and 210 
mathematical formulas along with 90 cue phrases – and found that fewer cue phrases (and no 
mathematical formulas) in the presentation produced more self-caught IAMs. It has been 
argued that the additional verbal and numeric information places sufficient cognitive load such 
that the associative, bottom up process that results in a cue triggering an IAM, gets interrupted. 
Conversely, less cognitive load in the form of verbal or numeric information allows this process 
to complete and the contents of an IAM to enter consciousness (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000).  
1.3.3 Research into IAMs and Psychopathology 
 
 Whilst the exact relationship of IMs to IAMs remains a point of contention (see 
below), there is increasing acknowledgment of the role of autobiographical memory – 
including IAMs – in the onset and maintenance of certain psychopathologies (Watson & 
Berntsen, 2015). An early example of this, albeit in the realm of voluntary autobiographical 
memory, was the observed tendency of participants, who had recently attempted suicide, 
toward reporting overly general autobiographical memories (OGM) in response to cue words 
even when explicitly asked to retrieve specific memories of events that happened at a 
particular time and place (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). The OGMs lack temporal detail and 
can be characterised either as extended, i.e., referring to an event occurring over a period 
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longer than one day (e.g. “when I was in sixth form”) or categoric, i.e., referring to a repeated 
event without a person being able to recall a particular episode (e.g. “the auditions when I 
wasn’t called back”) (Williams & Dritschel, 1992). A large body of replicable results 
suggests that people with depression, low mood, a history of trauma and/or PTSD have a 
tendency to recall more OGMs, especially in response to positive cue-words, although 
specificity is also impaired in the retrieval of negative memories relative to controls (Ono, 
Devilly, & Shum, 2016; Williams et al., 2007; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & 
Dritschel, 1988; Williams & Scott, 1988). Moreover, results of some studies suggest that 
OGM may be reflective of a broader inability of depressed or dysphoric people in particular 
to engage in goal-directed retrieval of different types of autobiographical memory (e.g. 
specific, categorical; Dritschel, Beltsos, & McClintock, 2014; Hitchcock et al., 2019).  
And whilst involuntary memory in psychopathology was long assumed to manifest 
primarily as IMs, evidence shows this to not necessarily be the case. In a diary study of 
involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories in depressed and never-depressed 
participants, Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, and Watkins, (2012), found that even for the 
depressed participants 50% of their memories were positive and 14% neutral, highlighting for 
the researchers that a high proportions of memories recorded were not IMs. Separate analysis 
of the same data by Watson et al. (2013) found that depressed patients took significantly 
longer to record the requested number 10 instances of each type of memory. In terms of 
specificity however, no group differences were found, with both depressed and never 
depressed reporting more specific involuntary than voluntary memories. Similarly, in a 
laboratory study with dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants, Kvavilashvili and 
Schlagman (2011) found no group differences in IAM frequency or retrieval time, or the 
vividness, specificity or rehearsal of reported IAMs. Group differences did emerge with 
regard to participants own assessment of the emotional valence of their memories, with 
 46 
dysphoric participants reporting more negative memories than non-dysphoric. In addition, the 
dysphoric group reported more memoires triggered by internal thoughts compared to non-
dysphoric controls.  
 The particular way in which non-intrusive IAMs manifest in PTSD compared to 
depression alone, may differ. Schönfeld and Ehlers (2017) recruited participants who had 
experienced a Stressor Criterion A traumatic event. In their final sample, 26 participants had 
PTSD and 26 participants did not. All were asked to keep a diary of their IAMs for one week 
with no limitations placed on recording frequency. The PTSD group reported many fewer 
IAMs in the diary than the non-PTSD group, as well as significantly fewer non-trauma 
memories and more trauma memories. In the PTSD condition, there were also fewer specific 
and more general memories reported, suggesting that some of the over generality observed in 
voluntary autobiographical memories extends to IAMs as well (Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2017).  
 
1.4 Theoretical accounts of IMs and IAMs  
 
Debate has arisen about how best to account for our experience of IMs, particularly 
within the context of PTSD, though these theoretical accounts have implications for how we 
account for IMs in non-clinical populations as well. Controversy has hinged on whether we 
can account for IMs with the existing (and standard) models of autobiographical memory 
system (and IMs are a predictable, if enhanced, output of that system) or whether IMs can 
only be explained by the existence of a separate system, with a particular breakdown within 
that system resulting in repetitive, disruptive and often distressing memories.   
In relation to IMs, it has been suggested that the re-experiencing and arousal 
following a traumatic event may represent an adaptive response. For example, soldiers who 
develop PTSD following combat experience may arguably rely on the hypervigilance 
associated with their IMs for continued survival, and this only becomes maladaptive when 
they return to civilian life (Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Carlson, & Twentyman, 1988). A 
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similar line of thinking could be applied to IMs that occur outside of the context of a PTSD 
diagnosis.  There is considerable evidence that heightened emotion during an experience 
results in enhanced encoding and greater subsequent accessibility (McGaugh, 2013). Indeed 
emotional and physiological arousal during an analogue (virtual reality) trauma has been 
found to be predictive of the later frequency of IMs for that content (Malta et al., 2020). In 
line with this, clinical theories of traumatic memory posit that details of a traumatic event are 
only partially inaccessible to voluntary recall, whilst being highly accessible to involuntary 
recall (Brewin et al., 2010). Cognitive psychologists cite evidence to the contrary, arguing 
that there is parity in voluntary and involuntary access to the memory (Berntsen, 2012).  
1.4.1 Clinical theories of IMs 
 
As with empirical research on IMs, many earlier theories about the functioning of this 
type of memories were largely concerned with explaining the phenomenon in the context of 
clinical presentation, namely PTSD. One notable theory by Ehlers and Clark (2000) posits 
that IMs are a normal response to trauma, and will be experienced by many people following 
such an event. There are, however, those for whom the IMs will persist, and develop into 
PTSD. These people, they argue, are more likely to be engaged in negative, ruminative 
appraisal of the trauma and its aftermath (largely in the form of negative assessments of what 
the experience of the event and its fallout says about them – e.g. that they are weak, that they 
deserve punishment etc). In addition, the memory would have been poorly incorporated into 
the broader autobiographical memory narrative and would be resistant to integration because 
of the individuals’ efforts to avoid or suppress the memory (due to the abovementioned 
painful associations).  This type of associative memory and perceptual priming for reminders 
of the event, would account for the repeated, intrusive and distressing nature of these 
memories, and seemingly incidental nature of some reported trigger (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Foa & Rothbaum, 1998).  
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 Another clinical theory that accounts for the experience of IMs is the Dual 
Representation Theory of PTSD. The original version of the theory posited two memory 
systems – verbally accessible memory (VAM) and situationally accessible memory (SAM). 
Standard encoding processes would have events captured by both systems in parallel, and the 
representation would be linked in the memory system. The VAM system is available to 
voluntary (top down) recall, and the SAM supplies perceptual features to memories retrieved 
in this fashion (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996). More recently, these have been recast as 
s-reps (sensory representations) and c-reps (contextual representations) to account more 
broadly for intrusive images in a range of clinical presentations. With particular regard to 
IMs, the peri-traumatic dissociation that occurs during a traumatic event means that memory 
encoding via the c-rep system can be disrupted, and dislodged from the s-rep. This results in 
fragmentation to voluntary recall for the event that seems to be a characteristic of PTSD, as 
well as the repeated intrusion of sensory detail for the event via the s-rep system (Brewin et 
al., 2010).  
In this conception the s-rep almost behaves like a ‘free radical’, breaking into 
consciousness unexpectedly and disruptively until it can be relinked with the c-rep and better 
incorporated into the broader narrative memory (Brewin et al., 2010). Conceptually, these are 
arguably similar to the ‘free radicals’ that Tulving (1983) described with regard to semantic 
memory fragments recalled by amnesic patients that had become detached from their 
episodic context (e.g. a patient reporting certain words coming to mind for no apparent 
reason and not realising that these words were presented as part of an experimental task 
earlier). Tulving (1983) said there was no evidence of such memories in normally functioning 
memory, but Kvavilashvili and Mandler (2004) have suggested that some instances of mind 
pops may represent free radicals. The first author (L.K.) kept a diary of involuntary semantic 
memories over a period of four months, and reported instances of seemingly random words 
 49 
(e.g. ‘el diablo’) or names of places (e.g. ‘Acapulco’) would reach consciousness without any 
accompanying episodic detail for how this information had entered long term memory. 
Similarly, IMs have both pathological and healthy presentation. Tulving's (1983) conception, 
however, posits free radicals as unintegrated into both semantic and episodic systems, 
whereas the IM as free radical suggests a failed pairing of s-rep with c-rep, but not 
necessarily failed integration of the s-rep within the perceptual memory system.  
According to the updated dual representation theory, s-reps come to be the 
predominant drivers of the recollective process during a flashback.  In Figure 1.2, the boxes 
with bold green outlines represent the cognitive architecture of c-reps, and the bold green 
arrows represent the top-down, c-rep driven process in deliberate recall, which is managed by 
the prefrontal cortex. The dashed red lines represent the subordinate role of s-reps in the 
retrieval process. This is inverted in Figure 1.3, with the bold red lines representing the 
enhanced role of s-reps, relative to the now dashed lines for the structures which support c-
reps. In these circumstances, the prefrontal cortex is no longer managing the overall process 
and is therefore not represented. What is unclear according to this schema, is if this process 
maps on to that of IMs, as a potentially distinct process to flashbacks, and how the two might 
differ from standard IAMs.  
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Figure 1-2: Schematic representation of deliberate visual recall according to the updated 





Figure 1-3: Schematic representation of “involuntary flashback of a traumatic event” 
according to the updated dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) 
 
 
1.4.2 IM Theories Developed by Cognitive Psychologists 
  
The divergence between clinically and cognitively developed theories for PTSD in 
general (and the manifestation of IMs in particular) has sometimes been posited as arguments 
for ‘special mechanisms’ versus ‘basic mechanisms’ views on IMs.  That said, this 
characterisation itself is contentious (Brewin, 2014; Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008). As 
suggested by these labels, ‘special mechanisms’ implies that IMs occur because of a 
particular break down in the functioning of the autobiographical memory system during the 
coding of a highly distressing or traumatic event. An example of another ‘special mechanism’ 
account of memory has been the ‘now print!’ theory of flashbulb memories (FBMs), 
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proposed by (Brown & Kulik, 1977). This was a theoretical means of accounting for the 
apparently particular way in which highly emotive yet shared experiences (e.g. learning of 
the assassination of President Kennedy) were encoded, resulting in enhanced access to 
memory detail over time, particularly for the circumstances in which one found oneself at the 
time of learning the news. Empirical research on the consistency of FBMs over time has, 
however, resulted in the view, adopted by many cognitive psychologists, that they are a 
standard output of a normally functioning autobiographical memory system, and do not 
require special mechanism for their explanation (e.g., Hirst & Phelps, 2016; Talarico & 
Rubin, 2018). 
 Similarly, the basic mechanisms view posits that we can account for IMs within 
existing theories of autobiographical memory. Proponents of this view do not dispute the 
distressing nature of trauma memoires, only assert that they are an enhanced version of non-
trauma IAMs instead of a distinct phenomenon. This enhanced encoding during the original 
event and resultant IMs do not represent aberrant functioning of the autobiographical 
memory system, but rather a predictable output of that system (see Figure 1.4; Berntsen, 
2009).  
Key to the basic mechanisms view is a refutation of the clinical observation that 
trauma memories are subject to high levels of involuntary retrieval (IMs) but are relatively 
inaccessible to voluntary retrieval. To study this dissociation, Rubin et al. (2008) recruited 89 
American undergraduates who were grouped according to their low (under 25) or high (over 
40) scores on the PCL, and asked them to record their involuntary memories for one week on 
an electronic device. For each involuntary memory recorded they were asked to retrieve a 
voluntary memory as well. Results showed that participants who scored high on the PCL 
reported more trauma-related memoires than the low PCL group, but there was no difference 
in the frequency with which these were involuntary versus voluntary. In addition, IMs and 
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voluntary memories for trauma did not differ in their impact on mood or centrality to the life 
story as measured by the Centrality of Events Scale (CES; see also Berntsen & Rubin 
(2006)). With particular regard to the latter scale, they have argued that its correlation with 
measures of PTSD symptomology provide evidence against the notion that voluntary recall 
for a traumatic event is fragmentary and inaccessible to the individual. More recent 
experimental evidence using a trauma film paradigm, however, has showed that it is possible 
to reduce the frequency of film related IMs (using a post encoding visuo-spatial task) without 
impacting the voluntary recall for the same content. This has been interpreted as lending 
support to the so called special mechanisms (aka ‘separate trace) account over the basic 
mechanisms (aka ‘single trace account; see Lau-Zhu, Henson, & Holmes, 2019).  
There are several other core assertions of the basic mechanisms view with regard to 
IMs. One is that positively and negatively valanced (non-trauma) memories can share 
phenomenological characteristics with IMs in terms of vividness, sense of reliving and 
impact on mood (see Berntsen, 2001, 2009). Another is that IMs are not exact replicas of 
each other, but consist of different elements or time slices of the event, suggesting that IMs 
are subject to the same reconstructive processes as ordinary IAMs (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008). 
Finally, in contrast to the ‘warning signal hypothesis’ (Ehlers et al., 2002), it has been argued 
that central features of IMs align with what participants recall as the most emotionally intense 
parts of the event (and not features of the environment present just before the event; Berntsen 
















Figure 1-4: Schematic representation of the differences between clinically derived theories of 
IMs and cognitively derived theories (from Hall and Berntsen (2008)) 
 
Some have questioned the usefulness of the ‘special’ and ‘basic’ mechanisms 
distinction. Brewin (2014), in reviewing the evidence for the parallel existence and 
interaction of perceptual and episodic memory systems in the generation of IMs in both 
clinical and non-clinical samples, notes that “to invoke special mechanisms implies that we 
have a good scientific understanding of how memory behaves under normative conditions (p. 
90)”. Furthermore, he argues that the suggestion that special mechanisms theories are derived 
solely from a narrow focus on PTSD research does not bear out, and that evidence for such a 
system can be found across a number of different research streams.  
1.5 Writing for Therapeutic Benefit 
 
There is a considerable amount of evidence showing that writing about traumatic and 
distressing life events can be beneficial to both physical and mental health (see Baikie & 
Wilhelm, 2005; Frattaroli, 2006; Pennebaker, 1997). This effect was first demonstrated by 
Pennebaker and Beall (1986), who asked student participants to write about one or more 
traumatic life events for 15 minutes for four consecutive evenings. Participants were asked to 





















the control group was asked to write about a trivial topic assigned to them. Results showed 
that the conditions writing about their emotions related to the traumatic event(s) reported 
better overall health at a six month follow-up, and that the condition that wrote about 
emotions and facts made fewer health centre visits. Studies using this method have 
demonstrated similar improvement in measures of immune response (Petrie, Fontanilla, 
Thomas, Booth, & Pennebaker, 2004), blood pressure (McGuire, Greenberg, & Gevirtz, 
2005) and pain (Rosenberg et al., 2002), as well as depression (Gortner, Rude, & Pennebaker, 
2006; Koopman et al., 2005) and anxiety (Shen, Yang, Zhang, & Zhang, 2018).  It is 
important to note that these results have not always been replicable (e.g. Niles, Haltom, 
Mulvenna, Lieberman, & Stanton, 2014; Zachariae & O’Toole, 2015), providing a sometimes 
mixed evidentiary picture, to which subsequent meta analyses have added some clarity by 
showing a more robust effect across studies (e.g. Frattaroli, 2006). 
  Similarly, initial results on the benefits of expressive writing for people experiencing 
PTSD has been somewhat mixed, but the accumulation of evidence may be providing a 
clearer picture. Some studies have found no main effect of writing condition (experimental 
versus control) on PTSD symptoms (Sloan, Marx, & Greenberg, 2011), but at the same time 
did find improvement in depression scores (Koopman et al., 2005) as well as mood and post-
traumatic growth (Smyth, Hockemeyer, & Tulloch, 2008). Another study recruiting new 
mothers found that those assigned to the expressive writing condition showed significantly 
lower post-traumatic symptoms at 3 month follow-up relative to controls, suggesting that this 
method may be most effective in cases of sub-clinical presentation (Di Blasio et al., 2015). A 
more recent meta-analytic review, however, found small to medium effect sizes of expressive 
writing on post-traumatic stress symptoms of avoidance, intrusion and hyperarousal in non-
clinical populations, but medium effect sizes in clinical populations (Pavlacic, Buchanan, 
Maxwell, Hopke, & Schulenberg, 2019).  
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In terms of method, when administered in its standard format, the expressive writing 
task requires a certain amount of sustained attention (i.e. 15-20 minutes of writing, over 3-5 
sessions). There have been some manipulations of this structure, which have shown that 
writing for 15 minutes for three intervals, separated by only 10 minutes, can yield similar 
improvement to 15 minute writing intervals separated by 24 hours (Chung & Pennebaker, 
2008). Other studies have manipulated the number and duration of expressive writing 
sessions, either reducing (e.g. one, 30-minute writing session; Greenberg, Wortman, & Stone, 
1996) or increasing both (e.g. five, 45-minute writing session; Schoutrop, Lange, Hanewald, 
Duurland, & Bermond, 1997), with both adaptations showing measurable benefits for 
participants.  
With particular regard to Greenberg et al. (1996), other brief, one-off interactions with 
the content of distressing memory have been shown to produce similar therapeutic benefits. 
Some studies have found that even the administration of one-off questionnaires about 
negative events (e.g. the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire – AMQ) can reduce 
distress associated with that event (Boals et al., 2011; Rubin et al., 2010). Whilst not 
engaging people in an extended writing task, the AMQ does ask participants that they rate 
emotions associated with their memory on a scale. It remains unclear, however, with the 
AMQ as with expressive writing more broadly, what specific mechanisms produce this 
benefit. It has been posited that it may not be entirely one or the other, but is perhaps a 
combination of exposure/emotional processing (whereby the emotional impact of the 
memory is reduced through repeated and/or prolonged interaction with its content) or 
cognitive adaptation (reappraisal of how the event is though about, often reflected in changes 
to the language used to describe it; Sloan & Marx, 2004).  
Evidence suggests that even shorter interactions with the content of distressing 
memory can produce similar outcomes. Briefly recording other types of intrusive cognition as 
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they arise (e.g. hallucinations, ruminative thoughts, suicidal ideation) has been shown to 
reduce of frequency of these thoughts and sometimes the distress associated with them (e.g. 
Clum & Curtin, 1993; Frederiksen, 1975; Rutner & Bugle, 1969). It has yielded similar 
effects with regard to certain behaviours (e.g. smoking; McFall, 1970).  Referred to as self-
monitoring in a therapeutic context, this intervention nonetheless follows largely the same 
pattern as diary keeping in IAM (and to a lesser degree, IM) research. Using either electronic 
or paper formats, therapist will ask clients to monitor and record either target behaviours or 
thoughts between sessions, which then form the basis for discussion during those sessions.  
The data collected can offer the client important insight into the frequency with which they 
exhibit the target behaviours or cognitions, as well as the precipitating events, and impact on 
emotional state (Cohen, Edmunds, Brodman, Benjamin, & Kendall, 2013).  
The therapeutic benefit of using a diary to record IM has been underexplored 
generally. This method has been used along with cognitive behavioural interventions as a 
basis assessing new interventions for depression (e.g. Newby, Lang, Werner-Seidler, Holmes, 
& Moulds, 2014) but even then participants were instructed to record in the diary at least 
once per day regardless of whether they experienced an IM (Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 
2009). In addition, as has been the case with diaries used in analogue ‘trauma film’ studies, 
these diaries have not asked about vividness, triggers or concurrent activity. This departs 
from cognitively oriented diary methods, which aim to assess the frequency with which the 
memory occurs along with other characteristics of memories. That said, initial findings using 
such a method with a non-clinical sample have shown a significant improvement in mood 
scores over time.  (Kvavilashvili, Sari, Fong, & Brewin, in preparation).  
These findings broadly align with the evidence-based therapies used to treat clinical 
manifestations of IMs. Particularly trauma focused Cognitive Behavioural Therapy focuses 
on incorporating the memory for the traumatic event into the broader ‘memory system’ to 
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reduce the incidence of intrusive memories for the event coming back in a disruptive and 
unbidden pattern. This is achieved through repeated ‘exposure’ to the memory content 
through relating it the therapist, and addressing some of the cognitive appraisals of the 
memory that are thought to contribute to PTSD symptom maintenance (Foa & Rothbaum, 
1998). Other therapeutic interventions, such as Eye Movement Desensitisation and 
Reprocessing (EMDR) also rely on people consciously bringing their IM to mind, but seem 
to function based on visuo-spatial suppression of the IM, in a matter similar to that seen in 
trauma film paradigm studies, in alignment with the dual representation theory (Gunter & 
Bodner, 2008).  
1.6 Rationale 
 
The literature review presented above has outlined research to date on IMs and IAMs, 
with a particular focus on methodology, and how the resultant findings have informed 
existing theories. One of the aims of this review was to suggest that IM research might 
benefit from greater incorporation of diary and laboratory methods primarily used in the 
study of IAMs. Another aim was to examine how the use of these methods might yield some 
therapeutic benefits for people experiencing IMs, and the higher rates of depression and 
PTSD symptomology which often accompany them.  
The following six chapters will present data from seven different studies. Chapter two 
presents the results of an online questionnaire survey of IMs, completed by an undergraduate 
student population (Study 1). The aim was to establish the prevalence of IMs in a non-clinical 
sample by asking participants to report an IM and rate it along a number of scales (e.g. 
frequency, vividness, distress, disruptiveness, and avoidance). It was anticipated that such 
memories would be common, thereby providing a sound justification for further investigation 
of IMs within this population.  
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Chapter three presents the results of a two-week diary study of IMs in a non-clinical 
population (Study 2). To date, only a limited number of studies have employed a diary 
method to study intrusive memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Kleim et al., 2013; Rubin et 
al., 2008, 2011; A. D. Williams & Moulds, 2007). Given the reliability of this method for 
studying IAM, it seems readily applicable to the study of IM, particularly for purposes of 
examining the frequency, phenomenology and triggers for IMs in daily life. Indeed, the 
limited use of a diary method to address these questions has already provided promising 
results. For example, a 1-week diary study of IM in a non-clinical population suggests that 
these may occur more frequently than suggested by previous research (Kvavilashvili, et al., in 
preparation). In addition, evidence suggests that keeping such a diary could have therapeutic 
benefit for people experiencing IMs (Dewey et al., 2015). But given that screening 
questionnaires alone can produce such a benefit (Boals et al., 2011; Rubin et al., 2010), the 
diary study in the present thesis has been designed to examine the effect of the diary in 
isolation and in conjunction with such questionnaires, to assess their independent and 
additive effect.  
Chapter four seeks to address the almost total absence of studies which examine 
naturally occurring IM under controlled laboratory conditions. The majority of studies that 
have investigated IMs in the laboratory, have done so with induced IMs often via exposure to 
negative imagery in the form of photos and films (Oulton & Takarangi, 2018; Takarangi, 
Nayda, Strange, & Nixon, 2017; Takarangi, Strange, & Lindsay, 2014). Because IAMs have 
been successfully examined under controlled laboratory conditions (Kvavilashvili & 
Schlagman, 2011; Plimpton et al., 2015; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008), the two studies 
(Studies 3a and 3b), presented in this chapter,  adapted a method used for this purpose to the 
study of IM. Based on the findings for IAMs, it was anticipated that the use of this method 
would demonstrate that it is possible to elicit naturally occurring IMs in the laboratory if 
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participants are exposed to relevant incidental verbal cues. In addition, it was hypothesized 
that personalized cues would be more effective for triggering IMs that non-personalised, 
incidental cues. Finally, it was anticipated that recording one’s IMs through participation in 
the laboratory task would have a therapeutic benefit for participants.  
Chapter five will present data from two analogue studies (Studies 4a and 4b) which 
incorporate the use of a comprehensive structured diary to examine not just the frequency of 
the film-related IMs but also their triggers, vividness and other associated phenomenology. 
The aim was to examine the triggers for analogue IMs as well as ongoing activities, to 
provide some basis for comparison with naturally occurring IMs and IAMs. In addition, a 
secondary aim was to explore the effect of a briefer but thematically consistent film on the 
frequency and phenomenology of film-related IMs reported in the structured diary.  
Chapter six presents the results of a within-subjects diary study of IAMs and analogue 
IMs (Study 5). A key aim was is to explore relationships between the frequency of IAMs and 
IMs, which was predicted to be positive and significant. A second aim was to conduct a 
within subject analysis of the nature of triggers in both types of cognition but also the 
conditions of which each come to mind. 
Finally, Chapter seven will summarize the primary aims and key findings of the 
studies presented in the thesis. The discussion of findings will focus in particular on what the 
results reveal in terms of the benefits/limitations of studying naturally occurring IMs in non-
clinical populations, the therapeutic benefits of diary keeping, and the triggers for naturally 
occurring and analogue IMs. Some limitations of the studies will also be discussed as well as 



































Chapter 2: The Nature and Frequency of Intrusive Memories in a Student 



























2.1 Introduction  
 
There is growing evidence to suggest that IMs are a common phenomenon non-
clinical as well as clinical populations. They are one of the key diagnostic criteria for PTSD, 
but they have also been found in depression, and not only in cases of co-morbidity (Reynolds 
& Brewin, 1999). Importantly, IMs have also been found to occur in non-clinical populations, 
in response to a range of life events. Some of these life events meet Criterion A ins the DSM-
V for traumatic events (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), with data suggesting that 
up to 70% of people will experience this type of event at some point in their lifetime (e.g., an 
automobile accident, an assault, or other type of near-death experience; Brewin, 2003). There 
are also other highly distressing events that fall outside the A2 criterion, but can nonetheless 
give rise to IMs, including experiences that most, if not all, of us will have at some point in 
life (e.g., the death of a family member or loved one, the breakdown of a relationship, a 
personal failure; (Brewin et al., 1996; Bywaters et al., 2004; Yeung & Fernandes, 2020).  
The rates at which people experience events which might form the basis of IMs 
suggests that a high proportion of the population could be experiencing them at any one time. 
And the results of some studies – particularly those focusing on IMs in depression - suggest 
that the prevalence of IMs does not differ according to the presence (or absence) of a clinical 
diagnosis.  For example, Spenceley and Jerrom (1997) recruited a sample of depressed, 
recovered and never-depressed women, and administered a revised version of the Impact of 
Events Scale (asking that participants only report traumatic memories based on events before 
age 16). They found no statistical difference in the commonality of IMs between the groups, 
with 70% of depressed women, 55% of recovered and 78% of controls reported experiencing 
an IM. Similarly, Newby and Moulds (2011) recruited a sample of 85 university students 
who were screened for current or past depression (25 were classed as depressed, 30 
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recovered, and 30 never-depressed). They found that 96%, 80% and 73% of participants in 
each group, respectively, reported experiencing an IM, again with no group differences.  
Whilst it appears that large parts of the population experience IMs, that is not to say 
that all IMs are experienced equally. For example, whilst Spenceley and Jerrom (1997) found 
that reports of experiencing an IM did not differ among depressed, recovered and control 
groups, the frequency of the reported IM was significantly higher in the depressed group than 
in the other two groups. By contrast, as reported earlier, Newby and Moulds (2011) did not 
find any differences in reported frequency of IMs over the previous week in their sample of 
depressed, recovered and never-depressed participants. At the same time, Spenceley and 
Jerrom (1997) found that measures of avoidance were higher in both the depressed and 
recovered group than they were in the control participants. Similarly, Newby and Moulds 
(2011) found that their depressed group reported higher levels of vividness, distress and 
interference associated with their IM than recovered or never-depressed participants, but 
there were no group differences in levels of “nowness/reliving” of the event. 
Furthermore, some studies suggest that there may be differences in the content of the 
IM in people with PTSD, depression and non-clinical controls. In a study involving 
participants with both PTSD and depression, Reynolds and Brewin (1999) found that 93% of 
IM-related memories could be placed into 4 categories: “family death, illness or injury,” 
“Illness or injury to the patient,” “assault on the patient,” and “interpersonal problems”. 
Participants with PTSD were more likely to report illness, injury or assault in relation to 
themselves, while depressed patients were more likely to report death, illness or injury in 
relation to a family member, or interpersonal problems (see Table 2-1). A study comparing 
the frequency of IMs and rumination in a sample of participants with major depressive 
disorder also found that a high proportion (73.7%) of reported IMs fell into the interpersonal 
problem/event category (Newby & Moulds, 2012). Finally, application of similar content 
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analysis with dysphoric participants drawn from the general population (with scores greater 
than 12 on the BDI-II) showed that the majority (60%) reported an interpersonal event as the 
basis of their IM (Newby et al., 2014). 
Whilst there is some evidence that IMs are experienced differently in clinical and 
non-clinical populations, this evidence appears to be inconsistent. Ongoing efforts to compare 
the clinical and non-clinical presentation of IMs has merit, but documented similarities 
suggest that it is also worthwhile using one to understand the other.  This lends credibility to 
studying IMs in (much more accessible) non-clinical populations as a means of 
understanding the phenomenon more broadly.  
Yet, there have been only a handful of studies that have exclusively examined the 
frequency, phenomenology and content of IMs in non-clinical populations. For example, 
Brewin, Christodoulides, and Hutchinson (1996) recruited a random sample of students and 
asked them to report their five most frequent intrusive memories and five most intrusive 
thoughts experienced in the past two weeks (negative or positive, with the order of reporting 
memories versus thoughts counterbalanced). Participants also estimated the frequency of 
each nominated thought/memory over the 2-week period, listed three emotions associated 
with each thought/memory, and rated it for pleasantness on a 10-point scale (1=very 
unpleasant, 10=very pleasant). Results showed no differences in the frequency with which 
participants reported negative versus positive IMs. The most frequent IM was reported to 
have occurred 32.9 times over the previous two weeks when reported before thoughts, and 
22.1 times when reported after (again with no differences in frequency between negative and 
positive memories). Mean pleasantness ratings for IMs varied slightly depending on whether 
participants reported thoughts first (5.96) or IMs first (5.07), though this difference was not 
statistically significant.  
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Other studies that have examined IMs in non-clinical populations have screened all or 
part of the sample for dysphoric mood (using the BDI or BDI-II). Newby et al. (2014) 
recruited a sample of 60 participants from the general public who reported experiencing an 
IM over the previous week, and had a BDI-II score suggesting dysphoria (12 or more). At 
baseline, participants reported their IM as occurring an average of 4.12 times per week and an 
average of 129.8 weeks since the event upon which the IM was based. In comparison, 
Bywaters et al. (2004) recruited 40 participants (both dysphoric and non-dysphoric) with a 
BDI lower than 3 or greater than 9. In a lab session, they were asked to report as many IMs as 
possible from the previous two weeks (pleasant and unpleasant). Participants reported a mean 
of 2.75 IMs, with 1.15 that were pleasant and 1.60 were unpleasant, but dysphoric 
participants reported experiencing their nominated IMs more frequently than non-dysphoric 
participants.  
The above-mentioned studies make a valuable contribution to our understanding of 
the frequency, phenomenology and content of IMs in non-clinical populations, but none have 
offered insight into the true prevalence of this phenomenon. Indeed, only one of these studies 
looked at IMs in a population that was not pre-screened for dysphoric mood, or used as a 
control (Brewin et al., 1996). Furthermore, only one study appears to have looked at the 
content of IMs in a non-clinical population, but again this sample was screened for dysphoric 
mood (Newby et al., 2014). Therefore, in order to further address the questions about the 
commonality of IMs in a non-clinical population, as well as their content, frequency, and 
phenomenology, the present study distributed an online questionnaire within an 
undergraduate psychology student population. Participation was invited from people who 
experienced an IM at least once a day. They were asked to describe their most frequent IM in 
writing, and rate it on a number of scales (for frequency, duration, vividness etc).  
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Despite its broadly exploratory nature, several predictions were made in this study. 
For example, given previous findings suggesting that IMs may be a common phenomenon 
(Brewin et al., 1996; Bywaters et al., 2004; Yeung & Fernandes, 2020) , it was expected that 
a large number of undergraduate psychology population would nominate an IM and complete 
a questionnaire. With regard to frequency of nominated IMs, it was expected that results of 
the present study would broadly align with some of the previous findings on non-clinical 
populations. Given inconsistent findings regarding phenomenology, it is difficult to predict 
how these might compare to previous studies, but it was anticipated that measures of 
phenomenology would correlate highly with each other. In terms of the content categories 
devised by Reynolds and Brewin (1999), based on previous results with non-clinical 
populations, it was anticipated that reported IMs would fall more into the categories of 
‘interpersonal problems’, as opposed to the categories of death, ‘death/illness of another 





 The study was exploratory in nature, and simply asked that prospective participants 
completed an online questionnaire about an intrusive memory that they had experienced at 
least once per day over the previous week.  
2.2.2 Materials 
 
Online Screening Questionnaire (adapted from Reynolds & Brewin, 1999; see 
Appendix I)): Through the online platform Qualtrics, participants were asked to complete an 
online screening questionnaire regarding the content of their currently experienced most 
intrusive memory and a number of characteristics associated with that memory. In a text box 
on the questionnaire, they were asked to describe the content of their nominated IM and 
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indicate how long ago the event occurred on which the memory was based. Then they were 
asked a series of questions about characteristics associated with the memory including: 1) the 
frequency with which they experienced the IM over the previous week (never, once or twice 
a week, 3 or 4 times a week, once a day, 2-3 times a day, 3-5 times a day, more than 5 times a 
day); 2) approximately how long the memory lasted when it came to mind (seconds, minutes, 
up to an hour, several hours, constantly); 3) how clear and vivid was the memory (1=not 
vivid, vague, 7=extremely vivid); 4) whether the memory was accompanied by any physical 
sensations (no physical sensations, some physical sensations); 5) the temporal vantage point 
when the memory came to mind (reliving the event as occurring here and now, looking back 
at the past); 6) how distressing the memory was (1=not at all distressing, 7=very 
distressing); 7) how much the participant felt it disrupted their daily activity (1=not at all 
disruptive, 7=very disruptive); 8) how much the participant avoided thinking about the event 
(1=not at all, 7=as much as possible); and 9) how much the participant avoided reminders of 
the event (1=not at all, 7=as much as possible). 
2.2.3 Participants 
 
Participants were psychology students from the University of Hertfordshire (UH) and 
were granted 0.2 credit hours in exchange for completion of the questionnaire. The age range 
of psychology students at UH is late teens and early 20s.  Of 622 total records, 399 (64%) 
were excluded for being incomplete, duplicate entries, or not meeting the criteria for intrusive 
memories (see below).  This left a final sample of 223 unique entries (one per participant) 
which represented approximately 36% of the psychology department year one and two 
student population.  
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2.2.4 Procedure  
 
The online questionnaire was advertised via the University of Hertfordshire Intranet 
(‘StudyNet’) as well as the online research participation website operated by the Psychology 
Department (the ‘SONA’ system). Responses were collected between December 2014 and 
April 2016. On the first page of the online questionnaire, participants were advised that the 
aim of the study was to examine the impact of IMs on mood and concentration in daily life, 
and therefore that anyone who experienced such memories frequently was eligible to 
participate (an indicative frequency of one IM a day was suggested). Participants were then 
asked to provide an email address, and if appropriate, their SONA number (for receipt of the 
0.2 hours of credit participants received in exchange for completing the questionnaire).  At 
the end of the first page it was stipulated that by clicking ‘next’ they were consenting to 
participation in this portion of the study. Based on their responses, some participants were 
invited to participate in two subsequent lab studies of naturally occurring IMs, which ran 
during two consecutive academic years, 2014-15 and 2015-16 (see Chapter 4).  
2.3 Results 
 
 The participants included in the analysis were those who completed the full 
questionnaire and were deemed to have reported a valid IM. Of 622 records obtained via the 
online questionnaire, 289 were incomplete (47%) and were therefore excluded from further 
analysis, leaving 333 records. It is plausible that some of the participants who decided not to 
complete the questionnaire were engaging in characteristic avoidance of their IM. Others may 
simply have decided, upon reading about the nature of IMs and the aims of the study, that 
they were not experiencing such memories, or not with sufficient frequency to meet the 
inclusion criteria.  
Out of the 333 completed records, 110 were not deemed to be IMs by the first coder 
(B.P.) because of the reported content or because the event upon which the memory was 
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ostensibly based was too recent (less than one month). Examples of records excluded on 
content grounds were autobiographical memories that were rated two or below on the seven 
point scales for  distress, disruptiveness and avoidance, combined with low frequency ratings 
and content that did not suggest an IM (e.g., “being told walk into the garage on Christmas 
morning and finding a bike wrapped up” or “I travelled to [another country] to compete in a 
dance competition. There were many professional dancers competing in the same category I 
was competing in and I thought I wouldn't progress far within the competition, however I 
managed to get to the finals and win the whole dance category.”) Other records were 
excluded as they were too recent and/or qualified more as intrusive thoughts than IMs, (e.g., 
“I always think about whether I had fed the dog prior to leaving my house to attend 
university” or “I very often think about the course work that I have to do, like the content of 
read articles in relation to the assignment that I have to write down and the other tasks that I 
have to complete soon...”).  
All 110 initially rejected reports were also examined by the second coder (L.K.). 
There were only three reports about which coders disagreed, resulting in 97% agreement 
between coders. Two of the three reports about which coders disagreed were reclassed as 
IMs, resulting in 108 exclusions. Of the 223 reports deemed as IMs by the first coder, 124 
were also reviewed by the second coder. Coders agreed in 88% of cases, and all 
disagreements were resolved through discussion. This resulted in an additional 13 reports 
being coded as non-IMs (and one identified as a duplicate entry) resulting in 122 exclusions 
overall and a final sample of 211 unique IM reports.  
Reported IMs were then coded by the first coder (B.P.) according to content 
categories developed by Reynolds and Brewin (1999): “death/illness of another person”, 
“illness/injury to oneself”, “assault or abuse to oneself ”, “interpersonal problems” and 
“other” (see Table 2-1). The second coder reviewed the same 124 memory descriptions as 
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above and coded these memories into the same content categories. There was very good 
inter-rater agreement ( =  ) Although the largest percentages of memories (28%) fell 
into the category of “interpersonal problems” and “other” (22%), exactly 50% of nominated 
IMs were equally distributed among the categories of “death/illness of another person”, 
“illness/injury to oneself” and “assault or abuse to oneself”. The results of two separate chi 
square analyses on content categories showed there to be differences in reporting frequencies 
by participants recruited to the present study and two clinical groups tested by Reynolds and 
Brewin (1999): depressed 2(4, N=256)=15.18, p=.004 and PTSD 2(4, N=253)=26.71, 
p<.001. This appears to be due to the number of cases in the present study that were coded as 
‘other,’ though there were also clear differences in the frequency with which participants in 
the present study and PTSD participants in Reynolds and Brewin (1999) reported 
interpersonal problems as the basis for their IMs.  
Table 2-1: Percentages of content categories for IMs nominated by participants, and as 





















































(n=42)      
      
Note: n refers to the number of memories reported.  
a From Reynolds and Brewin (1999).  
 
 
In addition, participants rated their IMs on a number of scales, including frequency, 
vividness, and distress. The mean frequency (see Table 2-2) was three to four times a week, 
though it is apparent in Figure 1 that the majority of participants reported experiencing their 
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IM once or twice a week. This aligns with minimum frequency criteria previously adopted 
for designation as an IM with a clinical population (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). It is worth 
noting, however, that 15 participants (7%) indicated that their IM had not occurred in the 
previous week, but they were included in the data set because the description of the event and 
the associated distress ratings aligned with what would be expected from a genuine IM.  
In addition, some accompanying measures align with what might be expected from 
genuine IMs, including high ratings of vividness, distress and avoidance. A majority of 
questionnaire respondents reported their memory as being accompanied by bodily sensations 
(69%), though a minority (30%) reported a sense of reliving the event rather than looking 
back at the past. Ratings for disruption and avoidance of reminders fell closer to the middle 
of the scale. Average ratings for duration and age of the IMs show them lasting for minutes 
and being between one and five years old. 
Table 2-2: Mean (standard deviation) ratings for each variable on the questionnaire. 
   
Characteristic Variable Rating Variable Description 
Frequency a 2.96 (1.30) Three or four times a week 
Vividness b 5.51 (1.24) Highly vivid (1-7 scale) 
Distress b 5.26 (1.43) Highly distressing (1-7 scale) 
Disruption b 3.62 (1.68) Moderate disruption (1-7 scale) 
Avoid thinking b 5.10 (1.83) High avoidance (1-7 scale) 
Avoid reminders b 4.92 (1.90) Moderate/High avoidance  
Duration c 1.87 (0.82) Minutes  
Mean age of memory 51.89 (54.92) Months 
a Frequency ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=none, 2=once or twice a week, 3=three or four times a 
week, 4=once a day, 5=two to three times a day, 6=three to five times a day, 7=more than five times a day 
b Ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=not at all, 7=extremely 





Figure 2-1: Reported frequency with which the IM came to mind over the previous week 
 
A number of Pearson’s correlations were run for the questionnaire measures that were 
rated on a scale. For this analysis, a more stringent p-value of 0.01 was used to account for 
the number of correlations run (see Table 2-3). In particular, distress ratings correlated 
positively with all other measures on the scale except for the age of the memory. This is 
understandable as older and newer memories could be equally distressing. Ratings for 
disruption correlated highly with all other measures except for memory age and ratings of 
vividness. Avoidance scores (avoiding thinking about the event and avoiding reminders of it) 
similarly did not correlate with memory age, but did correlate highly with each other. It 
seems plausible that the lack of relationship between these measures and the age of the IM 
can be explained in a similar manner (e.g. that newer and older memories could be rated 
highly on these scales). However, IM age correlated negatively with the reported frequency 
of the memory, suggesting that older memories may be experienced less often than newer 
memories.  
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Table 2-3: The results (r-values, and n) of two-tailed Pearson’s correlations between the 
scale items on the online questionnaire. 
 Mem. 
Age 
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**Significant at 0.01 
1 In a limited number of cases, participants failed to record the age of their IM.  
2 A problem with online questionnaire resulted in a failure to record vividness data for approximately half of 




 A number of important findings emerged from the present study. Firstly, the high 
number of responses to the questionnaire from the cohort of undergraduate psychology 
students suggests that IMs are a common phenomenon among a general student population. 
Secondly, ratings for frequency, duration and other aspects of phenomenology were aligned 
with some previous clinical findings, and tended to correlate with each other. And the content 
of IMs reported in the present study aligned with previous clinical samples in some key ways.  
The latter point in particular bolsters the argument for studying IMs in a general non-clinical 
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population, both as a means of understanding them as a standard feature of human cognition, 
but also gaining insight into their clinical presentation.  
2.4.1 Implications  
 
 The content of the reported IMs in the present study showed some interesting overlap 
with Reynolds and Brewin's (1999) clinical sample of patients diagnosed with depression and 
PTSD. In particular, the percentage of IMs coded as “death/illness of another person” in the 
present study (19%) tracked closely with the percentage reported by PTSD patients (24%). In 
addition the percentage of IMs that were based on “interpersonal problems” the present study 
(28%) was similar to the percentage reported in the depressed sample (33%). The same was 
true for “assault or abuse to oneself” – 13% in the present study and 18% in the depressed 
sample.   
Perhaps the most notable difference was the high proportion (22%) of reported IMs in 
the present study that did not fit any of the categories used by Reynolds and Brewin (1999), 
and were therefore coded as other. Some of the thoughts that fell into the ‘other’ category 
consisted of personal failure (e.g., “not getting into medical school” or “Walking into an 
exam hall at for a GCSE at secondary school and sitting at the desk turning over the paper 
and not knowing how to answer any of the questions”). Other studies that used personal 
failure as an explicit category with dysphoric participants found that it accounted for 11.8% 
of IMs reported (Newby et al., 2014). Other IMs reported in the present study did not seem to 
easily fit under the other headings (e.g., “my house being burgled,” or “being caught shop 
lifting in secondary school”).  
It is interesting that analysis of Reynolds and Brewin’s (1999) sample showed that the 
content of IMs reported by participants with depression differed somewhat from the content 
of IMs reported by those with PTSD. This difference seemed to hinge primarily on the 
proportions of memories that fell into the categories of “illness/injury to oneself” and 
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“assault or abuse to oneself” (higher in the PTSD group) and the “interpersonal problems” 
category (higher in participants with depression). At the same time, the most notable 
similarity between the present study and Reynolds and Brewin’s (1999) data is the broad 
similarity between the proportions of IMs that fell into the “interpersonal problems” 
category. This suggests that the present sample may well score high on measures of 
depression (but not PTSD), had these data been collected (see below).  
 In terms of the phenomenology of the reported IMs, ratings for vividness, distress and 
avoidance in particular suggest that these are genuine intrusions. The mean vividness rating 
for the present study was well above the midpoint (5.51) with a modest standard deviation 
(1.21), suggesting that a large proportion of participants in the present study gave vividness 
ratings above the mid-point on the 7-point scale. This is also well above previously reported 
vividness ratings for IAMs (using the same scale) in dysphoric (M=4.89, SD=0.99) and non-
dysphoric (M=5.00, SD=1.21) samples (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011). Direct 
comparison with previous results in other studies is rendered somewhat difficult by the 
differences in scales used. For example, Reynolds and Brewin (1999) found that 88% of IMs 
reported by participants with depression and PTSD were rated as vivid (rather than ‘some 
detail’ or ‘unclear’ on a 3-point scale), and the mean distress rating was 7.9 out of 10 with no 
group differences. 
 Other variable ratings yielded results comparable to previous studies. For example, 
62% of the depressed group in Reynolds and Brewin’s (1999) study reported physical 
sensations accompanying their IM, compared to 66% of participants in the present study. In 
addition, Reynolds and Brewin (1999) reported that 77% (n=99) of the IMs collected in their 
study occurred several times a week or more with 23% (n=30) occurring once a week or less. 
This scale is slightly different from that reported in the present study, which showed the 
majority of participants reporting their IM as occurring once or twice a week (39%), and the 
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second highest frequency as 3-4 times per week (23%). In addition, 16% of participants 
reported experiencing their IM once per day, 11% reported experiencing it two to three times 
per day, 3% three to five times per day, and 1% more than five times a day. This amounts to 
93% of participants in the present study experiencing their IM at least once per week. These 
findings suggest that frequency represents another variable showing important overlap in 
clinical and sub-clinical manifestations of IMs.  
2.4.2 Limitations 
 
 As the study was originally conceived of as a screening tool for another study (for 
details, see Chapter 4), certain demographic information such as sex, age and occupation was 
not collected.  It is certainly the case that most, if not all, of the participants were 
undergraduate psychology students in their first and second year of study, who completed the 
questionnaire in exchange for course credit. There may have been also a small number of 
psychology master’s students. The absence of sex data, however, restricted some potentially 
useful analyses, such as gender differences in reported content, frequency and 
phenomenology of IMs.  
 There is evidence that younger people are at higher risk for mental ill health, and 
maybe students in particular, which means that this sample may not be entirely representative 
of the general population (Andrews & Wilding, 2004; Blanco et al., 2008; Castillo & 
Schwartz, 2013; Reavley, Mccann, & Jorm, 2012). This does not negate the fact that it has 
been possible to capture genuine IMs, and in this respect is may be no disadvantage for 
psychology researchers that this type of cognition may be more prevalent among the student 
populations they will be primarily recruiting to participate in their research.  
 No measures of depression or PTSD symptoms were gathered alongside the 
questionnaire. Had this been done, it would have made possible a number of correlations with 
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variables such as frequency and distress ratings, which would in turn have offered a fuller 
picture of the data collected.  
2.4.3 Conclusions 
 
 The results of the present exploratory pilot study point to a number of different 
avenues for future research. Only a limited number of studies have recruited non-clinical 
participants who experience naturally occurring IMs. The present findings suggest this is a 
fruitful method, that participants could be readily recruited in this fashion. Given the 
limitations of retrospective reports for assessing the true frequency and phenomenology of 
IMs, a diary method would be the most appropriate approach to employ with this type of 




























Chapter 3: A Diary Study of Naturally Occurring Intrusive Memories in Non-



































3.1. Introduction  
 
 The diary method has been used to study a range of involuntary cognitions, perhaps 
most notably IAMs, but also involuntary semantic memories, and task-unrelated thoughts or 
mind-wandering. Studying the frequency, content, phenomenology and triggers of such 
thoughts in daily life requires a method that facilitates their recording shortly after they come 
to mind (Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018). Despite its demonstrated usefulness, a diary has 
only been used a limited number of times for the study of IMs, which have instead been 
investigated primarily via interviews and questionnaires. The findings from these studies 
have contributed to our understanding of IMs, but the acknowledged limitations of 
retrospective reports suggest that greater use of a diary method could add an important facet 
to that understanding. Given that IMs are a common cognitive phenomenon, as suggested by 
the results of Study 1 in Chapter 2 (see also Brewin et al., 1996; Bywaters et al., 2004; Yeung 
& Fernandes, 2020), a compelling case can be made for a greater use of diaries for the study 
of naturally occurring IMs.  
3.1.1 Studying IAMs with a Diary Method 
 
Diary studies of IAMs have shown that these memories are a common occurrence in 
everyday life. Frequency reports have differed depending on the recording instructions given 
to participants, with results suggesting that shorter periods of recording may yield more 
entries. For example, mean numbers of recorded IAMs have varied from 17.21 IAMs 
recorded in a 7-day paper diary (with the option to make tick entries if full entries were not 
possible) (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008), to 22.13 over a 1-day period using a simple 
mechanical counter to acknowledge the occurrence of IAMs without recording any relevant 
details of the experience (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2011). A recent comparison of IAM 
frequency over a 1-day period of diary keeping and on Day 1 of 7-day diary keeping found 
that participants made significantly more fully recorded entries during the shorter 1-day diary 
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study (M=5.82 versus M=2.82; Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018). In comparison, however, 
a recent experience-sampling study estimated that we may experience as many as 14 IAMs 
per hour (approximately every 4 minutes; Gardner & Ascoli, 2015).  
Diary research has been important for illuminating other phenomenological aspects of 
IAMs. For example, it has been demonstrated that their content is of varied emotional 
valence, with positive, neutral and negative presentation (Berntsen, 1996). The majority of 
cues for reported IAMs are environmental (external), though people also report memories 
that are triggered by their own thoughts, or which have no identifiable triggers (Berntsen, 
1996; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004, Study 4; Schlagman & 
Kvavilashvili, 2008). Of all triggers, the majority are abstract and verbal rather than sensory 
perceptual, which runs counter to popular conceptions of IAMs from literature (such as 
Marcel Proust’s description of a vivid involuntary memory triggered by the taste of a 
Madeline dipped in tea; Mace, 2004; Schlagman, Kvavilashvili, & Schulz, 2007).  
3.1.2 Studying IMs with retrospective self-reports  
 
Much of the available data on IM frequency is from clinical studies that ask 
participants, either via questionnaire or interview, to estimate the frequency with which they 
experienced a nominated IM within a given time period. For example, Birrer, Michael, and 
Munsch (2007) administered a questionnaire asking participants with PTSD (n = 26), 
depression with trauma (n=20), and depression without trauma (n=19) to rate the frequency 
of their IM on a scale of one to three (1=once or more per day, 2=once or more per week, 
3=once or more per month). They found the mean ratings given by participants in the PTSD 
group (M=1.65, SD=0.63), the depression with trauma group (M=2.05, SD=0.89) and the 
depression without trauma group (M=2.07, SD=0.80) did not differ from each other.  By 
contrast, Steil and Ehlers (2000) found that participants who had experienced a motor vehicle 
accident reported experiencing their IM between 19 (SD=27; Study 1) and 35 times per 
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month (SD=74; Study 2). Similarly, in a sample of 129 IMs, nominated by participants with 
depression and PTSD (not comorbid), Reynolds and Brewin (1999) found that 30 memories 
(23%) were reported as occurring once a week or less, and 99 (77%) were reported as 
occurring several times a week or more (with significantly higher frequency in the PTSD 
group). Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, and Clark (2004) recruited 22 patients with chronic 
PTSD, and found that in the week prior to beginning a course of cognitive behavioural 
therapy, they reported experiencing a mean frequency of between four and five IMs per 
week. Finally, in a sample of 31 patients with PTSD (9 with comorbid depression), Speckens, 
Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, and Clark (2007) found that the median IM frequency over the 
previous week was 3 (range = 0-25), whilst Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, and Clark (2006) 
found that 44 patients with PTSD reported a mean frequency of 5.38 (SD=5.69) IMs per 
week. It is also interesting that frequency reports were slightly higher in one non-clinical 
study, with participants across two counterbalanced conditions reporting a mean of 37.95 IMs 
over the previous two weeks (Brewin et al., 1996). It therefore appears that even in clinical 
samples an average rate of IM frequency is once per day or less.   
Although at least two non-clinical studies have investigated IMs with positive content 
(Brewin et al., 1996; Bywaters et al., 2004), they are primarily thought to be associated with 
negative life events. Some studies have recruited on the basis of both diagnosis as well as the 
criterion A experience of the prospective participants (such as people who have been in a 
motor vehicle accident; Speckens et al., 2006; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Other studies that 
recruited participants, based on PTSD diagnostic criteria alone, have nevertheless sought to 
clarify the experiences on which the IMs were based, noting either the broad categories into 
which they fell (e.g., assault, motor vehicle accidents, other accidents; Hackmann et al., 
2004) or coding them into defined content categories to determine the proportion of total IMs 
that fell into each category (e.g., family death illness or injury, illness or injury to the patient, 
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assault on the patient, or interpersonal problems; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999, see Chapter 2, 
Table 1).  
 Retrospective studies have also asked participants to report on key phenomenological 
aspects of their IMs, including vividness, distress, and feelings of ‘nowness’, and avoidance. 
Results vary by study and scale used, with some participant samples reporting mean ratings 
well above the mid-point (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999; Speckens et al., 2006), and some 
reporting means that fell below (Birrer et al., 2007). Nonetheless, these measures were 
subject to the same retrospective bias as estimates of frequency, making the use of a diary for 
the recording of such memories a particularly worthwhile undertaking.  
 Finally, triggers have received some attention in the literature as well, though 
participant reports in studies employing only interview or questionnaire methods would have 
suffered from the same retrospective bias. Birrer et al. (2007) found that participants reported 
the majority of their IMs being triggered by ruminative thoughts (70%), though they also 
reported other internal processes such as feelings (43%) and brief, intrusive thoughts (39%). 
Reported external triggers included people (57%), places (50%), television programs (23%), 
clothes (13%) and sounds (11%). These proportions contrast with other clinical evidence that 
most IM triggers are in fact environmental, and overlap with peripheral perceptual elements 
of the environment in which the traumatic even took place (Ehlers et al., 2002; Hackmann et 
al., 2004).  
3.1.3 Studying IMs Using a Diary Method 
 
The relative paucity of IM diary research has arguably limited our knowledge of 
important aspects of this cognitive phenomenon, including frequency. Though diaries are one 
of the best available tools for approximating true frequency of fleeting phenomena, several of 
the published IM diary studies only asked that people record a certain number of IMs, with 
the understandable aim of not to burden them (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Rubin, Boals, & 
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Berntsen, 2008). Two diary studies that did ask participants to record all of their IMs found a 
mean frequency of 5.92 (SD=9.56) IMs per week (Williams & Moulds, 2007) and 
approximately 13.2 (SD=10.3) over two weeks (Rubin et al., 2011). Other studies have 
prompted participants to estimate the frequency of their IMs over a brief time interval. A 
more recent electronic diary study recruited adult females with PTSD related to childhood 
sexual abuse, and prompted them every two hours between 8 am and 8 pm to estimate the 
number of IMs or flashbacks they had experienced during the previous two hours. When the 
data was aggregated, they found that participants reported a mean frequency of 74.45 
(SD=62.02) IMs over a week. This was significantly higher than the retrospective estimate 
(M=49.52, SD=18.44) made at the end of the week of diary keeping (Priebe et al., 2013). 
Existing diary studies have looked at triggers to a very limited degree. Williams and 
Moulds (2007) found that 60% of participants in their study could identify a trigger for their 
IM, but no additional information about the nature of those triggers was reported. Kleim et al. 
(2013) have done perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of triggers to date using a diary. 
All participants in their study had experienced an assault or motor vehicle accident, but 20 
out of 44 had a diagnosis of PTSD, and no group differences were found in the triggers 
reported. Across the sample, the majority of triggers (47.7%) were “perceptual, similar 
situation, stimulus or person” (p.1001). Other external triggers included the actual trauma 
scene (2.8%), newspaper or TV reports (10%), trauma-related conversations (7.6%) and 
study-related cues (12.1%). Only a very small minority of the reported cues might be classed 
as internal, including physiological triggers (6.9%) and trauma related thoughts (4.1%).   
 In terms of the conditions under which IMs occur, the only study that would appear to 
examine this (Kvavilashvili et al., in preparation), found that 70% of reported IMs (n=69) 
came to mind when participants were engaged in an automatic, habitual activity (such as 
walking to university or washing up). The remaining 30% of IMs were reported as coming to 
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mind when participants were engaged in more controlled activities that required greater 
cognitive resources for successful completion (e.g. studying, having a conversation). It was 
found that these proportions did not differ significantly from those reported for IAMs by 
Berntsen (1998) and Schlagman et al. (2007).  
3.1.4 Possible Therapeutic Effects of Diary Keeping  
 
There is a substantial body of evidence demonstrating the psychological and 
physiological benefits of expressive writing (see Pennebaker, 1997). The application of this 
method to PTSD has produced encouraging results, though the intervention appears to 
improve participant mood but not necessarily symptoms of PTSD (Koopman et al., 2005; 
Sloan et al., 2011; Smyth et al., 2008).  
There is some evidence, however, that other forms of interaction with the content of 
IMs may reduce symptoms. Dewey et al. (2015) recruited 32 university students who had 
experienced at least one traumatic event and had a minimum score of 44 on the Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder Checklist - Civilian Version (PCL-C). Participants kept an android 
smart phone with them for a period of two weeks and were prompted six times per day to 
complete an adapted version of the PCL-C regarding the IM they reported at screening, and 
rate the intensity with which they were experiencing the emotions of fear, anger, guilt, 
shame, and sadness. In addition, participants were administered a paper and pencil version of 
the PCL-C three times – at screening, at the beginning of the two-week period of diary 
keeping, and at the end. Mean PCL-C scores recorded at the third administration (M = 46.97, 
SD = 13.19) were significantly lower than those recorded at screening (M = 57.16, SD = 
10.06) and the beginning of the diary keeping (M = 55.72, SD = 10.87). A limitation of the 
study – which the authors themselves note – was the absence of a control condition that either 
monitored a different type of cognition over the same time period, or did not monitor their 
thoughts at all.  
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Other researchers have also found a relationship between monitoring and therapeutic 
effect.  Kvavilashvili and Brewin (2013) asked non-clinical participants who reported 
experiencing at least one IM per day to keep a diary for one week. Participants underwent an 
interview at the first meeting, during which they were asked to nominate up to three IMs, and 
rate them on a number of scales (for frequency, vividness, avoidance etc.). The experimental 
condition (n=13) involved completing a 12-item questionnaire on a diary page each time their 
nominated IM came to mind, whilst participants in the control condition (n=14) simply 
placed a tick in a grid in a diary each time this occurred. The Beck Depression Inventory and 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) were administered at the beginning and end 
of the one week of diary keeping. Scores on both scales dropped significantly between the 
first and second administrations for both the experimental and control conditions. This raised 
the question of whether the diary keeping (whether full or tick) was producing the therapeutic 
effect, or if it was the IM interview during the initial meeting, or both.  
Indeed there is evidence that even a one-off administration of questionnaires about 
negative memories can produce therapeutic benefit. Rubin, Boals, and Klein (2010) asked 
participants to nominate a very negative event, and then randomly assigned them to either 
write about that event (expressive writing condition), or what they had done the day prior 
(control condition). All paticipants also completed the Autobiographical Memory 
Questionnaire (AMQ) and the Impact of Events Scale (IES). They found that participants 
showed reductions in the intrusiveness of the memories and associated distress levels in both 
expressive writing and control conditions, a finding they replicated acorss three studies. This 
led the authors to conclude that completion of the AMQ and IES created therapeutic benefit, 
and that the mechanism by which this occurred was similar enough to expressive writing that 
participation in that condition did not show any additional benefit above and beyond control 
participants. In a follow-up study (Experiment 4), participants in the experimental condition 
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were asked to complete the AMQ and IES in relation to their nominated negative memory, 
whilst the control group simply nominated a memory, but did not complete these meaurses. 
The same improvements were evident in the experimental condition as in the previous three 
studies. The results were also replicated in Experiment 5, where the experimental group 
completed the measures in relation to their negative memory, whilst the control group – the 
measuers in relation to a postive memory. Again the experimental group showed 
improvement while the control group did not (Boals, Hathaway, & Rubin, 2011).   
3.1.5 Aims and Design 
 
In summary, there is a clear need for research that explores the true frequency of IMs 
in daily life. This has been underexplored generally, and particularly with regard to non-
clinical populations. A diary method such as the one used in IAM research is very well suited 
to this purpose and in addition to frequency, will facilitate ‘real time’ exploration of the 
triggers for IMs as well the conditions in which they arise in daily life, and how these 
compare to standard IAMs. Finally, available evidence suggests that interaction with the 
contents of an IM, either through expressive writing, questionnaire completion, or monitoring 
has some therapeutic benefits on participants. Questions remain, however, about the 
mechanisms driving the observed improvement, and how to activate these mechanisms most 
effectively for maximum therapeutic benefit. For example, if exposure is the primary means 
by which distress is reduced (Rubin et al., 2010), is the most efficient way of achieving this 
through completion of an expressive writing task, or can a questionnaire or monitoring 
activate the same mechanism, potentially in a less time consuming and confronting fashion?  
In order to address these questions, a between-subjects study with three conditions 
was designed, which recruited participants from the general population (primarily students at 
UH) who reported experiencing IMs at least once a day. In two of the three conditions, 
participants were asked to record their IMs in a structured diary for two weeks (based on the 
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finding of Kvavilashvili & Brewin, 2013, described above, that one week of diary keeping 
had reduced measures of depression and anxiety). To isolate the potential therapeutic effects 
of being exposed to IMs by recording them in a diary, participants in the third, control 
condition were asked to keep a diary of their involuntary prospective memories (PMs). 
Involuntary PMs come to mind spontaneously like IAMs, but their content relates to a future 
intention or task that has yet to be completed – e.g., suddenly remembering that you need to 
make an important phone call or book accommodation for an upcoming holiday in the 
evening when you finish your shift at work (see Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007). This was 
selected as a control in the present study because in Kvavilashvili and Brewin (2013) the 
intended control (a tick diary of IMs) produced the same therapeutic benefit as the 
experimental condition (a full diary of IMs). Based on this design, it was predicted that 
participants who recorded their IMs in the structured diary would show greater improvement 
in measures of depression, anxiety and PTSD symptoms than participants who recorded their 
involuntary PMs.  
However, as described earlier, therapeutic benefits could also result by simply 
reporting and rating IMs during an initial interview with the researcher even without keeping 
a dairy (Boals et al., 2011; Rubin et al., 2010). Therefore, we also manipulated the presence 
or absence of initial IM interview across the three conditions. In particular, before keeping a 
dairy of IMs, participants in the first IM-interview/diary condition, completed an IM 
interview modelled after Reynolds and Brewin (1999), whereby they nominated up to three 
of their most distressing IMs, provided a written description of each and rating them along a 
number of scales (for frequency, vividness, avoidance etc.). In contrast, participants in the 
second IM-keywords/diary condition only nominated their IMs by writing three to four 
keywords, thereby interacting only minimally with the content. Participants in the third IM-
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interview/PM-diary condition completed the same IM interview as in the first condition, but 
then kept a diary of their PMs instead of nominated IMs. 
Based on previous findings, it was expected that the IM interview could also produce 
therapeutic benefits (Boals et al., 2011; James W Pennebaker, 1997; Rubin et al., 2010). If 
the impact of IM interview was greater than that of the IM diary, then participants who 
completed the IM interview and the PM diary would show similar levels of improvement as 
participants in the IM-Interview/diary condition, and both of these conditions would 
demonstrate higher therapeutic benefits than participants who completed the IM diary but 
only nominated their IMs by keyword. Finally, whilst available evidence did not give 
grounds to predict an additive effect between the IM interview and the IM diary (Rubin et al., 
2010), this possibility was not ruled out in the present study.  
Additional predictions relate to frequency, triggers and phenomenology of reported 
IMs. Because of the limitation often placed on reporting frequency during diary or EMA 
studies, it might be expected that the present study would yield a greater number of reports, 
based on the absence of such restrictions. This should be balanced, however, against recent 
findings from IAM research that shorter periods of diary keeping may yield a higher number 
of reports (Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018). With regard to triggers it was anticipated that 
the majority of these would be external (in the surrounding environment) rather than internal 
(in one’s own thoughts). In addition, the majority of IM triggers were expected to be sensory 
perceptual rather than abstract and verbal. As in case with the majority of involuntary 
cognitions, it could also be predicted that a majority of IMs would come to mind when people 
were in diffuse state of attention and engaged in cognitively undemanding tasks, and that this 
would not necessarily differ from PMs. Finally, IMs were predicted to show some other 







 A mixed experimental design was used, whereby participants were randomly 
allocated to one of three different conditions, and then completed a series of parallel tasks 
involving questionnaire completion in the lab at different time points, a two-week period of 
diary keeping, and a 4-week follow-up by email. Table 3-1 below outlines the sequence 
completed in each condition. (The names given reflect the primary distinguishing features of 
each condition, though common procedural tasks between conditions within each column, 
depicting a given timepoint, are highlighted).  
Table 3-1: Experimental design and conditions 
 



















































 A total of 105 participants were recruited from the University of Hertfordshire student 
body and staff, as well as from the community. The study was advertised via a number of 
means: the online psychology student research participation (SONA) system; the University 
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of Hertfordshire intranet (StudyNet); a research newsletter circulated by email within UH; 
social media; and posters placed around the University. Psychology students were offered 3 
hours of participation credit, but participants from outside the department were not offered 
payment for participation. Participants were self-selecting and were advised that the only 
inclusion criterion was that they experienced at least one IM per day.  
A total of 23 (non-psychology) participants did not return the diary after attending the 
first session. Some did not return for the second meeting and did not respond to further 
communication from the primary researcher. Others indicated that they wished to discontinue 
their participation based on finding the diary keeping too difficult or time consuming. One 
attended the second session but never returned the diary. On seven occasions, participant 
failure to return the diary made it unclear to which condition they had been assigned. Of the 
remaining 16 participants that dropped out, six had been assigned to the IM-interview/diary 
condition, six to the IM-keyword/diary condition, and four to the IM-interview/PM-diary 
condition.  
Of the remaining 82 participants, an additional 19 were excluded for a number of 
reasons which resulted in a final sample of 63 participants (54 female). At screening, five 
participants nominated what appeared to be intrusive thoughts or current concerns rather than 
IMs, and were excluded on that basis. One additional participant was excluded because of the 
recency of the event in memory (which had to be at least four weeks old, to best approximate 
the cut-off for a PTSD diagnosis). Four were excluded for their non-compliance with PM 
diary task, either failing to make full entries, or recording thoughts other than PMs (e.g. 
IAMs, IMs, ongoing tasks, general thoughts about the future). An additional eight 
participants were excluded because of poor IM diary compliance (recording either current 
concerns/intrusive thoughts that did not align with their IM reported at screening, making 
incomplete entries, or reporting that they failed to keep the diary with them at least half the 
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time). Finally, one participant in the IM-keyword/diary condition was excluded because their 
full memory description was not collected (see procedure below) and it was therefore not 
possible to assess whether the content of IMs reported in the diary aligned with this 
description.     
In the final sample of 63 participants, there were 22 participants in the IM-
interview/diary condition, 19 participants in the IM-keywords/diary condition, and 22 
participants in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition (see Table 1). As indicated in Table 3-1, 
a number of scales, measuring state- and trait-anxiety (STAI), depression (BDI) and PTSD 
(PCL-C) were administered before and after the 2-week period of diary keeping (see full 
descriptions of the measures below). Table 3-2 presents the mean (SD) scores on these scales 
administered at the first meeting. A series of one-way ANOVAs showed no group differences 
in the STAI-State scores F(2, 62) = 1.33, p = 0.27, STAI-Trait scores F(2, 62) = 2.53, p = 
0.08, nor the BDI scores F(2, 62) = 1.04, p = 0.36 or PCL-C scores F(2, 62) = 1.22, p = 0.30. 
The mean age of participants was 23.4 (SD = 6.79, range 17 - 49) with no group differences 
(F < 1).  
Table 3-2: Mean (SD) preliminary scores on scales administered during first meeting. 
 IM-interview/diary IM-keywords/diary IM-interview/PM-diary 
STAI-State 39.14 (9.47) 44.68 (12.87) 41.47 (10.59) 
STAI-Trait 52.36 (10.05) 54.63 (8.99) 48.05 (9.60) 
BDI 19.09 (8.47) 20.89 (11.07) 16.73 (8.38) 
PCL-C 45.23 (9.10) 50.37 (11.43) 46.95 (11.31) 
 
3.2.3 Materials  
 
IM Nomination Questionnaire: This questionnaire was adapted from Reynolds and 
Brewin (1999; see also the online screening questionnaire described in Chapter 2). 
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Participants in the IM-interview/diary  and IM-interview/PM-diary conditions were asked to 
nominate up to three of their most IMs by providing a sufficiently detailed written description 
of content of their IM, and an indication of how long ago that event occurred. For each IM 
nominated, participants were asked to complete a brief questionnaire about their memory, 
including: 1) the frequency with which they experienced the IM over the previous week 
(never, once or twice a week, 3 or 4 times a week, once a day, 2-3 times a day, 3-5 times a 
day, more than 5 times a day); 2) approximately how long the memory lasted when it came to 
mind (seconds, minutes, up to an hour, several hours, constantly); 3) how clear and vivid was 
the memory (1=not vivid, vague, 7=extremely vivid); 4) whether the memory was 
accompanied by any physical sensations (no physical sensations, some physical sensations); 
5) the temporal vantage point when the memory came to mind (reliving the event as 
occurring here and now, looking back at the past); 6) how distressing the memory was 
(1=not at all distressing, 7=very distressing); 7) how much the participant felt it disrupted 
their daily activity (1=not at all disruptive, 7=very disruptive); 8) how much the participant 
avoided thinking about the event (1=not at all, 7=as much as possible); and 9) how much the 
participant avoided reminders of the event (1=not at all, 7=as much as possible).  
As in the IM-interview/diary and IM-interview/PM-diary conditions, participants in 
the IM-keywords/diary condition were asked to nominate up to three of their most intrusive 
IMs, but instead of providing full descriptions, were asked only to write 3-4 keywords on the 
nomination form. Participants in this condition did not complete an accompanying 
questionnaire about the frequency, duration, vividness and other characteristics of their 
nominated IM. At the end of the 2-week period of diary keeping, they were asked to provide 
a full written description of the IMs nominated during the first meeting. All of the 
participants included in the final sample were able to do so.  
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Diaries (see Appendix II): Participants in all three conditions received A5 booklets in 
which to record their memories over a 2-week period. Participants in the IM-interview/diary 
and IM-keywords/diary conditions were given identical diaries, in which they were asked to 
record their IMs. Participants in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition were asked to record 
their involuntary PMs in a similar diary. Both types of diary consisted of 32 pages, though 
participants were advised that if they ran out of space they would be provided with another 
booklet.  
In the two IM diary conditions, participants had to record the time and date that the 
IM was experienced, and the time and date it was recorded in the diary. They then provided a 
brief written description of the memory in the space provided and indicated whether there 
was any trigger (in your thoughts, in the environment, no trigger). If there was a trigger, they 
were asked to describe what it was. Participants also described the activity they were 
involved in and rated their levels of concentration (1=not at all, 5=fully concentrating). 
Vividness was rated on a 7-point scale (1=very vague, almost no image, 7=extremely vivid, 
almost like normal vision). Next, participants indicated if the memory evoked any emotions 
(yes/no) and physical sensations (yes/no) and described these in their own words if the ‘Yes’ 
response was ticked. Participants then indicated how long ago the event in the memory 
occurred and whether they had had the memory of this event before (never, only a few times, 
sometimes, often, very often). Finally, if participants had had this memory before, they had to 
indicate whether this memory was ‘exactly the same as previous memories of this event’ or 
whether the memory was ‘of the same event but from a different detail or time segment of the 
event’. 
The diary of involuntary PMs followed an identical format but omitted the last three 
questions regarding how long ago the event in memory occurred, whether the memory for the 
event had been experienced before, and whether the memory detail was the same or different 
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from previous times it was experienced. Instead, participants were asked to indicate when 
they formed the intention upon which their involuntary PM was based, and when they 
planned to carry out their intended task in the future. Both types of diary had a grid within the 
front cover page, and participants were advised that if an IM or involuntary PM came to 
mind, but they did not have an opportunity to record a full diary entry immediately (e.g., they 
were driving), and later they had forgotten some details of the experience, they could make a 
tick in the grid next to corresponding day to indicate this.  
Post-diary Compliance Questionnaires (see Appendix III): Participants in all three 
conditions answered several questions designed to measure compliance with the diary 
method, and what benefit they felt they derived from keeping the diary, if any. For example, 
participants had to indicate on how many days (out of 14) they forgot to keep a diary with 
them, and indicate the percentage of their IMs that they were able to record in the diary. 
Participants were also asked to indicate how difficult they found keeping a diary of their IMs 
or PMs (very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat difficult, very difficult), whether they found the 
process of recording their memories at all useful, and if they felt it had any effect on their 
mood (1=made me feel a lot worse, 4=no effect, 7=made me feel a lot better). They were 
also asked to indicate whether they felt recording their IMs or involuntary PMs had any effect 
on the frequency, intensity or controllability of their nominated IMs (overall more, overall 
the same, overall less, not sure). 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 
1970: see Appendix IV): This is a 40-item measure of anxiety. The first 20 items assess 
participants’ anxiety in the present moment (state anxiety). Items including “I am tense,” “I 
am comfortable,” and “I feel nervous,” are scored on a four-point rating scale (1=not at all, 
2=somewhat, 3=moderately so, 4=very much so). The second set of 20 items assess 
participants’ general tendency towards feeling anxious (trait anxiety). Items including “I 
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inclined to take things hard” and “I lack self-confidence” are similarly scored on a four-point 
rating scale (1=almost never, 2=sometimes, 3=often, 4=almost always). Some items on the 
scale are reverse scored, and overall scores range from 20 to 80, with higher scores indicating 
greater anxiety. The STAI has high test-retest reliability, with one study registering an r value 
of .97 for the state scale and .45 for the trait scale. It has also been found to be a valid means 
of differentiating between state and trait anxiety, with statistical differences emerging 
between groups (one of which was exposed to a stressor, one of which was not) in state 
scores (p<.025), but not trait scores (Metzger, 1976).  
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; 
see Appendix V): The BDI is a 21-item self-report measure of depression that has been 
shown in previous research to have good reliability and validity. The questions align with 
clinically observed attitudes and symptoms characteristic of depression (e.g. sense of failure, 
guilty feeling, crying spells, irritability etc.). Participants select from a number of optional 
responses to a given item, to indicate the severity with which they are experiencing that 
symptom (e.g. Question C: 0 – I do not feel like a failure, 1 – I feel I have failed more than 
the average person, 2a – I feel I have accomplished very little that is worthwhile or that 
means anything, 2b – As I look back on my life all I can see is a lot of failures, 3 – I feel I am 
a complete failure as a person (parent, husband, wife). There is a numerical value assigned to 
each response (with some given equal weight, e.g. 2a and 2b), which are added with other 
responses to arrive at the final score. The scores range from 0 to 63 with higher scores 
indicating greater levels of depression. Scores of 10 to 18 are generally thought to indicate 
mild depression, 19 to 29 moderate depression, and scores of 30 and over indicate severe 
depression. The BDI has been shown to be a highly reliable measures, and in one review of 
25 studies was found to have a mean coefficient alpha of 0.86 with psychiatric populations, 
and 0.81 with non-psychiatric  (Beck, Steer, & Carbin, 1988). It has also demonstrated high 
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rates of validity, with significant correlations between BDI scores and clinician estimated 
depth of depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 1961).  
PTSD Check List – Civilian Version (PCL-C; Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, 
& Forneris, 1996; see Appendix VI): The PCL-C is a 17-item questionnaire used to assess the 
severity of DSM-IV symptoms associated with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. In contrast to 
the military (PCL-M) and specific (PCL-S) versions, the PCL-C asks general questions and is 
therefore suitable for use with samples from the general population. Participants are advised 
that each item represents a problem or complaint that people sometimes report after a 
stressful experience. Participants indicate on a 5-point scale (1=not at all, 2=a little bit, 
3=moderately, 4=quite a bit, 5= extremely) whether they are experiencing, for example, 
“repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts or images of a stressful experience from the past?” 
or “trouble remembering important parts of a stressful experience from the past?” Items one 
through five correspond to criterion B in the DSM entry for PTSD (intrusion symptoms), 
questions six through 12 correspond to criterion C (avoidance) and questions 13 through to 
17 correspond to criterion D (negative alterations in cognition and mood). Scores range from 
17 – 85, with higher scores indicating greater severity of symptoms. A score of 44 has been 
recommended as a clinical cut-off for a diagnosis of PTSD. Previous uses of the PCL with 
non-clinical populations has shown it to have good consistency (=.94) and test-retest 
reliability (r=.66). It demonstrates good validity, reflected in high correlations with other 
measures of symptomology, including the PTSD Civilian Mississippi Scale (r=.60) and the 
Trauma Symptoms Checklist (r=.61; Conybeare, Behar, Solomon, Newman, & Borkovec, 
2012) 
3.2.4 Procedure  
 
 When confirming their attendance at the lab session, participants were randomly 
allocated to one of three conditions, represented in Table 1. Upon arriving in the lab, 
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participants were given a verbal definition of intrusive memories as “involuntary, 
spontaneous memories of a (mostly) negative event, that repeatedly intrude upon 
consciousness, often against your will, are hard to control, and may disrupt your ongoing 
activities,” and asked to confirm that they did indeed experience this type of memory.  
After obtaining consent and some demographic information, participants were asked 
to complete the STAI, BDI, and PCL-C. Participants were then asked to nominate up to three 
intrusive memories. It was stressed that there was no necessity to nominate more than one, 
but that some people reported having more than one IM on a daily basis. For participants in 
the IM-interview/diary and IM-interview/PM Diary conditions, the form given for this 
purpose asked that, for each memory nominated they described the content of their memory 
in ‘sufficient detail’ and an indication of how long ago the event occurred. Participants in 
these experimental conditions also completed an accompanying questionnaire for each IM 
nominated, which asked that they rated memory on a number of measures including 
frequency, duration, vividness, etc. For the IM-keyword/diary condition, participants 
nominated their IM using just 3-4 keywords rather than a full description. In all three 
conditions, if participants nominated more than one IM, they were asked to record their most 
distressing and troublesome memory first, at the top of the sheet.  
 Participants were then given detailed instructions of how to keep a diary of their 
nominated IM or involuntary PM over a period of two weeks. They were advised that, each 
time a memory came to mind, they should take a moment and fill out an entry in the diary. At 
times when this was not possible, they had the option of recording a tick in the grid on the 
front cover of the diary. It was stressed that there was no maximum or minimum reporting 
requirement, but that they should simply monitor their thoughts and record only the genuine 
instances of IMs or involuntary PMs, which popped into mind without them trying to 
deliberately recall or think about them. The researcher went over each question in the diary 
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with participants to ensure that they understood, and indicated the start and end date for the 
period of dairy keeping on the front cover. Participant were told to start recording the 
following morning and carry on for 14 full days.   
At a follow-up meeting two weeks later participants returned their diaries, completed 
the STAI, BDI and PCL-C again and were asked to complete a diary-compliance 
questionnaire on how well they had adhered to the diary keeping, and whether they felt it had 
been useful to them. After this they received a partial debrief on the aims of the study, 
excluding the hypothesis about therapeutic benefit. Four weeks following the second 
meeting, participants received an email with a link to a final set of questionnaires (STAI, BDI 
and PCL-C). Once completed, they received a full and final debrief regarding all the aims of 
the study. 
3.2.5 Data Preparation 
 
 The data was prepared for analysis in line with standard practice in diary studies. 
Items from the diary that were recorded on a scale (e.g., vividness, concentration) were 
calculated as means across the number of recorded memories before being entered into the 
ANOVA. Dichotomous items or those with discrete categories (e.g., whether the memory 
evoked any emotions or bodily sensations, whether the memory was exactly the same as on 
previous occasions or if it was focused on a different detail of the event) were calculated as 
proportions out of total recorded memories.  
In addition, all memories recorded in the diaries were reviewed by two researchers to 
determine whether participants had followed the instructions. Reported memories were coded 
as either PM, actual IM, IM-related or non-IM, with a very good degree of inter-rater 
reliability (Cohen’s Kappa =.89). After participant exclusions, there were 265 involuntary 
PMs recorded by participants in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition. Just two of these were 
excluded from further analysis because – contrary to participant instructions to begin 
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recording the next day - the entries were dated the same day as the lab meeting. This left a 
final total of 263 PMs.  However, some of the memories recorded in IM-interview/diary and 
IM-keywords/diary conditions did not meet the criteria for actual IMs. A total of 99 memories 
were coded as IM-related, because they referred to the event upon which the nominated IM 
was based, but which did not represent the actual instance of the nominated IM. For example, 
“thinking about hospitals; the time I spent there and the emotions it evoked” when the 
nominated IM was about the death of a loved one in the hospital, or “Being with George5 in 
his kitchen…” when the memory was about the death of a family member following a 
motorbike accident. Finally, the additional 68 descriptions were coded as non-IMs because 
their content did not align with the content of the nominated IM, or the associated 
characteristics were not what would be expected from a genuine IM (e.g., participants would 
say that they had never had this memory before). In fact, many non-IMs were standard IAMs 
or more ruminative thoughts. Examples might be “sitting on the floor in a sunbeam with my 
grandparent’s old dog Ben” when the nominated intrusions had been about a car accident and 
exam failure, or “No messages, lonely” when the nominated IM was about the breakup of a 
relationship following an automobile accident. The exclusion of IM-related and non-IMs 
resulted in a total of 264 actual IMs. All subsequent analysis of IMs is based on these reports.  
3.3 Results 
 
 All participants nominated at least one IM at screening and kept a diary for two weeks 
(either of their IMs or PMs), although there was considerable variability in reported 
frequency of diary entries (see below). All participants also completed the BDI, STAI and 
PCL-C at screening and two-week follow-up (to return the diary). However, a significantly 
smaller number completed the third online version of these questionnaires. For all inferential 
analysis, the alpha level was set to 0.05. In cases where Mauchley’s Test was found to violate 
 
5 Name changed to protect anonymity.  
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the assumption of sphericity, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser ( 
< .75) or Huyhn Feldt (  > .75) estimates of sphericity (Field, 2013). 
3.3.1 Nominated IMs 
 
 All participants nominated at least one IM at the first meeting, but 27 participants 
(43%) nominated two IMs, and 23 (37%) nominated 3 IMs. The mean number of memories 
nominated in the IM-interview/diary condition (M = 2.23, SD = 0.87), IM-keywords/diary 
condition (M = 2.32, SD = 0.67), and the IM-interview/PM-diary condition (M = 1.95, SD = 
0.65) did not differ from each other, F(2, 62) = 1.36, p = 0.26. 
 All nominated IM were classed into one of five categories (see Reynolds & Brewin, 
1999): death/illness to another person, illness/injury to oneself, assault or abuse to oneself, 
interpersonal problems, and other. The rates at which different categories of memory were 
nominated is represented in Table 3-3. There were no group differences for the first 
nominated memory, 2(8, N = 63) = 6.37, p = 0.61 nor were there any for the second 2(8, N 
= 48) = 9.27, p = 0.32, or the third 2(8, N = 22) = 12.10, p = 0.15.  
 
Table 3-3: Percentage (frequency) for the first (of three) nominated IM as a function of event 
category 












IM-interview/diary 18% (4) 27% (6) 9% (2) 41% (9) 5% (1) 
IM-keywords/diary 16% (3) 11% (2) 21% (4) 41% (8) 11% (2) 
IM-interview/PM-
diary 
27% (6) 18% (4) 23% (5) 32% (7) 0% (0) 
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 In the IM-interview/diary and IM-interview/PM-diary conditions, participants were 
also asked to rate their nominated IM on a number of scales including the frequency with 
which they experienced the memory over the previous week, how long it lasted, and how 
disruptive they found it when the memory came to mind (see Table 3-4). Participants in the 
IM-keywords/diary condition were not asked to complete these scales when writing out a full 
description of their memory during the second meeting. It seemed the case that this data was 
unlikely to be comparable to that collected during the first meetings in the IM-interview/diary 
and IM-interview/PM-diary conditions, so the decision was taken to not collect it from 
participants in the IM-keywords/diary condition.  
If nominating more than one IM, participants were asked to start with their most 
intrusive IM. The mean ratings for the first nominated IM in the IM-interview/diary and IM-
interview/PM-diary conditions are presented in Table 3-4. A series of one-way ANOVAs 
revealed no group differences in the ratings for different variables. In addition, 73% of 
participants’ first nominated IMs in the IM-interview/diary condition were reported as be 
accompanied by bodily sensations, whilst this was the case for 76% of participants’ first 
nominated IMs in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition. There were no group differences 
2(1, N = 43) = 0.07, p = 0.80.6 In the IM-interview/diary condition, 46% of participants 
reported their first nominated IM to be like “reliving the event as occurring here and now” 
rather than “looking back at the past.” In the IM-interview/PM-diary condition, 55% of 
participants indicated their first nominated IM was accompanied by this sense of reliving. 





6 One participant in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition failed to report whether they experienced bodily 
sensations with their nominated IM, resulted in lower degrees of freedom for the chi-square analysis. 
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Table 3-4: Mean (SD) ratings for characteristics of first nominated IM, and the results of a 
One-way ANOVA.  
 
            Condition  






Variable description p 
Frequency a 2.82 (1.79) 
 
2.41 (1.50) Between 1 and 4 times per 
week 
0.42 
Vividness b 5.59 (1.56) 
 
5.09 (1.27) Highly vivid (1-7 scale) 0.25 
Distress b 5.45 (1.79) 
 
5.22 (1.19) Highly distressing (1-7 scale) 0.62 
Disruption b 4.27 (1.88) 
 
3.86 (1.46) Medium disruption (1-7 scale) 0.43 
Avoid thinking b 6.27 (1.03) 
 
6.0 (1.41) High avoidance (1-7 scale) 0.47 
Avoid reminders b 5.32 (2.06) 
 
5.27 (1.89) High avoidance (1-7 scale) 0.94 
Duration c 1.0 (1.02) 
 
1.05 (0.84) 1 = seconds, 2 = minutes  0.87 
Age of memory  46.4 (76.1) 45.9 (48.8) Months 0.98 
a Frequency ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=none, 2=once or twice a week, 3=three or four times a 
week, 4=once a day, 5=two to three times a day, 6=three to five times a day, 7=more than five times a day 
b Ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=not at all, 7=extremely 




3.3.2 Diary compliance  
 
Overall, the self-reported diary compliance was good with 55% of participants in the 
IM-interview/diary condition, 53% in the IM-keywords/diary condition and 50% in the IM-
interview/PM-diary condition reporting that they kept the diary with them every day during 
the 14 days of diary keeping. A chi square analysis showed no group differences 2(2, N = 
63) = 0.92, p = 0.95. The mean number of days (out of 14) that participants in the IM-
interview/diary condition failed to keep the diary with them was fairly low at 1.05 (SD = 
1.69, range = 0 - 5), and did not differ from those reported in the IM-keywords/diary 
condition (M = 1.25, SD =1.59, range = 0 - 4), or in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition (M 
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= 1.66, SD = 2.37, range = 0 - 9) (F < 1). Finally, participants in the IM-interview/diary 
condition reported being able to recorded on average 72.50% (SD = 23.74) of all the IMs 
experienced during the two weeks of diary keeping, which did not differ from mean 
percentages reported by participants in the IM-keywords/diary condition (M = 72.63, SD = 
23.06) and in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition (M = 67.68, SD = 25.72) (F < 1). These 
percentages are comparable to those found in recent studies comparing paper and smartphone 
diary compliance for recording transient cognitive phenomena other than IMs (in this case 
IAMs and Everyday Memory Failures) (Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018).   
3.3.3 Memories recorded in the diary and their characteristics 
 
 In all three conditions, there was considerable variability in the frequency with which 
participants recorded in the diary (see Table 3-5) as evidenced by large standard deviations 
and ranges. Therefore, analyses were run on square root transformed values for these 
variables (e.g., see Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018). The results of a one-way ANOVA 
showed a main effect of group F(2, 60) = 8.62, p = .001, 2 = .22. Bonferroni corrected post-
hoc analysis revealed that significantly more PMs were reported than IMs in the IM-
interview/diary (p = .001) and IM-keywords/diary (p = .007) conditions, but the latter two 
did not differ from each other (p = 1.0). 7 However, the three groups did not differ in terms of 
the number of recorded tick entries (F < 1). 8   
 
7 It is worth noting, that these group differences result from the removal of memories that were coded as IM-
related from this analysis. If IM-related memories are retained and then combined with IMs for the IM 
interview/diary (M = 8.45, SD = 7.49) and IM Keywords/diary (M = 9.32, SD = 9.03) conditions, the results of 
a one-way ANOVA show no group differences when compared to the IM interview/PM-diary condition, F(2, 
60) = 1.30, p = 0.28. 
8 It is also interesting that the number of fully recorded diary entries decreased from week 1 to week 2 of diary 
keeping in all three conditions.  The results of a 3 (experimental group) x 2 (week of diary keeping) mixed 
ANOVA on the square root transformed values of fully recorded entries showed a significant main effect of 
week of diary keeping F(1, 60)=11.43, p=.001, 2=0.16. With regard to tick entries, however, there was no 




Table 3-5: Mean frequency, SD and range of full, tick, and combined full and tick diary 
entries. 
 Full Entries Tick Entries 
 Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
IM-interview/diary 5.64 3.24 1-13 9.86 13.95 0-49 
IM-keywords/diary  7.37 8.83 3-32 8.32 11.64 0-45 
IM-interview/PM-diary 11.95 5.77 3-28 5.45 6.88 0-24 
 
3.3.4 Assessing the Therapeutic Benefit of Recording IMs in a Diary 
 
3.3.4.1 Assessing Therapeutic Benefit with Measures of Psychopathology 
 
 A key aim of the present study was to examine the potential therapeutic benefits of 
recording IMs in a structured diary. The BDI, STAI and PCL-C were administered three 
times during the course of the study – at the beginning of the first and second lab sessions, 
and via online questionnaire four weeks after completion of the diary keeping. At the third 
administration, 17 participants in the IM-interview/diary condition, 12 in the IM-
keywords/diary condition and 14 in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition completed the final 
set of online questionnaires for a total of 43 participants overall. This represented a drop-out 
rate of five participants for the IM-interview/diary condition, seven for the IM-
keywords/diary condition, and eight for the IM-interview/PM-diary condition, for a total of 
20 participants. This rate of non-completion did not differ by experimental condition 2(2, 







































































Scores on all measures were square root transformed in order to normalize the data. A 
series of 3 condition (IM-interview/diary, IM-keywords/diary, IM-interview/PM-diary) by 2 
time (baseline and follow-up) mixed ANOVAs were run for each of the psychopathology 
scales. With regard to STAI-State, there were no differences between the first and second 
time of administration (F < 1), though group differences were approaching significance F(2, 
60) = 2.69, p =.08, 2 = .08. There was no interaction between group and time of 
administration (F<1). 
For the STAI-Trait scale, there was a similar pattern, with no difference between the 
first and second administration F(1, 60) = 2.57 p = .11, 2 = .04, though there were group 
differences F(2, 60) = 3.64, p = .03, 2 = .11. There was not however, any interaction 
between group and time of administration (F < 1). Pairwise comparisons (LSD) show that 
STAI-Trait scores recorded in the IM-keywords/diary condition were significantly higher 
than in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition (p = .01), but not the IM-interview/diary 
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condition (p = .28). There were also no differences in the scores recorded in the IM-
interview/PM-diary condition and IM-interview/diary condition (p = .11). 
With regard to the BDI, there was a main effect of time of administration F(1, 60) = 
6.26 p = .02, 2 = .09, with scores dropping significantly between Time 1 and Time 2 across 
all three conditions. As can be noted from Table 3-6, however, the largest such drop was 
recorded in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition. There was, however, no main effect of 
group F(2, 60) = 2.40 p = .10, 2 = .07, nor was there an interaction between time of 
administration and group F(1, 60) = 1.16 p = .11, 2 = .04.  
Finally, with regard to the PCL-C, there was a main effect of time of administration 
F(1, 59) = 6.58 p = .01, 2 = .10, with scores dropping significantly from Time 1 to Time 2. 
There was a significant main effect of group F(2, 59) = 3.55 p = .04, 2 = .11, as well as a 
marginally significant interaction between group and time of administration F(1, 59) = 2.88 p 
= .06, 2 = .09. 9 Tests of simple main effects show a significant drop in PCL-C scores from 
Time 1 to Time 2 in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition (p = .001) but not the IM-
interview/diary condition ( p = .201) or the IM-Keyword/diary condition (p = 919; see Figure 
3-1).  
 




Figure 3-1: Mean PCL-C scores as a function of experimental group and time of 
administration  
 
To further explore the relationship between IM and PM diary keeping and scores on 
the PCL-C, additional analyses were conducted on its subscales measuring Criteria B 
(intrusion symptoms), C (avoidance) and D (negative changes in cognition and mood) (see 
method section above). The square root transformed scores on each of these subscales were 
again entered into a 3 condition (IM-interview/diary, IM-keywords/diary, IM-interview/PM-







































































For the Criterion B subscale (measuring intrusion symptoms), results show a main 
effect of time of administration F(1, 60) =10.35 p = .002, 2 = .15, a marginally significant 
effect of group F(2, 60) = 2.46, p = .09, 2 = .08, and a significant interaction between the 
two F(1, 60) = 6.25 p = .003, 2 = .17. 10 Tests of simple main effects show a significant drop 
in Criterion B subscale scores in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition (p = .001) but not the 
IM-interview/diary condition (p = .802) or the IM-keyword/diary condition (p = .545; see 
Figure 3-2).  
For the Criterion C subscale (measuring avoidance symptoms) there was no main 
effect of time of administration F(1, 59) =1.65 p = .20, 2 = .03, but there was a marginally 
significant effect of group F(2, 59) =3.06 p = .06, 2 = .09. There was not, however, a 
significant interaction between time of administration and group F(1, 59) =1.34 p = .27, 2 = 
.04. Post hoc comparisons (LSD) show that participants in the IM-keyword/diary condition 
reported higher Criterion C subscale scores overall than either the IM-interview/diary (p = 
 
10 The participant whose full PCL-C score could not be calculated for the second administration, did respond to 
the initial five questions, so the Criterion B subscale score for this participant was included in the analysis.  
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.052) condition and the IM-interview/PM-diary condition (p = .025). The latter two 
conditions did not differ from each other (p = .758).  
Finally, for the Criterion D subscale (measuring negative changes in cognition and 
mood), results show a marginally significant effect of time F(1, 59) = 3.26 p = .08, 2 = .05, 
but not of group F(2, 59) =1.93 p = .31, 2 = .04. There was also no interaction (F < 1). 
Pairwise comparisons (LSD) show a significant drop in Criterion D subscale scores for the 
IM-interview/PM-diary condition (p = .047) but not the IM-interview/diary (p = .309) or IM-
keyword/diary (p = .888) conditions.  
In summary, whilst changes to the STAI scores did not improve significantly between 
the first and second administrations, the BDI and PCL-C results both showed a significant 
drop across the three conditions. Only in the case of the PCL-C, however, was this modified 
by a marginally significant interaction, showing greater improvement in the IM-
interview/PM-diary condition than in the IM-interview/diary condition (which showed 
numerical improvement that was no statistical significance) and the IM-keyword/diary 
condition (which showed no improvement). Further analysis of the PCL-C subscales suggest 
that the improvement in scores in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition is primarily driven by 




Figure 3-2: Time 1 and 2 scores on the Criterion B subscale of the PCL-C as a function of 
experimental condition.  
 
3.3.4.2 Subjective assessment of therapeutic benefit 
 
 In addition to diary compliance, the debriefing questionnaire that participants were 
asked to complete included items designed to capture their subjective assessment of the 
usefulness of recording their memories in a diary. On a 7-point scale they indicated whether 
they felt that keeping a diary of their IMs or PMs had any effect on their mood (1=made me 
feel a lot worse, 4=no effect, 7=made me feel a lot better). Responses, as a function of 
experimental group, are presented in Table 3-8. For purposes of data presentation, responses 
in the 1 to 3 range were grouped together as indications of negative effect, whilst responses in 
the 5-7 range were grouped together as indications of positive effect. Results of a chi-square 
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analysis show a strong effect of experimental group on subjective assessment of the mood 
effects of diary keeping 2(4, N = 63) = 20.55, p < .001. More than half of the participants in 
the IM-keywords/diary condition reported that the diary keeping made them feel worse 
overall, whilst nearly the same proportion of participants in the IM-interview/diary condition 
reported that the diary improved their mood overall. The majority (73%) of participants in the 
IM-interview/PM-diary condition reported that the diary keeping had no effect on their mood.  
 
Table 3-8: Percentage (frequency) of reported mood effects of diary keeping 
 Worse 
overall 
No effect Improved 
overall 
Total 
IM-interview/diary 18% (4) 36% (8) 46% (10) 100% (22) 
IM-keyword/diary 53% (10) 31% (6) 16% (3) 100% (19) 
IM-Interview/PM-Diary 0% (0) 73% (16) 27% (6) 100% (22) 
Total 22% (14) 48% (30) 30% (19) 100% (63) 
 
 Participants also responded to questions about whether recording their memories 
(either IMs or PMs) had any impact on the frequency, intensity or controllability of the IM 
that they nominated during the first session. For each variable, participants indicated whether 
their IM was more frequent/intense/controllable, less so, about the same, or if they were not 
sure. The majority of participants in the IM-interview/diary (46%), the IM-keyword/diary 
(58%) and IM-interview/PM Diary (55%) conditions reported that they found the frequency 
of their nominated IMs overall the same as before they began the two weeks of diary keeping  
2(6, N = 63) = 2.92, p = .82. In addition, over 70% of participants in each of the three 
conditions reported that the intensity of their nominated IM was overall the same, 2(6, N = 
63) = 5.93, p = .43. Finally, with regard to controllability, in the IM-keywords/diary 
condition, 21% of participants reported that their IMs were overall more controllable, while 
37% reported that they were less so. In contrast, 32% of participants in the IM-
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interview/diary condition said their IMs were more controllable, while 14% said they were 
less so. In the IM-interview/PM Diary condition 68% of participants said controllability of 
their IM was overall the same. There was no relationship between experimental condition and 
response to this item 2(6, N = 63) = 13.16, p = .11.  
 In summary, subjective assessment of the benefits of diary keeping aligned more with 
original predictions, in that a majority of the participants in the IM-interview/diary condition 
reported an improvement in their mood, whilst the majority of participants in the control IM-
interview/PM-diary condition reported no effect. By contrast, participants in the IM-
keyword/diary condition reported a negative effect on their mood, suggesting there is 
something about the initial interview that produces benefit that the diary alone cannot.   
3.3.6 Conditions in which IMs were recorded 
 
3.3.6.1 Triggers for IMs  
 
A majority of the reported triggers for both IMs and PMs were environmental (see 
Table 3-10). To account for variability in the data, the proportions of each type of trigger 
were entered into a 3 (experimental condition) x 3 (trigger type) ANOVA. The results 
showed a main effect of trigger type, F(2, 118) = 12.59, p < .001, 2p =.18, but not group (F 
< 1), or their interaction F(4, 118) = 1.10, p = .36, 2p = .04 (see means presented in Table 3-
10). Pairwise comparison (LSD) showed that environmental triggers were reported more 
frequently than internal thoughts (p = .001) or  reports of no trigger (p < .001). The frequency 






Table 3-9: Mean proportions (SD) of triggers reported as a function of trigger category and  
condition.  
 Trigger Category 
 Environment Own Thoughts No Trigger 
IM-interview/diary 53.68 (30.35) 29.27 (25.52) 17.06 (22.97) 
IM-keywords/diary  44.39 (23.55) 32.72 (22.79) 22.89 (26.87) 
IM-interview/PM-diary 46.36 (18.01) 25.06 (16.49) 29.94 (17.26) 
 
 In addition, participants’ descriptions of triggers were coded according to a scheme 
developed by Mace (2004) into the categories of ‘abstract/verbal,’ ‘sensory/perceptual,’ 
‘physiological/psychological state’ and ‘undecided/unclassifiable.’ Abstract triggers were 
those that arose internally (thoughts as triggers for memories) or in response to verbal 
information in the environment (written words or conversation). Sensory/perceptual cues 
represented more concrete sensory information from the immediate environment (e.g. sounds, 
smells, objects) which aligned with some feature of the memory triggered. 
Physiological/psychological states that acted as triggers were primarily emotions/feelings or 
endogenous states or experiences of which we can be conscious of (e.g. hunger, fatigue, 
pain). Any trigger for which there was insufficient or ambiguous information was coded as 
“undecided/unclassifiable.” Over half of the trigger descriptions were double coded by two 
independent raters, with a high level of agreement ( =.73). All coding disagreements were 
resolved through discussion.  
 To account for the fact that the number of recorded IMs varied across participants, the 
proportions of each type of trigger were calculated for each participant, and these proportions 
were entered into a 3 (experimental condition) by 3 (trigger modality) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor. (Due to the low number of triggers coded as “unclassifiable,” 
these were excluded from the analysis). Results showed a significant main effect of trigger 
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modality F(1.31, 77.47) = 46.59, p < .001, 2p =.44, but not experimental group F(2, 59) = 
1.07, p = .35, 2p =.04. The overall proportion of abstract cues was greater than 
sensory/perceptual cues (p = .006). The proportion of abstract and sensory/perceptual cues 
was each greater than physiological/emotional state cues (both p < .001).  
 
Figure 3-3: Mean proportions of triggers reported, as a function of modality and 
experimental condition 
 
However, this main effect was qualified by a significant experimental condition by 
trigger modality interaction F(2.63, 77.47) = 3.39, p = .03, 2p = .10. As can be noted in 
Figure 3-3, the pattern of means for different trigger modalities in the IM-interview/diary 
condition was different from that in the other two conditions. The proportions of 
abstract/verbal (M = 44.18) and sensory/perceptual (M = 51.57) triggers were not 
significantly different from each other in the IM-interview/diary condition (p = .54). By 
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contrast, in the IM-keywords/diary and IM-interview/PM-diary conditions the mean 
proportions of abstract triggers (M = 65.63 and M = 62.84, respectively) were significantly 
higher than sensory/perceptual triggers (M = 29.11 and M = 30.71, respectively) (p = .006 
and p = .011, respectively). In addition, participants in the IM-interview/diary condition 
reported higher proportion of sensory/perceptual cues than participants in the IM-
keywords/diary (p = .02) and IM-interview/PM-diary (p = .02) conditions, which did not 
differ from each other (p = .86). Conversely, participants in the IM-interview/diary condition 
reported significantly fewer abstract/verbal cues than those in the IM-keywords/diary 
condition (p = .02) and the IM-interview/PM-diary condition (p = .04). The IM-
keywords/diary and IM-interview/PM-diary conditions did not differ in the proportions of 
reported abstract triggers (p = .76). Finally, there were no group differences in reports of 
physiological/emotional state cues (all p > .05).  
3.3.6.2 Ongoing activities and self-reported concentration levels  
 
The activities in which participants reported being engaged when they experienced an 
IM or PM were coded as either automatic and habitual (and therefore requiring little 
concentration for successful completion, e.g., “walking to uni, making tea, tidying”) or 
controlled (demanding greater concentration, e.g., “in my living room watching TV” and 
“studying, talking to family, writing a lab report“). Due to the positively skewed data, a 3 
(experimental condition) x 2 (automatic versus controlled activity) mixed ANOVA was run 
on the proportions of these variables. Results showed a significant main effect of activity 
type, F(1, 60) = 6.72, p = .01, 2p = .10 (see Figure 3-4), but no main effect of condition or an 
interaction (both F < 1). Across the sample, regardless of condition, automatic activities were 
reported more often than controlled activities.  
Concentration levels across all three conditions were comparable and close to mid-
point of the 5-point scale with the mean ratings of 3.31 (SD = 0.66) in the IM-interview/diary 
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condition, 3.22 (SD = 1.10) in the IM-interview-keyword condition, and 2.92 (SD = 0.44) in 
the IM-interview/PM-diary condition. The results of a one-way ANOVA revealed no group 
differences F(2, 60) = 1.55, p = .22, 2p =.05.  
 
Figure 3-4: Mean proportions of automatic versus controlled concurrent activities  
reported, as a function of experimental condition.  
 
3.3.7 Additional findings  
 
Participants rated their IMs and PMs along a number of additional variables (see 
Table 3-10). With regard to vividness, despite evident numerical differences in the ratings 
given by participants who recoded IMs versus those who recorded PMs, there were no 
significant group differences (F<1). The results of a one-way ANOVA, however showed 
group differences in the proportion of IMs and PMs that were accompanied by bodily 
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sensations F(2, 60) = 4.42, p = 0.02, 2p = 0.13. Post hoc comparisons showed that the IM-
interview/PM-diary condition reported a lower proportion of bodily sensations than the IM-
interview/diary (p = .021) or IM-keywords/diary (p = .009) conditions, which did not differ 
from each other (p = 0.67).  
Of the 264 actual IMs reported in the diary, 219 (83%) evoked emotions, and in 98% 
of cases these were negative (e.g. sadness, anger, disgust or embarrassment). By contrast, 
only 43% (n=113) of reported PMs were accompanied by an emotional response, though in 
82% of cases these too were negative emotions. The results of a 3 (experimental condition) x 
2 (proportion of negative vs positive emotions) mixed ANOVA showed a main effect of 
emotions reported F(1, 55) = 498.90, p < .001, 2p = 0.90, with a much greater proportion of 
reported memories being negative. There was no effect of group (F < 1), but there was a 
significant interaction F(1, 55) = 3.56 p = .04, 2p =.12. Tests of simple main effects showed 
that participants in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition reported a lower proportion of 
negative emotions than the IM-interview/diary (p=.021) or IM-keywords/diary (p=.030) 
conditions, but a higher proportion of positive memories than the IM-interview/diary 
(p=.026) or IM-keywords/diary (p=.024) conditions.  
Finally, with regard to IMs alone, there were no differences between the IM-
interview/diary and IM-keyword/diary conditions in the mean rehearsal ratings reported 
(F<1). In terms of the varied nature of IM content, 123 of the IM reports (47%) were 
designated as exactly the same as previous occasions when the memory came to mind, whilst 
139 (53%) were said to be of the same event but focused on a different detail or time 
segment. There were no differences between the proportions of each memory category, nor 





Table 3-10: Mean (SD) diary ratings and proportions for memory characteristics  
 IM-interview/diary IM-keyword/diary IM-interview/PM-diary 
Vividness 4.46 (1.65) 4.60 (1.05) 4.11 (1.27) 
Bodily Sensations a 45.09 (39.36) 49.87 (38.49) 19.79 (27.56) 
Negative Emotions b 97.50 (11.18) 96.87 (7.24) 85.82 (23.07) 
Identical IM Content c 48.80 (37.06) 44.23 (24.50) NA 
Rehearsal d 4.08 (0.79) 4.17 (0.63) NA 
a Mean proportion of IMs/PMs that were reported to be accompanied by bodily sensations 
b Of the total number IMs/PMs reported as being accompanied by emotions, the mean proportion of instances 
where these were coded as negative. 
c Proportion all IMs reported 




 Several important findings emerged from the present study. For example, just a 
handful of previous studies have shown that it is possible to recruit participants for IM studies 
from a non-clinical population (Brewin et al., 1996; Bywaters et al., 2004). The results of this 
study reinforce this finding and underline the usefulness of accessing such a population for 
purposes of studying IMs. Indeed, the results of the present study, combined with those of 
Chapter 2, show that these memories are reasonably frequent in the general population 
without the clinical diagnosis of PTSD.   
In addition, the present study demonstrates the usefulness of a diary method to study 
IMs in general and in a non-clinical population. As noted above, given the reliability of the 
diary method in other research areas, it is odd that it has not been used more for the study of 
IMs (Kvavilashvili, 2014). And diary ratings of frequency, emotion, and bodily sensations in 
the present study suggest that the IM reported at screening were successfully captured. In 
addition, compliance with the diary method in the present study was generally good and 
comparable to what has been reported in previous diary studies on other spontaneous 
phenomena (see Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018). Furthermore, like in previous studies, 
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participants in both IM diary conditions (IM-interview/diary and IM-keywords/diary), as well 
as in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition, reported a greater number of entries during the 
first week compared to the second week of diary keeping (see Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 
2018). Most importantly, findings concerning combined number of entries (i.e., fully 
recorded IMs and tick entries) suggest that non-clinical participants were experiencing their 
IMs slightly more frequently than once a day. 
With regard to the conditions under which IMs were reported to occur, results showed 
that the majority of IMs arose when participants were in a diffuse state of attention (e.g. 
engaged in a cognitively undemanding activity), a finding that was also supported by the 
examination of mean concentration ratings, which were around the mid-point of the 5-point 
scale. In addition, the majority of triggers were environmental rather than internal, with a 
minority being reported as having no trigger. Further examination of the nature of triggers 
revealed that in the IM-interview/diary condition there were fewer abstract/verbal than 
sensory/perceptual triggers (though this difference was not significant) while in the IM-
keyword/diary and IM-interview/PM-diary conditions, the proportion of abstract/verbal 
triggers was much higher than sensory/perceptual. Thus only the first condition aligned with 
what has been previously found in IAM research, while the other two conditions diverged 
considerably.  
However, the results for therapeutic benefit did not align with predictions. There were 
no main effects of  time of administration for the STAI-State or the STAI-Trait, though group 
difference were approaching significance for the former and reached significance for the 
latter.  For the BDI, there was a significant change in score between the first and second 
administrations of the scale, but group difference did not emerge. The PCL-C was the only 
scale for which there was a main effect of time of administration and experimental condition, 
as well as a marginally significant interaction. However, this was because T2 scores in the 
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IM-interview/PM-diary condition were significantly lower than in the IM-interview/diary or 
IM-keywords/diary conditions. Given that keeping the PM diary was introduced to serve as 
the control condition, this finding was unexpected. Closer examination of the three subscales 
of the PCL-C showed that this overall effect seemed to be primarily driven by a significant 
drop in Subscale B scores. But again the difference between T1 and T2 Subscale B scores 
reached significance in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition, but not the IM-keywords/diary 
or the IM-interview/diary conditions.  
3.4.1 Implications 
 
 The number and frequency of IMs reported at screening would seem to align with that 
found in other retrospective studies, even with some clinical populations (Reynolds & 
Brewin, 1999). The diary data, however, suggests more frequent reports of approximately 
once per day. Given the acknowledged limitations of retrospective reports, this high 
frequency of IMs as reported in the diary suggests that previous estimates may have been low 
(Kvavilashvili et al., in preparation). However, a recent direct comparison of retrospective 
and diary reports (collected 3 times per day over one week) of PTSD symptoms suggests that 
retrospective reports tend to align with the highest levels of symptom severity as reported in 
the diary (Schuler et al., 2019). Although the diary method is not perfect, and carries with it 
both problems of compliance and meta-awareness (e.g. participants failing to note that they 
have experienced an IM and therefore failing to record it; Green, Strange, Lindsay, & 
Takarangi, 2016), it still may be able to reflect more accurately true frequency of IMs in 
everyday life than retrospective self-reports and questionnaires, especially if participants are 
also encouraged to simply acknowledge the occurrence of IM in those cases when immediate 
recording is not possible (i.e., tick entries).  
 Given the population accessed and lack of clinical cut-off, it could reasonably be 
asked to what degree these memories map on to those experienced by people with clinical 
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levels of depression and PTSD. Some measures in the present study suggest that, based on 
mean ratings, they might be a different phenomenon, particularly the data on vividness – 
which did not differ from that reported in the control group for PMs. It may therefore be 
appropriate to plot these memories on a continuum as suggested by Kvavilashvili (2014), 
with the memories reported in a non-clinical population perhaps lying somewhere between 
IAMs and IMs in PTSD in terms of their associated characteristics.  
 The conditions of retrieval for IMs would seem to square largely with the conditions 
reported for research on IAMs and other types of involuntary cognition such as involuntary 
semantic memories and mind-wandering, which is a replication of previous findings in this 
area (Kvavilashvili et al., in preparation). Results from previous studies show that such 
thoughts are much more likely to pop to mind when we are in a state of diffuse attention 
(Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). Furthermore, for IAM research in particular, reported 
triggers are more often environmental than internal, and most are identifiable (i.e. participants 
do not report that many instances of ‘no trigger’; Berntsen, 1996; Schlagman et al., 2007). On 
the basis of this finding, with regard to cuing, these results would suggest that IMs function 
in manner broadly similar to IAMs.  
 Finally, findings concerning therapeutic effects of diary keeping were unanticipated, 
given that a PM diary was adopted as a control condition for the recording of IMs. However, 
there is some evidence to suggest that training in goal setting and fulfilment has some 
therapeutic benefit (Sergeant & Mongrain, 2014). The 4-point drop in the mean BDI score in 
the IM-interview/PM-diary seems to be primary driver of the overall drop in scores from 
Time 1 to Time 2 (see Table 3-7). By contrast, the IM-interview/diary condition showed 
some numerical improvement, while the IM-keyword/diary condition showed none. It is 
possible that the act of recording small goals in the diary in the form of PMs has some 
therapeutic benefit, particularly if these small goals are achieved. This may have constituted 
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sufficient lift in mood  (and/or occupied sufficient cognitive resources) to interrupt the 
negative appraisals that are part of IM maintenance (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 
2004), in turn resulting in the significantly improved scores on the PCL-C. To that end, it 
would be interesting for future research, would be an indication from participants of whether 
they completed on their intentions that they recorded in the diary.  
Another possible explanation is that there was some particular benefit derived from 
disclosing the IM in the lab – writing about it and rating it on a number of scales – and then 
moving onto something more adaptive in focus, such as the PM diary. In this respect, it 
seems possible that the length of the IM diary keeping was too long in duration, either adding 
no benefit to that derived from the laboratory-based interview, or perhaps even eroding some 
therapeutic gains made during the initial period of diary keeping. The effect of this extended 
period of diary keeping would seem to be particularly apparent in the IM-keyword/diary 
condition where participants did not have the opportunity to disclose their IM in the lab, but 
then kept the same IM diary for two weeks. This group showed no statistical or numeric 
improvement in their STAI, BDI or PCL-C scores.  
The above may be one way of accounting for the divergence between the results 
regarding therapeutic benefit in this study as compared to a one-week study that tested this 
effect. Kvavilashvili et al. (in preparation) found that one week of IM diary keeping resulted 
in marked (and statistically significant) drops in depression and anxiety scores in both full 
entry and tick entry conditions. This was unanticipated, as the tick entry (e.g., simply placing 
a tick in a grid each time one of the nominated IMs came to mind, instead of completing a 
full entry) was chosen as a control. This interesting finding led to the suggestion that some 
interaction with the memory content (even if it was minimal in case of ticked entries), might 
result in therapeutic benefits, and that one week of improvement would only be increased as a 
result of two weeks. There could therefore be several reasons that this did not replicate in the 
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case of a two-week diary. Perhaps structured, but time limited interaction (for one week) with 
the memory yields benefit, but there is something about more prolonged interaction of two 
weeks with the content that counteracts this.  
The results obtained from participants’ subjective assessment of the benefits of diary 
keeping suggests that there is something important about disclosing the contents of the IM in 
person. This is most clearly reflected in the responses from participants in the IM-
keywords/diary condition, more than half of whom (53%) reported that the diary keeping 
made them feel worse overall, with relatively few (16%) reporting that it improved their 
mood. In contrast, in the IM-interview/diary condition just under half (46%) of participants 
reported that the diary keeping improved their mood overall, with 18% reporting that it had 
made them feel worse. And whilst disclosure may be important, it is interesting that 73% of 
participants in the IM-Interview/PM-Diary condition reported that the diary keeping had no 
effect on their mood. The condition which subjectively reported the best outcomes engaged 
in both an IM interview and IM diary keeping, suggesting some element of an additive  
effect, despite this not being predicted (Boals et al., 2011; Rubin et al., 2010).  
 In addition, it is difficult to account for the apparent divergence between subjective 
assessment of the therapeutic benefit of diary keeping, and the results obtained from the 
STAI, BDI, and PCL-C. Participants in the IM-Interview/PM-Diary condition showed the 
greatest improvement, even if not on all scales, yet were the group who most often reported 
that the diary keeping had no effect. Conversely, participants in the IM-interview/diary 
condition subjectively reported overall improvement in mood and yet this was not reflected in 
their scores on the scales administered. Only the IM-keyword/diary showed some congruence 
between scores on the STAI, BDI, and PCL-C and their subjective assessment of the impact 





In Study 2, there was a relatively high drop-out rate as well as exclusion rate. The 
majority of drop-outs came from people who were not psychology students and were 
therefore not receiving credit for their participation. There was no reward or reimbursement 
for participants outside of the psychology department and contemplation of this at the time of 
original ethics application might have gone some way toward retaining these participants for 
the duration of the study. That said, a handful of participants did report finding the recoding 
highly unpleasant, and therefore declined to continue.  
Exclusions, as mentioned in the method section, resulted from self-selecting 
participants later being determined to be unsuitable for the study. The experimental procedure 
was such that it was only possible to scrutinize IM reports and questionnaire scores after 
participants had left the first session. The aim was to recruit people who experienced at least 
one such memory per day, but it was noted from the screening data at the beginning of the 
results section that this was not consistently achieved. Cut-off criteria in terms of participant 
inclusion were not rigidly employed but used with a certain amount of discretion, such that a 
few participants were included that had not experienced their memory in the past week, but 
reported content, distress and vividness that suggested a genuine IM. In addition, only 
participants for whom the event on which the memory was based was more than one month 
old were included in the study. Some of the difficult concerns about screening, however, 
could be avoided through use of an online screening process, using similar measures, which 
would then inform decision about who to invite to the laboratory.  
3.4.3 Conclusion 
 The present study offers important methodological insight into how best to study IMs. 
Additional burdening of clinical populations can be avoided, whilst not having to resort to 
analogue studies alone. Recruiting non-clinical participants to a diary study of IMs offers 
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insight into the frequency and phenomenology of this type of memory, as well as what 
therapeutic benefit might be derived from diary keeping. This method has also provided 
important information on triggers, about which there are nonetheless some outstanding 
questions, particularly with regard to the reactivity of these memories, and their susceptibility 
to cuing from the type of abstract/verbal trigger, which is most often reported in the case of 
IAMs. These questions guide the subsequent lab studies into naturally occurring IMs, the 




















Chapter 4: The Role of Cues in Eliciting Naturally Occurring IMs in a Non-


































As demonstrated in Chapter 3, diaries have been instrumental to the study of IAMs, 
and as a methodology have much to contribute to our understanding of IMs. There are, 
however, limitations to this method, mainly that it does not enable researchers to 
systematically manipulate variables (Vannucci, Batool, et al., 2014). This limitation is best 
addressed through the use of controlled laboratory methods. Such methods have been 
developed for the study of spontaneous off-task thoughts in general, including IAMs, and 
studies employing them have replicated and extended key findings from diary research (e.g., 
Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011; Plimpton et al., 2015; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). 
In particular, they have facilitated deeper exploration of the type of cues that tend to trigger 
IAMs (Mazzoni et al., 2014; Vannucci, Pelagatti, & Marchetti, 2017), and the impact of 
cognitive load on the frequency of memories reported (Vannucci, Pelagatti, et al., 2014).  
4.1.1 Studying IAMs Under Controlled Laboratory Conditions  
 
 The laboratory method of studying IAMs more commonly used at present was 
originally developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008). Their ongoing vigilance  task 
required that participants detected rare target slides, with vertical line patterns, among 
hundreds of slides with non-target horizontal line patterns. In addition, each slide contained a 
brief word phrase in the middle of the slide (e.g., “window shutters,” “devoted friend,” “sun 
burn”), which participants were asked to ignore (with a cover story that participants in 
another condition were being asked to monitor the words and ignore the line patterns). It was 
expected that exposing participants to incidental verbal cues while they were engaged in an 
undemanding and boring task would mimic the conditions in which IAMs were reported to 
occur in diary studies (i.e., during undemanding habitual activities and in response to 
incidental cues in the environment) (Berntsen, 1996; Mace, 2004). As in the diary studies, 
participants were given a comprehensive definition of IAMs, and asked to monitor their 
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thoughts during the vigilance task. If at any time an IAM popped into their mind, they were 
instructed to press the space bar, thereby stopping the presentation sequence, and to record 
their thoughts in that moment. What set this apart from previous methods for investigating 
off-task thoughts or mind-wandering was the incorporation of incidental verbal cues in the 
ongoing task, which was found to reliably trigger IAMs (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
The method has since been adapted in a number of ways, in order to further explore 
the role of demand characteristics. Vannucci, Batool, Pelagatti, and Mazzoni, (2014) used a 
two-by-two design to manipulate the instructions that participants received and the method of 
thought capture during the vigilance task. Participants who were instructed to monitor only 
their IAMs reported significantly more IAMs than participants who were instructed to 
monitor the occurrence of any off-task thoughts during the vigilance task. In addition, 
participants who were stopped by the experimenter and asked to record their thoughts 
reported more IAMs than participants who stopped themselves. These findings were 
replicated and extended by Barzykowski and Niedźwieńska (2016) who similarly found that 
participants who were instructed to report only IAMs (rather than monitor for any task-
unrelated thoughts during the vigilance task) reported their IAMs as more vivid, clearer and 
accompanied by more physical sensation.  
Additional adaptations of the method have been designed to test the frequency and 
nature of cues - and cognitive load - in the elicitation of IAMs. For example, it has been 
found that verbal cues are much more effective than pictorial cues in triggering IAMs 
(Mazzoni et al., 2014). Among the possible explanations for this are a mismatch between the 
details of a given pictorial cue and the individual’s own memory representation. It also aligns 
with the results of Mace's (2004) diary study, which found that abstract and verbal cues were 
more effective at eliciting IAMs than more concrete sensory or perceptual cues.  
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Clinically relevant applications of the method have included a study of IAMs in 
dysphoric mood. Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2011) asked 25 stable dysphoric (score of 16 
or above on the BDI) and 28 non-dysphoric (score of 6 or below on the BDI) participants to 
complete the same vigilance task, and stop to report any instances of IAMs that came to 
mind. They found that dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants reported equal frequencies 
of IAMs, but the dysphoric group reported more memories triggered by internal thoughts, and 
fewer by cue phrases. Whilst dysphoric participants did not report more objectively negative 
memories (i.e., memories of negative events such as accidents or failures), they rated their 
memories as more negative than non-dysphoric participants. Memories rated as negative also 
had a bigger impact on the mood scores of dysphoric participants.  
This vigilance task has also been applied to the study of analogue intrusions. In order 
to examine the impact of single versus multiple verbal cues on IMs, Oulton and Takarangi 
(2018) asked participants to view a series of distressing static images and then complete a 
version of the above-described vigilance task. During the vigilance task, participants in one 
group were exposed to single cue words which were based on the images seen previously 
(e.g. knife; crying, etc.); a second group was exposed to triplet cue phrases (e.g. skull-sick-
hunger); and a control group was not exposed to any cue phrases.  The authors expected that 
single written cues would prove more effective than the triplet cues at triggering analogue 
IMs (and that the inverse would be true for involuntary elaborative cognitions). This 
prediction was based on the premise that “distinct cues isolate relevant nodes in the 
associative network, but not irrelevant nodes that disrupt retrieval” (Oulton & Takarangi, 
2018, p. 271). Results, however, showed that the single and triplet cue conditions did not 
differ in the mean frequencies of analogue IMs reported. Both conditions, however, resulted 
in more analogue IM reports than the no-cue (control) condition.   
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Whilst the vigilance task developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) has been 
used extensively to investigate IAMs, and on at least one occasion to investigate analogue 
IMs, there appear to be not instances of it having been used to study naturally-occurring IMs. 
Given how successful the vigilance task has been in replicating and extending the findings on 
IAMs, obtained originally from diary studies, there is a compelling case for similarly 
developing a vigilance task to examine naturally-occurring IMs under controlled laboratory 
conditions. This will facilitate a more in-depth understanding of the role of cues in triggering 
IMs, and, in contrast to the analogue method, will involve the recruitment of participants who 
already experience such memories, rather than inducing intrusions in the laboratory.  
4.1.2 The role and nature of triggers in IMs  
 
As discussed in the introduction, prevailing theories of IAMs posit that they are 
brought to conscious awareness through a process of spreading activation in the network, 
instigated by a cue (more often external), which sufficiently overlaps with the memory 
content (Berntsen, 2009; Conway, 2005). Some argue that IMs are triggered by a similar 
process, but that access to them is enhanced by a number of factors, among them the high 
level of emotion associated with the event on which the memory is based (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2008). There is however an alternative view, based more on theory developed in clinical 
settings, which argues that IMs represent a disruption to the standard functioning of the 
autobiographical memory system. This disruption results in a separation of memory traces for 
perceptual features of the event from the narrative context in which they would normally be 
situated (Brewin, 2014; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & 
Burgess, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). The latter view would suggest that IMs are 
particularly susceptible to sensory perceptual triggers, to match the primary content of the 
repetitive, unwanted memory.  
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However, when taking a broader view of available evidence, the picture is less clear. 
Some studies have shown that exposure to images that relate to one’s own traumatic 
experience can bring to mind memories of that experience (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & 
Clark, 2005), and a similar relationship was found with analogue IMs (Krans, Pearson, 
Maier, & Moulds, 2016). A naturalistic diary study of IMs in participants with and without 
PTSD found that slightly less than half of reported triggers were more sensory-perceptual in 
nature (including a similar situation or stimulus, or the actual trauma scene itself; Kleim, 
Graham, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2013). In contrast, a retrospective questionnaire study of IMs in 
participants with PTSD and depression (with and without trauma) found that all participants 
identified a large proportion of IMs (as much as 70%) as being triggered internally by their 
own thoughts (Birrer et al., 2007).  
Therefore the balance of evidence to date suggests that divergent results about the 
cues for IMs may be in part an artefact of the method used. This reinforces the case for 
studying naturally-occurring IMs under controlled laboratory conditions, to examine the role 
of cues in eliciting IMs, particularly the role of written, verbal cues and the degree of their 
relatedness to the memory content.  
4.1.3 Aims and Predictions  
 
This chapter will present the results of two laboratory studies (3a and 3b). The aim of 
both studies was to test the hypothesis that verbal cues can elicit naturally-occurring IMs 
under controlled conditions, as they have been shown to do with analogue IMs (Oulton & 
Takarangi, 2018). An additional aim was to test whether the degree of relevance of the verbal 
cues to the memory content determines whether they successfully result in retrieval. 
Participants in both studies were selected from the wider group of participants originally 
recruited to complete an online questionnaire, which asked that they provided a written 
description of their most frequent IM, and rated it on a number of scales. Participants whose 
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reported IMs were judged to be genuinely recurrent and distressing were invited to a further 
lab session, under the pretext of testing their concentration, during which they completed a 
600-trial vigilance task based on that developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008). In 
addition, there were 8 stop trials – points at which participants were stopped during the 
vigilance task and asked to report their thoughts in that moment (Plimpton et al., 2015). 
 To accomplish the above aims, Study 3a manipulated the presence or absence of 
verbal cues between participants (experimental versus control condition), and the presence or 
absence of IM-related cues before the 8 stop probes (in the experimental condition only). In 
the experimental condition a cue phrase was presented on each of the 600 slides (as in 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008), but on four occasions a personalized cue phrase – based 
on the content of the IM reported at screening – was inserted into the presentation 
immediately before the stop trial. For example, if a participant reported an IM about an 
automobile accident, the cue phrases might be “shattered windscreen,” “screeching tires,” 
“oncoming traffic” and “ambulance siren.” The remaining four stop probe trials were 
preceded by incidental cues that were not directly relevant to the reported IM. In the control 
condition, instead of cue phrases, each slide featured a mathematical formula (e.g. “4 x 5 = 
20” or “8 – 5 = 3”). To further explore the role of meaningful verbal cues in triggering IMs, 
Study 3b manipulated the presence or absence of such cues within and between subjects, by 
inserting four personalized cue phrases before stop probes in the experimental condition, but 
exposing participants in the control condition only to cue phrases that were unrelated to their 
IM nominated at initial screening phase.   
Using this method, in Study 3a it was predicted that it would be possible to elicit 
people’s naturally-occurring IMs under controlled laboratory conditions. Based on IAM 
research, it was expected that participants in the experimental condition (with verbal cues) 
would report more IMs than participants in the control condition (with maths cues). It was 
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also predicted that the greater overlap between cue and memory content would result in 
personalized cue phrases being reported more often as triggers than incidental cue phrases.  
A final aim of the study was to see if completing the vigilance task – and writing 
about IMs in the lab – would improve participants’ mood. There was some reason to believe 
that this might occur based on the results of previously cited research on expressive writing 
and autobiographical memory questionnaire completion (Boals et al., 2011; James W 
Pennebaker, 1997; Rubin et al., 2010). Keeping a 2-week diary of IMs (Chapter 3, Study 2) 
produced no consistent therapeutic effect, though one possible explanation for this is that the 
length of time was too long. Because of these contradictory results, however, no strong 
predictions were made that completion of the vigilance task would yield therapeutic benefits 
(as measured by the BDI, STAI or a Likert scale for rating mood).  
4.2 Method - Study 3a 
 
4.2.1 Design  
 
A between-subjects design was used, whereby participants were randomly allocated 
to either experimental or control conditions. The primary independent variable was whether 
participants were exposed to verbal cue phrases (experimental condition) or mathematical 
formulas (control condition) during the vigilance task. The primary dependent variables were 
the number of IMs reported during the vigilance task, as well as scores on the second 
administration of the STAI-State and the BDI. Within the experimental condition, there was 
also an additional within-subjects independent variable of personalized versus non-
personalized cue phrases. 
4.2.2 Participants 
 
A total of 381 people fully or partially completed an online screening questionnaire 
regarding their IM (see Chapter 2). On the basis of their responses, 41 participants were 
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selected for invitation to the laboratory session, and were included in the final sample (22 
experimental, 19 control). Of these, 35 were female (85.4%) and 6 were male (14.6%) with 
no gender differences as a function of experimental condition 2(1, N = 41) = 1.17, p = .208. 
The mean age was 21.83 (SD=6.0). There were similarly no group differences in age or 
baseline BDI and STAI scores (see Table 4-1). Psychology students were granted 1.3 credit 
hours for their participation. 
 
Table 4-1: Mean (SD) for age, baseline BDI, STAI and the results of a one-way ANOVA. 
 Experimental 
 
Control F df p 
Age 21.23 (6.43) 22.53 (5.56) .471 1,39 .497 
BDI 11.86 (9.22) 16.94 (9.10) 3.04 1,38a .089 
STAI-State 41.59 (9.18) 43.78 (12.58) .403 1,38a .529 
a A computer error resulted in baseline scores not being collected from one participant.  
4.2.3 Materials  
 
Online Screening Questionnaire (see Chapter 2, Appendix I):  this questionnaire, 
completed via the online platform Qualtrics, asked participants to describe briefly the content 
of their current IM, and rate the memory on a number of characteristics.  
 Vigilance Task:  the vigilance task was adapted from that used by Plimpton et al., 
(2015) from a task that was originally developed by Schlagman & Kvavilashvili (2008). Six 
hundred slides were presented in the middle of a computer screen (for 1500 ms each) using 
the software SuperLab (see Appendix VII). Participants were asked to detect infrequent slides 
with patterns of vertical lines (n=11) among frequent slides with patterns of horizontal lines 
(n=589). They were instructed to press the spacebar when they detected a target slide, and 
their response time was recorded by the computer programme. In the experimental condition, 
cue phrases appeared in the centre of each slide (e.g. “clear blue sky”, “forgotten 
appointment”, “tumble dryer”), which were selected from a bank of 1200 phrases previously 
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coded (independently) for their emotional valence (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; see 
Appendix VIII). In the control condition, these were replaced with simple mathematical 
calculations (e.g. “16 + 1 = 17”, “9 x 11 = 99”, “17 – 4 = 13”). 
In the experimental condition, an equal number of negative, neutral and positive cues 
were distributed throughout the presentation. At four points in the presentation, however, the 
stock phrases were removed and replaced with cue phrases that were relevant to the IM 
reported by the participant. For example, in response to an IM about a friend’s suicide the cue 
phrases “personal loss”, “feeling responsible”, “tragic event” and “lasting grief” were 
inserted within the standard sequence of cue phrases.11 At eight points during the vigilance 
task, the presentation stopped, and a slide appeared instructing participants to “Please record 
your thoughts and concentration now.” On four occasions, these stop trials with a thought 
probe came immediately after participants were presented with one of their personalized cues 
that appeared on a preceding trial for 1500 ms (stop probes 3, 5, 6 and 8). On the four 
remaining occasions, the stop trials were following the presentation of a non-personalized cue 
(stop probes 1, 2, 4, and 7). The timing of stops was mirrored in the control (mathematical 
formula) condition with the exception that stop probes were preceded by trials with non-
verbal information (e.g., maths calculations).  They were also given a brief questionnaire to 
record their thoughts and concentration (see below).  
Thought Probe Questionnaire (see Appendix X): this was a four-item questionnaire 
that participants were asked to complete each time they were stopped during the presentation, 
and a further five questions to be answered after the vigilance test was over. The first 
question asked simply that they recorded their thoughts in the moment they were stopped, 
and they were given space in order to describe the thoughts in their own words. In the second 
 
11 The IM descriptions provided by participants at screening were read by members of the research team. 
Keywords that closely reflected the content of the reported IM (including perceptual features and associated 
emotions) were independently nominated, and four of these were agreed upon through discussion.  
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question, participants were asked to tick a box to indicate whether they believed their 
thought was spontaneous (i.e., just popped into mind) or deliberate. If they believed their 
thought to be spontaneous, they were asked to tick a box to indicate if it was triggered by 
something in the environment, in their own thoughts or that there was no trigger. If they 
could identify a trigger, they were asked to describe this in their own words. In question 3, 
participants were asked to rate their concentration level on a 5-point scale (1=not 
concentrating at all, 5=fully concentrating) at the moment when the thought came to mind. 
The fourth question asked that participants rated the vividness of their thought on a 7-point 
scale (1=very vague, almost no image at all, 7=very vivid, almost like normal vision).  
The second page of each questionnaire was completed after the vigilance task ended. 
In question 5, participants were asked to indicate whether their thought was a past memory, 
future event, or related to a current/ongoing situation. If the thought was about the past or 
future, they were asked in question 6 to indicate how long ago the event on which the 
memory was based occurred, or how far into the future they were projecting. In question 7, 
participants were asked to indicate the frequency with which they had had this thought in the 
past (1=never, 2=once or twice, 3=a few times, 4=several times, 5=many times). In question 
8, they were asked to rate the pleasantness of their thought on a on a 5-point scale (1=very 
unpleasant, 3=neutral, 5=very pleasant). Finally, in question 9, participants were asked to 
tick a box to indicate how specific they believed their thought to be (e.g. “one off 
event/thing”, “general thought about a repetitive event”, “general thought about an extended 
event”). 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, et al., 1961): See Study 2 (Chapter 3; Appendix 
V).  
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970): See Study 
2 (Chapter 3; Appendix IV).  
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Mood Scale: In order to provide another baseline and follow-up measure of mood, 
participants were asked to complete a simple 9-point Likert scale immediately before and 
after they completed the vigilance task. Participants were simply asked to circle the number 
on the scale that best reflected their current mood (1=extremely negative, 5=neutral, 
9=extremely positive).  
4.2.4 Procedure  
As described in the method section of Chapter 2, participants were provided a 
description of IMs and were invited to take part in a study examining the impact of IMs on 
mood and concentration in daily life, if they currently experienced such memories (an 
indicative frequency of one IM a day was suggested). Although the aim was to recruit people 
who reported experiencing their nominated IM at least once a day,  the research team also 
carefully examined the content (i.e., the description of IM provided by the participant) and 
additional ratings (i.e. duration, distress and avoidance) of nominated IM in reaching a 
decision about whom to invite to the laboratory session. At the point of invitation, 
participants were randomly allocated to experimental or control conditions (so that the 
individually tailored cues could be inserted into the presentation for the former condition).  
Participants were given a more comprehensive information sheet upon arrival in the 
lab and asked to consent to their participation in the remainder of the study. They were then 
asked to complete online versions of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the State 
portion of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) before receiving detailed instructions 
about the vigilance task and completing a practice trial consisting of 40 slides (with three 
targets, but no thought probes).  
After completed the practice trial, participants were given the following verbal 
instructions: 
As you can see, this experiment is about people’s attention and their concentration 
during fairly lengthy monotonous tasks. You might be familiar with the situation in 
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which your thoughts wander off during an easy monotonous task (for example, 
driving). However, at critical points, such as when approaching roundabouts, you will 
need to pay attention to what you are doing again. Our study is interested in these 
fluctuations in concentration and thoughts during such monotonous tasks. In addition, 
we are also interested in the effects of verbal and non-verbal information on your 
concentration levels throughout the task. Hence, some participants will be detecting 
lines on the screen and other participants need to detect words/mathematical formulas. 
You have been allocated to the group that detects lines. Therefore, you can just ignore 
the words/mathematical formulas and concentrate on the lines.  
 
The main vigilance task is similar to the practice one but longer. In addition, the 
presentation will occasionally stop, and you will be prompted to record your 
concentration level and thoughts at the moment you were stopped.  
 
As you can see, although this task is quite simple, it can be difficult to maintain 
concentration. As with the driving example, your thoughts may drift to matters 
unrelated to the task. These thoughts can be about anything: the past, present or the 
future. They may be thoughts that pop into your mind spontaneously, or they may be 
something you have deliberately chosen to think about. It doesn’t matter if your 
concentration and thoughts fluctuate in this way throughout the presentation, but 
please ensure that you write down the content of your thoughts at the exact moment 
you are stopped. Each time you are stopped by the presentation, you will be provided 
with a questionnaire to record your thoughts and assess your level of concentration.  
 
Just before beginning the vigilance task, participants were asked to rate their mood in 
that moment on the 9-point scale. During the vigilance task, participants were exposed to a 
total of 11 target slides in both the experimental and control conditions. In addition, the 
presentation stopped 8 times and they were asked to complete thought probe questionnaires. 
In the experimental condition, on four of those occasions the stop probe came immediately 
after the participant was exposed to a personalized cue that had been developed based on the 
IM they reported in the screening questionnaire (stop probes 3, 5, 6 and 8). On the remaining 
four occasions (stop probes 1, 2, 4 and 7) the cue immediately preceding the stop probe was 
incidental (i.e., drawn from the pre-existing bank of cue phrases and not tailored to the 
content of the reported IM). In the control condition, the mathematical calculations that 
appeared instead of the cue phrases were presented in a fixed sequence, with no variation 
from participant to participant.  When the presentation stopped, participants were 
immediately given the first side of the thought probe questionnaire, and asked to record the 
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contents of their mind as quickly as possible. On the first stop probe trial, they were guided 
through the remaining questions about the trigger for the thought, the concentration rating at 
the time it came to mind, and how vivid the thought was. Once this was completed, they were 
asked to return the questionnaire to the experimenter, who numbered them in the top right-
hand corner to maintain the order in which they were completed.  
Once the vigilance task was completed, participants were asked to complete the 
second side of the thought probe questionnaire (regarding the temporal location, 
repetitiveness, pleasantness and specificity of the thought). The researcher handed each 
questionnaire to participants one-by-one, so that they could refer to their reported thought 
before completing the second side. Once the second side of all the questionnaires had been 
completed, participants were asked to rate their mood again on the 9-point scale. Finally, they 
were asked if at any point, during the presentation, they experienced an IM, other than during 
one of the stop trials. If they indicated yes, they were also asked how many times this 
occurred, what the trigger was, and if the IM was identical to the one reported on the 
screening questionnaire or different. The researcher recorded this information on a piece of 
A4 paper designated for this purpose.  
Before leaving the lab, participants were partially debriefed that one of the purposes 
of the study was to see if their IM came to mind during the vigilance task, and if so, whether 
it was more likely to be triggered by a personalized or irrelevant cue. Participants were then 
advised that they would receive an email in three days with a link to a final set of 
questionnaires (BDI and STAI – State). Once these were completed, they received a full and 
final debrief.  
4.3 Results - Study 3a 
 
 All participants completed the online screening questionnaire and the laboratory-
based vigilance task. The IMs reported at screening were coded according to content, and the 
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mean ratings for associated measures of frequency, duration, distress and vividness were 
analysed for group differences. The experimental and control groups were compared for the 
frequency of thought-type reported (e.g. task related versus unrelated, spontaneous versus 
deliberate) as well as the frequency of IMs reported. The role of personalised versus non-
personalised cues in triggering IMs was analysed within subjects in the experimental 
condition, comparing the frequency of IMs reported for stop probes 3,5,6,8 (personalised 
cues) with IMs reported for stop probes 1,2,4,7 (non-personalised cues).   In cases where 
Mauchley’s Test was found to violate the assumption of sphericity, degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser ( <.75) or Huyhn Feldt ( >.75) estimates of sphericity 
(Field, 2013). Finally, BDI and STAI scores were analyzed for group differences as well as to 
assess possible therapeutic benefits of reporting IMs during the vigilance task. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the alpha level adopted for determining significant results was 0.05.  
4.3.1 Content and phenomenology of IMs Reported at screening 
 
The content of IMs reported by participants in the initial online questionnaire varied 
considerably. This content was coded according to the scheme developed by Reynolds and 
Brewin (1999), into the categories of ‘death/illness of another person,’ ‘illness/injury to 
oneself,’ ‘assault or abuse to oneself,’ ‘interpersonal problems’ and ‘other.’ Examples of the 
types of memories that fell into the ‘other’ category were a criminal conviction, failing first-
year university exams, and a near automobile accident. The results of the coding are 
presented in Table 4-2. Because of the small number of IMs that fell into the category 
“assault or abuse to oneself” (none in experimental condition, and one in the control) these 
were combined with IMs that fell into the category “illness/injury to oneself.” Whilst there 
are some notable differences in the distribution of reported IMs between the two groups – 
namely the frequency of ‘interpersonal problem’ reports - these were not statistically 
significant 2(3, N = 41) = 1.86, p = .60. 
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Table 4-2: Percentages (frequency) of IMs as a function of experimental condition and 




















































      
 
The IMs reported at screening were also rated by participants on a number of scales, 
the means for which are presented in Table 4-3. The frequency of the memories was on 
average, ‘3-4 times per week’. In addition, the ratings given for distress, vividness and 
avoidance were high (well above mid-point on the scale). There were no group differences 
between the experimental and control conditions for the mean ratings given on any of the 
associated measures. In addition, 73% of participants in the experimental condition reported 
their IM to be accompanied by bodily sensations, whilst this was the case for 63% of 
participants in the control condition. There were no group differences 2(1, N = 41) = 0.43, p 
= 0.51. Similarly, 32% of participants in the experimental condition reported their IM to be 
like “reliving the event as occurring here and now” rather than “looking back at the past,” 
whilst this was the case for 26% of participants in the control condition. Again there were no 









Table 4-3: Mean (standard deviation) ratings for experimental and control conditions, and 




Characteristics Experimental Control Variable Description p 
Frequency a 2.54 (1.30) 3.05 (1.35) 3-4 times per week 0.23 
Vividness b 5.64 (1.18) 5.33 (1.33) Highly vivid (1-7 scale) 0.45 
Distress b 5.64 (1.43) 4.95 (1.51) Highly distressing (1-7 scale) 0.14 
Disruption b 3.36 (1.43) 3.74 (2.08) Moderate disruption (1-7 scale) 0.50 
Avoid thinking b 5.05 (1.89) 5.26 (1.88) High avoidance (1-7 scale) 0.71 
Avoid reminders b 4.73 (2.10) 4.84 (2.17) High avoidance (1-7 scale) 0.86 
Duration c 1.82 (0.59) 1.84 (0.60) minutes 0.89 
Age of memory d 5.82 (1.09) 5.32 (1.76) less than one year 0.27 
a Frequency ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=none, 2=once or twice a week, 3=three or four times a 
week, 4=once a day, 5=two to three times a day, 6=three to five times a day, 7=more than five times a day 
b Ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=not at all, 7=extremely 
c Duration ratings were scored on a 5-point scale: 1=seconds, 2=minutes, 3=up to an hour, 4=several hours, 
5=constantly.  
d Timeframe ratings for the memory were made on an 8-point scale: 1=twenty-four hours, 2=one week, 3=one 
month, 4=within six months, 5=less than one year, 6=between one and five years, 7=between five and ten years, 
8=more than 11 years.  
 
4.3.2 Vigilance Task Performance 
 
During the vigilance task, participants were exposed to 11 targets slides (featuring 
vertical lines). The mean number of successfully detected targets by pressing the space bar 
was 9.75 (SD=1.04) for the experimental condition and 9.11 (SD=2.52) for the control 
condition, whereas the corresponding mean response times were 776 milliseconds 
(SD=71.64) and 801 milliseconds (SD=238.32), respectively. However, due to a software 
error, responses were only collected for 8 participants in the experimental condition and 9 in 
the control condition. The results of two, one-way ANOVAs on the number of successful 
targets and the mean response times show no group differences (both F<1).  
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4.3.3 Types of Thoughts Reported 
 
Each of the 41 participants were stopped 8 times during the course of the vigilance 
task, resulting in a total of 328 thought probes. On 15 of these occasions, participants 
reported that their mind was blank, leaving 313 probes. Participants were asked to rate each 
reported thought as either deliberate (i.e. something they had chosen to think about) or 
spontaneous (i.e. something that had just popped into their mind; see Plimpton et al., 2015). 
A total of 88 thoughts (28%) were coded as deliberate and 225 (72%) were coded as 
spontaneous thoughts. Two researchers also coded all of the 313 thoughts as either task-
related (e.g. referencing some aspect of the vigilance task, including participants’ assessment 
of their performance) or task-unrelated (Plimpton et al., 2015; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011). For example, if participants reported waiting for 
the vertical lines to come up or thinking that the task was boring these thoughts were classed 
as task-related, and if they were thinking about matters not relevant to the vigilance task (e.g., 
their upcoming exam or winning a prize in a high school), thoughts were classed as task-
unrelated. Inter-rater reliability was very good (Cohen’s Kappa=.82).  Of 313 valid thought 
probes, only 40 (13%) were classed as task-related, and 273 (87%) were classed as task-
unrelated.  
Spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts were the unit of interest for analysis. Therefore, 
the 19 thoughts (6%) that were coded as both deliberate and task-related were removed from 
further analysis. An additional 21 thoughts (7%) were coded as spontaneous and task-related 
and were also removed. Finally, an additional 69 thoughts (22%) that were coded as 
deliberate and task-unrelated were removed. This yielded a total of 204 spontaneous, task-
unrelated thoughts (65% of all valid thought probes). Of these, 30 thoughts referred to IMs 
nominated by participants at screening (see section 4.3.7 below).  
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The reported frequencies of different types of thought by experimental condition are 
presented in Table 4-4. These frequencies suggest that the different types of incidental stimuli 
encountered by participants on each trial (verbal vs. numeric information) had a substantial 
impact on the type of thought that participants were reporting. Group differences in the 
reported frequency of deliberate vs. spontaneous thoughts and task-related vs. task-unrelated 
thoughts suggest that the control group was able to more successfully concentrate on the task 
than the experimental group. Although the total numbers of deliberate, task-related thoughts 
were fairly low, control group participants had a significantly higher number of such thoughts 
than experimental group participants. By contrast, participants in the experimental group 
reported a significantly higher number of spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts. 
 
Table 4-4: Mean (SD) frequencies of each category of thought (including IMs) as a function 
























































4.3.4 Characteristics of spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts and their triggers  
The mean ratings of on-task concentration and thought characteristics for 
spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts (excluding the 30 IMs) are presented in Table 4-5. 
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Results of one-way ANOVAs on these ratings showed no significant differences between 
experimental and control conditions. 
 
Table 4-5: Mean (SD) ratings for each variable (excluding IMs) as a function of group, and 









Concentration a 3.27 (0.97) 3.12 (1.10) 0.63 
Vividness b 4.61 (0.99) 4.64 (0.96) 0.89 
Rehearsal c 3.06 (0.65) 2.83 (0.69) 0.28 
Pleasantness d 2.99 (0.58) 2.94 (0.66) 0.81 
a Concentration ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=not at all, 5=fully concentrating.  
b Vividness ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=very vague, almost no image at all, 7=very vivid, almost 
like normal vision 
c Rehearsal ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=never, 2=once or twice, 3=a few times, 4=several times, 
5=many times 
d Pleasantness ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=very unpleasant, 3=neutral, 5=very pleasant. 
 
 
By contrast, there were marked differences between the conditions in terms of number 
of different types of triggers (environmental trigger, own thoughts, no trigger) reported by 
participants for spontaneous task-unrelated thoughts (excluding IMs). While participants in 
the experimental condition (verbal cues) reported a very high proportion of environmental 
triggers for their thoughts, participants in the control condition (mathematical formulas) 
reported a high proportion of ‘own thoughts’ as triggers (see Table 4-6). Reports of ‘no 
trigger’ was relatively infrequent in both groups. It is also worth pointing out that, in line 
with previous studies using the vigilance task, the majority of environmental triggers (91%) 
reported in the experimental condition referred to incidental cue-words presented on the 
screen. In contrast, the majority of environmental triggers (96%) reported by control 
participants involved some other aspects of the vigilance task (e.g., patterns of lines on the 
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screen) or external distracters (“vibration of phone”, “footsteps” and “my stomach making 
funny noises”).  
Table 4-6: Percentage (total) of reported triggers as a function of experimental group. 
 Environment Own Thoughts None Total 
Experimental  62% (64) 24% (25) 14% (14) 100% (103) a 
Control 27% (19) 70% (49) 3% (3) 100% (70) 
a One participant failed to record a trigger for one of their reported thoughts.   
 The frequencies for each trigger-type (environment, own thought, no trigger) were 
calculated by participant, and entered into a 2 (experimental condition) x 3 (trigger-type) 
mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. Results showed a significant main 
effect of trigger type F(1.69, 63.15) = 15.84, p < .001, 2 = .289, and a marginally significant 
effect of experimental condition F(1, 39) = 3.17, p = .083, 2 = .075. However, these effects 
were qualified by a significant interaction F(1.69, 63.15) = 14.26, p < .001, 2 =.268 (see 
Figure 4-1).  Tests of simple main effects revealed that participants in the experimental 
condition reported more environmental triggers (M = 2.91, SD =1.65) than the control group 
(M = 1.00, SD = 0.94) (p<.001), whilst the control group reported more own thought triggers 
(M = 2.58, SD = 2.14) than the experimental group (M = 1.14, SD = 0.94) (p=.007). In 
addition, the experimental group reported more instances of thoughts with no trigger (M = 





Figure 4-1: Mean frequency with which each type of trigger was reported, as a function of 
experimental group.  
 
4.3.5 IM Frequency 
A key objective of the study was to determine whether it was possible to capture 
people’s naturally occurring IMs under controlled laboratory conditions, using a method that 
was previously shown to be successful for capturing IAMs. Results from the present study 
show that it is possible to capture IMs under such conditions. A total of 30 IMs were 
recorded across both conditions (24 in the experimental condition and 6 in the control 
condition). These IMs represented 15% of all 204 spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts (19% 
in the experimental condition, and 8% in the control condition). 
Because of the relatively high number of participants who did not report any IMs 
during the course of the vigilance task, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was used to 



























IMs (M = 1.09, SD = 0.97) than the control group (M = 0.32, SD = 0.95), U = 100, z = -3.17, 
p = .002, r = -0.49. The high standard deviations, particularly in the control condition, show 
that there was considerable variation in the reporting frequency per participant. Indeed, three 
participants reported the six IMs collected in the control condition, but four of these IMs 
were reported by one participant. In the experimental condition, the 24 IMs were reported by 
15 participants (two participants each reported six IMs, five participants reported two IMs, 
and eight participants reported one IM).  
4.3.6 Types of triggers reported for IMs 
 
Participants in the control condition appeared more likely to report their own thoughts 
as triggers for their IMs, whereas participants in the experimental condition appeared more 
likely to report environmental triggers for their IMs. Indeed, the only instance where a 
participant in the control condition reported an environmental trigger for their IM was when 
“the ambiance of the room, bright with the fan, matching room conditions of the memory” 
(for an IM regarding the breakup of a relationship). The results of a chi square analysis 
showed these group differences to be significant 2(2, N=30) = 10.17, p = .006 (see Table 4-
7).  
 
Table 4-7: Percentage (frequency) of IMs as a function of group and reported trigger.  





79% (19) 17% (4) 4% (1) 100% (24) 
Control 
 
17% (1) 83% (5) 0% (0) 100% (6) 
 
One of the main aims of the present study was to examine whether people’s naturally-
occurring IMs were more susceptible to being triggered by personalized cues, or if the 
memories could be triggered by seemingly irrelevant cues. This was accomplished by 
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inserting personalized cues within the vigilance task completed by participants in the 
experimental condition. Of the 19 IMs reported in the experimental condition in response to 
environmental triggers, 17 of these (89%) were in response to cue phrases that appeared on 
the screen during the vigilance task.   
Of the 15 participants in the experimental condition who reported an IM, 13 reported 
verbal cue phrases appearing on the screen as triggers. These IMs accounted for 17 of the 24 
total IMs reported in the experimental condition.  For nine of the reported IMs the identified 
verbal cues were personalized (M = 0.63, SD=0.50). For the remaining eight IMs the 
identified verbal cues were non-personalized (M = 0.56, SD = 0.63). The results of a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests showed no difference in the frequency with which each type of 
cue was reported by participants in the experimental condition, z = -0.28, p = 0.78, r = -0.07.  
4.3.7 Phenomenology of Reported IMs 
 
The mean ratings given to IMs for concentration, vividness, rehearsal and 
pleasantness (as a function of experimental group) are presented in Table 4-8. Participants in 
the experimental condition gave significantly higher concentration ratings when recording 
their IMs than participants in the control condition. There were no group differences in the 
IM ratings given for vividness, rehearsal, and pleasantness. However, it should be pointed out 
that these comparisons could be made on very small numbers of participants who actually 











Table 4-8: Mean ratings for each variable as a function of experimental condition, and the  






(N=15)   
Control  
(N=3)   
 
p 
Concentration a  3.44 (1.14) 1.08 (0.14) .002 
Vividness b 5.17 (1.28) 6.58 (0.72) 0.10 
Rehearsal c 4.17 (0.75) 4.67 (0.58) 0.36 
Pleasantness d 1.56 (1.10) 1.33 (0.58) .912 
a Concentration ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=not at all, 5=fully concentrating.  
b Vividness ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=very vague, almost no image at all, 7=very vivid, almost 
like normal vision 
c Rehearsal ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=never, 2=once or twice, 3=a few times, 4=several times, 
5=many times 
d Pleasantness ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=very unpleasant, 3=neutral, 5=very pleasant.  
 
 
 Finally, it was interesting to compare the ratings given by participants to IMs and to 
spontaneous task-unrelated thoughts referring to the past, which could be conceived of as 
ordinary IAMs that are usually captured by the vigilance task with incidental cue words (see 
Plimpton et al., 2015). The mean ratings are presented in Table 4-9 as a function of memory 
type (IM vs. IAM) , along with the results of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. As can be noted, 
there were no differences with regard to reported concentration levels. There were, however, 
highly significant differences in the reported vividness, rehearsal and pleasantness of IMs in 






Table 4-9: Mean ratings of each variable for IMs and past memories (non-IM), and the 
results of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
  




Concentration 2.97 (1.44) 3.37 (1.21) .273 
Vividness 5.48 (1.45) 4.68 (1.35) .002 
Rehearsal 4.39 (0.74) 2.92 (1.36) .002 
Pleasantness  1.61 (1.15) 2.57 (0.98) .007 
a Only 14 participants (11 in the experimental condition and three in the control condition) reported both an IM 
and an IAM. Therefore the means and analyses presented are based on these participants.   
 
4.3.8 Therapeutic Effects of Recording IMs  
 
 To test for possible therapeutic benefits of reporting their IM during the vigilance 
task, participants were divided into two groups according to whether they had reported an IM 
(n = 18) or not (n = 23), regardless of experimental condition (see Table 4-10). Participants’ 
scores on the BDI, STAI, and 9-point mood scale were then entered into a 2 (IM reported or 
not) x 2 (time of administration) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. 
The analyses for the BDI and STAI scores did not result in any significant main effects or 
interactions. Results for the mood scale showed  a significant main effect of time of 
administration F(1, 39) = 8.74, p = .005, 2 = 0.18, a main effect of condition F(1, 39) = 
5.94, p = .019, 2 = 0.13, but no interaction F(1, 39) = 1.50, p = 0.23, 2 = 0.04.  Participants 
who reported an IM seemed to rate their mood lower overall than participants who did not, 




Table 4-10: Mean scores at the first and second administrations of the BDI, STAI and 9-point 
mood scale, as a function of whether participants reported and IM during the vigilance task. 
 IM reported IM not reported 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
BDI 15.94 (10.30) 15.63 (10.95) 12.68 (8.57) 14.14 (11.38) 
STAI 42.56 (10.59) 43.81 (7.30) 42.59 (11.13) 44.50 (8.83) 
Mood 5.44 (1.50) 4.5 (1.50) 6.22 (1.38) 5.83 (1.75) 
Note: Two participants did not complete the BDI and STAI at Time 2 
4.4 Discussion - Study 3a 
 
 The present study resulted in several novel findings. The most important finding was  
that it is possible to elicit naturally occurring IMs in the lab using the modified version of a 
paradigm originally developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) for studying IAMs. In 
addition, most of these IMs arose in response to environmental triggers, the majority of 
which were the phrases presented on the screen during the vigilance task. Thus, results 
strongly suggest that IMs are as dependent on meaningful environmental cues as other types 
of involuntary cognition, as evidenced by the paucity of IMs reported in the control 
(mathematical formulas) condition. However, the effort to examine the ‘reactivity’ of IMs by 
manipulating the relevance of some cues to the IM reported at screening, did not produce any 
effect. Participants in the experimental group were equally likely to report their IM in 
response to a personalized cue as to a non-personalized cue.   
It seems likely that the high number of cues overall lessened the impact of the 
personalized cues. This could have occurred for a number of reasons. Because cues were 
presented on each trial, and there were hundreds of trials, this made it difficult to remove all 
non-personalized cues from the presentation sequence that might have had some relevance to 
the IM reported at screening. Therefore, some participants reported their IM as being 
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triggered by a non-personalised cue phrase that was nonetheless meaningfully related to the 
content of their reported IM (see Table 4-11; Berntsen, 2009).   
In addition, the number of cues also presented many competing opportunities to 
trigger a retrieval process for other autobiographical content. For example, if a participant 
already had an autobiographical memory triggered by a non-personalized cue that was 
presented 10 slides before the stop trail, the personalized cue that appeared immediately 
before the stop trial would have had to disrupt this already-occurring retrieval process 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). It is also possible that having a personalized cue just 
before the stop trial provided too little time to initiate a successful retrieval process. Indeed, 
when Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) first developed this lab method, participants were 
asked to stop the presentation themselves to report that an IAM had come to mind. For those 
IAMs which were reported by participants to have been triggered by a particular cue phrase 
on the screen it was possible to calculate the retrieval time, i.e., the time it took the 
participant to report an IAM after seeing this cue phrase. Schlagman and Kvavilashvili 
(2008) found that the mean retrieval time for such IAMs was between 4.61 (SD=3.81; Study 











Table 4-11: Sample of IMs reported in response to personalized and non-personalized cues. 
Reported IM 
 
Reported Trigger Relatedness 
Thoughts of friend's suicide 
 
 
"senseless tragedy" Non-personalised 
 
Bad memories of my parents 
last year late feb arguing 
violence scares me 
overthinking one particular 
event.  
 
the words displayed e.g. 
divorce, argument, wedding 
anniversary 
Non-personalised 
Thinking about my weight 
and ex-boyfriend 
Reading the words "feeling 
unwanted" and recently 





I was thinking about my 
most recent relationship and 
that I maybe rushed into it 
and then ended up putting 
up with a lot of unpleasant 
behaviour that I shouldn't 
have because he was my 
first love and I thought it 
seemed like the best thing to 




Words on slides ("hurtful 
deception"?) 
Personalised 
Seeing my mum in a 
hospital bed with no hair for 
the first time 
 
 
The phrase "hospital visit" Personalised 
Parking ticket & memory 
from before about car 
accident 
 




Finally, it is also possible that personalized cues were drowned out by the attentional 
resources needed to monitor all of the cues. Related studies have found that both increasing 
attentional load and increasing the number of verbal cues in the presentation sequence 
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resulted in a lower number of IAMs reported (Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski, & Chiorri, 
2019; Vannucci, Pelagatti, et al., 2014).  
Given the surprising finding that participants in the experimental condition of Study 
3a were equally likely to report their IM in response to personalised and random cue words,  
a follow-up (Study 3b) was designed, which aimed to isolate the impact of personalized 
cueing more effectively than in Study 3a. This was achieved by reducing the number of 
incidental cues to 150 (as opposed to the 600 verbal cues used in Study 3a) and personalizing 
a selection of 4 cues in the experimental condition, and not personalising any of the cues in 
the control condition. In other words, the effectiveness of personalised versus random cues 
was examined primarily between subjects (although the design also allowed to make 
comparisons between personalised and random cues within subjects in the experimental 
condition). As in Study 3a, the vigilance task contained eight stop trials. In the experimental 
condition, at stop trials three, four, five and six, an incidental cue phrase was replaced by a 
personalized cue which was inserted three slides before the stop trial (producing a 4.5 
second-long window for IM retrieval), and were not immediately preceded or followed by 
any other cues. The aim was therefore to maximize attentional resources for detecting 
personalized cues, and to allow sufficient time for the IM to be retrieved. By contrast, stop 
trials one, two, seven and eight, were preceded by non-personalised (incidental) cue words 
which were the same for all participants. In the control condition, participants encountered 
the same 150 cues distributed in semi-random fixed positions across 600 slides, as was the 
case in the experimental condition, with the exception that stop trials three, four, five and six 
were preceded by standard incidental (non-personalised) cues. It was predicted that these 
changes would mean that the number of reported IMs at stop trials three, four, five and six 
would be higher in the experimental than control condition due to personalised cues in the 
former, while there would be no differences between the conditions in the number of reported 
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IMs after stop trials one, two, seven and eight, which were preceded by the same (non-
personalised) incidental cues in both conditions.  
In addition, to examine whether recording IMs during the vigilance task resulted in 
mood improvements participants were asked to complete the same 9-point scale at the 
beginning and end of the laboratory session. They were also asked to complete the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) at the beginning of and after completing the 
laboratory session.  




The study used an experimental, between-subjects design, whereby screened 
participants were randomly allocated to either the experimental or control conditions. The 
primary independent variable was the relatedness of the cues to participants’ reported IMs 
(incidental in the control condition, and a combination of incidental and personalized in the 
experimental condition). The primary dependent variables were the frequency with which 
participants reported their nominated IM during the vigilance task, and the change in their 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) score from baseline.  
4.5.2 Participants  
 
Based on their responses to the online screening questionnaire (see Chapter 2), 74 
people were invited to a follow-up lab session. A total of 39 participants accepted and 
completed all aspects of the study (19 experimental, 20 control). Of these, 32 were female 
(82%) and seven were male (18%) with no gender differences as a function of experimental 
condition 2(1, N=39)=.24, p=.62. Similarly, there were no group differences in participants’ 




Table 4-12: Mean (SD) for age, baseline HADS and the results of a one-way ANOVA. 
 Experimental 
 
Control F df p 
Age 20.89 (4.74) 21.25 (6.59) .037 1,38 .85 




Online Screening Questionnaire: This was identical to the questionnaire used in Study 
3a.  
Vigilance Task: The vigilance task contained the same 600 slides, each presented for 
1500 milliseconds, using SuperLab software. As in Study 3a, participants were asked to 
detect infrequent arrangements of vertical lines (n=11) among frequent arrangements of 
horizontal lines (n=589), and were instructed to press the spacebar when they detected a 
target slide. In the present study, in both conditions cue phrases appeared in the centre of only 
150 slides (e.g. “clear blue sky”, “forgotten appointment”, “tumble dryer”). These were 
balanced for emotional valence (50 positive, 50 neutral, 50 negative). The experimental and 
control conditions mirrored each other in terms of the placement of the 150 cue phrases and 
eight stop trials. In contrast to Study 3a, however, cue phrases appeared three slides (4500 
milliseconds) before stop probe trials, and the two slides immediately preceding the stop trial 
had no cue phrases on them (see Appendix IX). The selection of this time interval was based 
on the mean IAM retrieval time of four to five seconds found by Schlagman and 
Kvavilashvili (2008).  For all of the stop trials in the control condition - and stop probes 1, 2, 
7 and 8 in the experimental condition - these cue phrases were fixed and did not differ 
between participants. For stop probes 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the experimental condition, participants 
were presented with a cue phrase that was based on the IM they reported at screening. As in 
Study 3a, the sets of four personalised cue words were derived individually for each 
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participant by the research team who independently nominated suitable cue phrases for each 
IM description and the best possible cue words were agreed upon after discussion.   
Thought Probe Questionnaire: This was identical to the questionnaire used in Study 
3a (see Appendix X). 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983; see 
Appendix XI): The HADS is a short, 14-item measure developed to gauge levels of 
depression and anxiety in a general medical population. It has 2 sub-scales for depression and 
anxiety, the questions for which are interspersed throughout the measure, and which are 
scored separately. Responses to each question incur a score of 0 to 4, some of which are 
reverse scored. Questions focus on particular symptoms for anxiety (e.g. “I feel tense or 
‘wound up’” 3=most of the time, 2=a lot of the time, 1=time to time, occasionally, 0=not at 
all; “I can sit at ease and feel relaxed” – 0=definitely, 1=usually, 2=not often, 3=not at all) 
and depression (e.g. “I look forward with enjoyment to things” - 0=as much as I ever did, 
1=rather less than I used to, 2=definitely less than I used to, 3=hardly at all; “I feel as if I am 
slowed down” – 3=nearly all of the time, 2=very often, 1=sometimes, 1=not at all). Overall 
scores of 8 to 10 are typically considered to reflect mild symptoms, 11-14 moderate, and 15 
to 21 severe (Stern, 2014).  
The HADS has been shown to be a valid measure of anxiety and depression 
symptoms, with subscale scores for each correlating highly with clinician determined ratings 
for each condition (both p<.001). Results also suggest the measure successfully distinguishes 
the symptoms for each. This is reflected in significant correlations between the same clinician 
determined ratings and subscale scores for a smaller group of participants (17) who showed 
high symptoms of depression or anxiety, but not both. Finally, the HADS has been shown to 
be a reliable measure, with a high rate of alignment between cases determined to be clinically 
significant following researcher interview and those determined to be clinically significant by 
 160 
the scale. This is reflected in a rate of only 1% false positives and 1% false negatives in the 
case of the depression subscale, and 5% false positive and 1% false negatives in the case of 
the anxiety subscale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).  
Mood Scale: This was identical to the scale used in Study 3a.  
 4.5.4 Procedure 
 
Upon their arrival in the lab, participants were given a more comprehensive 
information sheet than that presented with the online questionnaire, and asked to give written 
consent for their participation in the remainder of the study. Then they completed the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) via the Qualtrics 
online system before receiving detailed instructions (identical to Study 3a) about the 
vigilance task. Participants completed a practice trial before the main vigilance task. Before 
leaving the lab they were given an interim debrief sheet, and advised that they would receive 
an email in 3 days with a link to a final questionnaire (HADS). Once this was completed they 
received a full and final debrief via email. 
4.6 Results – Study 3b 
 
4.6.1 Content and phenomenology of IMs reported at screening 
 
 All IM descriptions collected at screening were coded according to the scheme 
developed by Reynolds and Brewin (1999) into the categories “death/illness of another 
person,” “illness/injury to oneself,” “assault or abuse to oneself,” “interpersonal problems” 
and “other.” The proportions of memories falling into each category are represented in Table 
4-13. There were no group differences between the experimental and control conditions 2(4, 




Table 4-13: Percentages (frequency) of IMs reported at screening for content categories for 














































28% (11) 18% (7) 18% (7) 10% (4) 26% (10) 
 
 
 In addition, participants rated their nominated IM on a number of scales, including 
frequency, duration, vividness distress and avoidance. The mean ratings for each variable as a 
function of experimental condition are presented in Table 4-14. The frequency with which 
participants experienced their nominated IM was closer to three to four times per week. 
Participants in both conditions rated their memories, on average, as highly vivid and highly 
distressing, with more moderate levels of disruption and avoidance. Some group differences 
did emerge regarding the avoidance ratings given. Participants in the experimental group 
indicated that they avoided thinking about the event marginally more than participants in the 
control group. There was a clear difference regarding avoidance of reminders, with the 
experimental condition participants reporting that they engaged in this more than control 
participants. It is difficult to account for these findings given the random allocation of 
participants to the experimental and control conditions.  
In addition, 68% of participants in the experimental condition reported their IM to be 
accompanied by bodily sensations, whilst this was the case for 65% of participants in the 
control condition. There were no group differences 2(1, N = 39) = 0.05, p = 0.82. In the 
experimental condition, 58% of participants also reported their IM to be like “reliving the 
event as occurring here and now” rather than “looking back at the past.” In the control 
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condition, 35% of participants indicated their IM was accompanied by this sense of reliving, 
but again there were no group differences 2(1, N = 39) = 2.06, p = 0.15. 
 
Table 4-14: Mean (standard deviation) ratings for experimental and control conditions, and 
results of one-way ANOVA for each.  
 Condition   
Characteristics Experimental Control Variable Description p 
Frequency a 3.0 (1.15) 3.50 (1.54) Three or four times a week 0.26 
Vividness b 5.58 (1.17) 5.65 (1.53) Highly vivid (1-7 scale) 0.87 
Distress b 5.11 (1.33) 4.90 (1.77) Highly distressing (1-7 scale) 0.69 
Disruption b 3.32 (1.45) 2.90 (1.57) Moderate disruption (1-7 scale) 0.40 
Avoid thinking b 5.37 (1.71) 4.25 (2.10) Moderate avoidance (1-7 scale) 0.08 
Avoid reminders b 5.16 (1.68) 3.70 (2.25) Moderate/High avoidance  0.03 
Duration c 2.11 (1.15) 1.75 (0.55) Minutes  0.22 
Age of memory d 6.00 (1.37) 5.60 (1.54) Between 1 and 5 years 0.40 
a Frequency ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=none, 2=once or twice a week, 3=three or four times a 
week, 4=once a day, 5=two to three times a day, 6=three to five times a day, 7=more than five times a day 
b Ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=not at all, 7=extremely 
c Duration ratings were scored on a 5-point scale: 1=seconds, 2=minutes, 3=up to an hour, 4=several hours, 
5=constantly.  
d Timeframe ratings for the memory were made on an 8-point scale: 1=twenty-four hours, 2=one week, 3=one 
month, 4=within six months, 5=less than one year, 6=between one and five years, 7=between five and ten years, 
8=more than 11 years. 
  
4.6.2 Vigilance Task Performance  
 
 Participants’ performance on the vigilance task as a function of experimental group is 
presented in Table 4-15. The results of two separate one way ANOVAs showed group 
differences in the rate of target detection F(1, 33)=5.33, p=0.027, but no differences in 
response time (F<1).  
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Table 4-15: Mean (SD) rate of successful target detection and response time (milliseconds) 
as a function of group. 
 Target Detection 
 
Response Time 
Experimental 9.70 (0.96) 841.90 (278.20) 
Control 10.41 (0.80) 817.40 (249.00) 
 
4.6.3 Types of Thoughts Reported  
All 39 participants were stopped 8 times during the presentation and asked to record 
their thoughts at that moment. This yielded a total of 312 thought descriptions. There were 12 
instances where participants indicated that their mind was blank when they were stopped, so 
these were removed from further analysis, leaving a total of 300 thoughts. Out of these, 53 
thoughts (18 %) were classed by participants as deliberate and 247 (82%) were classed as 
spontaneous.  
Two researchers also coded all thoughts as either task-related (e.g., “the task I have to 
complete and staying focused” or “I was thinking about when the next vertical line would 
appear”) or task-related interference, which involved an appraisal of one’s performance on 
the task, or an assessment of some other aspect of the task not directly related to what the 
participant has been asked to do (e.g. “task is getting boring, making me agitated” or “I am 
thinking there is only one more trial to do”). By contrast, thoughts were classed as task-
unrelated if they were completely unrelated to any aspects of the vigilance task (e.g., 
“Thinking about my sister” or “Thinking about driving lessons and my road rage”). Inter-
rater reliability was moderate (kappa=.546). A total of 14 thoughts (5%) were classed as task-
related, 52 thoughts (17%) were classed as task-related interference, and 234 thoughts (78%) 
were classed as task-unrelated.  
 Spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts were the primary unit of analysis. Therefore, the 
53 thoughts (18%) classed by participants as deliberate were excluded from further analysis, 
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leaving 247 spontaneous thoughts (82%). Out of these 247 thoughts, 7 (3%) were coded by 
researchers as task-related, and an additional 39 (16%) were coded as task-related 
interference. These 46 thoughts (19%) were also removed from further analysis, yielding a 
final sample of 201 spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts (67% of all valid thought probes). 
Of these, 21 thoughts referred to IMs nominated by participants at screening (see section 
4.6.6 below).  
The reported frequencies of different types of thought by experimental condition are 
presented in Table 4-16. In contrast to Study 3a, the only variable for which group differences 
emerged was task related thoughts (but these only represented only a very small proportion of 
the total thoughts reported). It appears that the inclusion of verbal cue phrases in both 
conditions resulted in groups being equally likely to report spontaneous and task unrelated 
thoughts.  This was the case even with the inclusion of Task Related Interference as a variable 
(which was not included in Study 3a).  
Table 4-16: Mean (SD) frequencies of each category of thought (including IMs) as a function 

































































4.6.4 Characteristics of spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts and their triggers 
 Participants rated each of their thoughts on a number of scales (assessing levels of 
vividness of the thought, concentration levels, etc) and the mean ratings given to all non-IM 
spontaneous task-unrelated thoughts are presented in Table 4-17, overall and as a function of 
experimental group. These were entered into a series of one-way ANOVAS, which showed 
no group differences.  
Table 4-17: Mean (SD) ratings for each variable as a function of group, and the results of a  
one-way ANOVA. 
  Condition 
 
 
 Overall Experimental Control p 
Concentration a 3.03 (0.92) 2.87 (0.91) 3.19 (0.93) 0.29 
Vividness b 4.58 (1.19) 4.65 (1.26) 4.50 (1.15) 0.71 
Rehearsal c 3.01 (0.74) 2.88 (0.73) 3.13 (0.75) 0.31 
Pleasantness d 3.18 (0.68) 3.09 (0.49) 3.26 (0.82) 0.44 
a Concentration ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=not at all, 5=fully concentrating.  
b Vividness ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=very vague, almost no image at all, 7=very vivid, almost 
like normal vision 
c Rehearsal ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=never, 2=once or twice, 3=a few times, 4=several times, 
5=many times 
d Pleasantness ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=very unpleasant, 3=neutral, 5=very pleasant. 
 
 
4.6.5 Reported triggers for non-IMs    
 Across both conditions, participants reported that 63% (114) of their non-IM thoughts 
were triggered by environmental cues, 26% (46) by their own thoughts, and 11% (20) had no 
trigger. In line with previous studies using the vigilance task, the vast majority (83%) (n = 
90) of these 114 environmental cues, described by participants, referred to word cues 
presented on screen. The remaining 4% (n = 4) referred to some other aspect of the vigilance 
task (e.g., pattern of lines on the screen) and 13% (n = 14) to stimuli in the environment (e.g., 
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noise outside the room).12 The frequencies with which participants reported each trigger 
category were entered into a 2 condition (experimental vs. control) x 3 trigger (environment, 
own thought, no trigger) mixed ANOVA. Results showed a very strong effect of trigger 
category F(2, 70)=22.34, p<.001, 2=0.39, but not of group (F<1), or an interaction F(2, 70) 
= 2.04, p = 0.14, 2 = .055. Pairwise comparisons (LSD) showed that environmental triggers 
were reported much more often than ‘own thoughts’ (p<.001) or ‘no trigger’ (p<.001). 
Similarly, participants reported their ‘own thoughts’ as a trigger more often than instances of 
‘no trigger’ (p = .029).   
4.6.6 IM Frequency 
 
 A total of 21 IMs were reported across both conditions13, with 16 (76%) IMs being 
reported in the experimental condition and 5 (24%) in the control condition. These IMs 
represented 15% of all spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts reported in the experimental 
condition, 5% of all such thoughts reported in the control condition, and 10% of all 
spontaneous task-unrelated thoughts reported across both conditions.  
 There was some variability in the reported frequency per participant in both 
conditions. In the control condition, five participants reported one IM, and the remaining 15 
participants (75%) did not report any IMs. In the experimental condition, nine of 19 
participants (47%) did not report any IMs. One participant reported four IMs, one reported 
three IMs, one reported two IMs, and seven (37%) reported one IM. Because of the high 
number of participants who did not report any IMs during the course of the vigilance task, the 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U Test was used to compare groups. 
 
12 On six occasions participants did not provide a description of their environmental trigger. 
13 This number excluded four memories reported in the control condition and two in the experimental 
condition that were deemed to be “IM-related” (see Chapter 3 data coding). An additional three memories 
excluded from the final total were determined to be IMs, but different from the ones reported at screening via 
the online form. Finally, one participant reported one of their IMs as a ‘deliberate’ thought.  
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It was expected that exposing participants to personalized cues would result in a 
greater frequency of IMs reported than exposing them to standardized, incidental cues, which 
were not related to the content of nominated IMs. Overall, across all the stop probes, the 
experimental group (M = 0.84, SD =1.12) did record more IMs than the control group (M = 
0.25, SD = 0.44), and this difference was significant U=130, z= -1.96, p=.032, r= -.314 (one-
tailed).  
If comparing the two groups across stop probes 3, 4, 5 and 6 (during which 
participants in the experimental condition were presented with personalized cues but 
participants in the control condition were not – see Table 4-18) we again find a significant 
difference U = 132, z = -1.96, p = .031, r = -.31 (one-tailed). This difference was not present, 
however, when comparing the two groups across the remaining four trials (1, 2, 7 and 8) 
where neither condition was exposed to personalized cues U = 179.50, z = -.64, p = .48, r = -
.10 (one-tailed). 
To compare within subjects, we used a Wilcoxon signed rank test to compare the 
frequency of IMs reported during stop probes 1, 2, 7 and 8 with the frequency of IMs 
reported during stop probes 3, 4, 5, and 5 in both the experimental and control conditions. 
Results show a significant difference in the experimental condition z = -2.49, p = 0.02, r = -
0.64, but not the control condition z = -1.34, p = 0.18, r = -0.59.  
Table 4-18: Mean (SD) frequency of IM reports as a function of experimental condition and  
stop probes.  
 Stop probes  3, 4, 5, 6 a 
 
Stop probes 1, 2, 7, 8 b 
Experimental  0.74 (0.99) 0.11 (0.32) 
Control 0.20 (0.41) 0.05 (0.22) 
a Personalised cues in the experimental condition, non-personalised cues in the control condition 
b Non-personalised cues in the experimental and control conditions 
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4.6.7 IM Triggers 
 
 The percentage (and frequency) with which participants reported each type of trigger 
(environmental, internal thought and no trigger) are presented in Table 4-19. In nearly all 
cases (95%), participants reported that their IM was triggered by an environmental cue. In all 
20 cases where an environmental trigger was reported, participants described the trigger as 
one of the cue phrases on the screen. A sample of IMs reported in response to personalized 
and non-personalized cues are presented in Table 4-20.  
Table 4-19: Percentage (frequency) of IMs as a function of group and identified trigger. 





94% (15) 0% (0) 6% (1) 100% (16) 
Control 
 
100% (5) 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (5) 
Overall 95% (20) 0% (0) 5% (1) 100% (21) 
 
To directly assess the role of personalized cues in eliciting IMs in comparison to non-
personalised cues in the experimental group, we examined participants’ reports of external 
triggers when they reported an IM during the stop probe. Of the 16 IMs reported in the 
experimental condition, 12 of these identified personalized cue phrases as triggers (75%).14 
The mean frequency with which personalized cues were reported in the experimental 
condition was 1.33 (SD=0.87) whilst the mean frequency with which non-personalised cues 
were reported was 0.33 (SD=0.50). The results of a Wilcoxon signed rank test showed these 
differences to be significant z = -2.31, p = .02, r = -.60.  
 
   
 
14 Of the remaining four IMs, two were reported during stop probes 1, 2, 7 and 8 and had non-personalised 
cues as triggers, one was reported during stop probes 3, 4, 5 and 6 and but indicated ‘to trigger’ for their IM, 
and one was reported during the same sequence (stop probes 3, 4, 5 and 6, which were preceded by 
personalised cues) but reported a non-personalised cue as a trigger.  
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Table 4-20: Reported IMs and triggers.  
Reported IM 
 
Condition Trigger description Relatedness  
"Mistaken identity' brought up 
a distressed memory which I 
was chased due to 
misidentification, and my life 




Experimental mistaken identity Personalized  






A break up I went through a 





breakdown" on the 
screen 
Personalized 




Experimental terrible nightmare Non-
personalized  
I was thinking of someone 




Control asthma attack Non-
personalized  
Last year my grandad passed 
away after knowing for less 
than 3 months that he had 
cancer. My dad`s side of the 
family aren’t close as well 
which is sad to see 
Control good health Non-
personalized 
 
4.6.8 Phenomenology of Reported IMs 
 
 The mean ratings given to IMs for concentration, vividness, rehearsal and 
pleasantness are presented in Table 4-21. These means are based on 17 participants (12 from 
the experimental condition and five participants from the control condition) who reported 
both an IM and an IAM.  When compared to the ratings given for non-IM past memories, 
some expected and unexpected results emerged. Concentration ratings given for both types of 
thought were virtually equal, suggesting that the ‘cognitive conditions’ (e.g. engagement in 
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an undemanding task) that precipitate an IAM are similar to those that precipitate an IM. 
Surprisingly, however, there were no differences in reported vividness between the IMs and 
non-IM past memories. Ratings for rehearsal and pleasantness were more aligned with what 
would be expected, with IMs receiving a significantly higher rehearsal rating than past 
memories, and IMs receiving a lower pleasantness rating (marginally significant difference).  
 
Table 4-21: Mean ratings (SD) for each variable as a function of thought type, and the 
results of a one-way ANOVA.  







Concentration a 3.14 (1.15) 
 
3.14 (0.97) .002 0.97 
Vividness b 5.0 (1.27) 
 
4.89 (1.09) .140 0.71 
Rehearsal c 3.78 (0.80) 
 
3.22 (0.82) 8.88 .009 
Pleasantness d 1.81 (0.94) 
 
2.41 (0.86) 4.04 0.06 
a Concentration ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=not at all, 5=fully concentrating.  
b Vividness ratings were made on a 7-point scale: 1=very vague, almost no image at all, 7=very vivid, almost 
like normal vision 
c Rehearsal ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=never, 2=once or twice, 3=a few times, 4=several times, 
5=many times 
d Pleasantness ratings were made on a 5-point scale: 1=very unpleasant, 3=neutral, 5=very pleasant. 
e N=17  
 
4.6.9 Therapeutic effects of recording IMs  
 
To explore possible therapeutic benefits of writing about their IMs, participants were 
divided into two groups according to whether they reported at least one IM during the 
vigilance task. A total of 17 participants (44%) reported at least one IM, whilst 22 (56%) did 
not. The mean HADS depression and anxiety scores for each group are presented in Table 4-
22, along with the mean scores on the mood scale that was administered at the beginning and 
end of the lab session. These were entered into a 2 (group) x 2 (time of administration) mixed 
ANOVA. With regard to the depression and anxiety scores, there were no significant main or 
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interaction effects (all F < 1). For ratings of mood, there was a main effect of time of 
administration F(1, 36) = 16.32, p <.001, 2 = .312, with mood ratings decreasing at the end 
of the session, but the main effect of group and group by time interaction were not significant 
(both F < 1).  
Table 4-22: Mean (SD) HADS depression and anxiety scores as a function of experimental 
group and time of administration.  
 IM reported IM not reported 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
HADS Depression 3.82 (2.70) 
 
3.82 (3.30) 4.09 (2.76) 4.68 (2.95) 
HADS Anxiety 8.12 (3.94) 8.35 (3.81) 7.55 (4.23) 8.0 (4.95) 
Mood a 6.0 (1.46) 4.94 (1.69) 6.18 (1.62) 5.09 (2.09) 
a Due to an error, a pre-task mood rating was not collected from one participant. 
4.7 Discussion – Study 3b 
 
 The present study replicates and extends some important findings from Study 3a. 
Namely, the findings showed that it is possible to elicit participants’ own, naturally occurring 
IMs in the laboratory under controlled conditions. In addition, the effect of personalized cues 
on the frequency of IM reports was clearer. This was made possible by a reduction in the 
overall number of cues in both conditions, which placed participants under less cognitive 
load, which had previously been shown to increase reports of IAMs (Vannucci, Pelagatti, et 
al., 2014). In both conditions, 4500 ms was allowed to elapse between cue presentation and 
stop trial, to allow sufficient time for IM retrieval (based on previous findings regarding IAM 
retrieval time: Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). As a result, between subjects comparisons 
showed that the experimental condition (personalised cues) retrieved significantly more IMs 
that the control condition (non-personalised cues). But even within-subjects comparison in 
the experimental condition alone showed the personalised cues (inserted before stop probes 3, 
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4, 5, and 6) to be more effective at eliciting IMs than the non-personalised cues (before stop 
probes 1, 2, 7 and 8). 
4.8 Overall Discussion  
 
 Studies 3a and 3b, described in this chapter, represent the first attempt at eliciting  
naturally-occurring IMs in a non-clinical population under controlled laboratory conditions. In 
addition to demonstrating that this is indeed possible, several additional and important findings 
emerged. Study 3a showed that IMs were susceptible to meaningful (verbal) cuing, as reflected 
by a strong main effect of cueing comparing meaningful verbal cues to mathematical 
calculations in the control condition. Whilst the within-subject comparison of personalized 
versus non-personalized cues did not reach the threshold for significance in Study 3a, it was 
possible to discern the greater impact of personalized versus non-personalised cue phrases in 
Study 3b. In the latter study, participants in the personalized cue condition reported 
significantly more IMs than participants in the non-personalised cue condition. In addition, 
reduction in the total number of incidental cues from 600 to only 150, presented during the 
vigilance task, in Study 3b appears to have contributed to the success of this manipulation. 
Finally, phenomenological ratings suggest that these were genuinely IMs in both studies, but 
the result did not show a relationship between IM reporting and improvement on measures of 
mood, depression or anxiety.  
4.8.1 IM Frequency 
 
A growing number of studies have demonstrated the suitability of the vigilance task in 
eliciting and measuring task-unrelated thoughts in the lab in general (Plimpton et al., 2015; 
Vannucci et al., 2017) and IAMs in particular (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011; Mazzoni et 
al., 2014; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; Vannucci, Pelagatti, et al., 2014; Vannucci et al., 
2017). The present results not only replicate but significantly extend these findings by showing 
that this method is also suitable for eliciting IMs that non-clinical participants reported as 
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experiencing in their daily life at the time that the study was conducted. The success of this 
method in eliciting involuntary cognitions in general may lie in its ability to recreate the 
conditions of low cognitive load under which off-task thoughts are generally experienced in 
day to day life.  
 Given the demonstrated impact of relevant verbal cues for triggering our personal 
past, it is perhaps unsurprising that in Study 3a participants in the control condition 
(mathematical calculations) reported many more deliberate and task-related thoughts than in 
the experimental condition. By contrast, participants in the experimental condition reported 
more spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts, and it was within this condition that a greater 
number of IMs were reported. That being said, the reduced cognitive load under which 
participants were placed in Study 3b (through the reduction in written verbal cues) did not 
appear to yield a greater mean frequency of IAMs or IMs than in Study 3a. Greater frequency 
of such memories was expected in Study 3b compared to Study 3a, based on previous 
findings by Vannucci, Pelagatti, et al., (2014), who showed that fewer verbal cues during the 
task resulted in a greater number of task unrelated thoughts.  The discrepant patterns across 
the Studies 3a and 3b could be a result of using a probe-caught method, whereas a self-caught 
method was used by Vannucci, Pelagatti et al. (2014). This manipulation of reducing the 
number of cue phrases in the vigilance task did, however, make it possible to obtain a main 
effect of personalized versus non-personalized cues in Study 3b.  
4.8.2 Triggers of IMs and Phenomenology 
 
 The results of Study 3a showed a very strong main effect cue type, with verbal 
phrases trigger many more off task thought generally – and IMs specifically – than 
mathematical formulas. As noted above, this is perhaps to be expected, given that verbal cues 
have been shown to be effective triggers for IAMs. There has been little exploration, 
however, of the capacity of verbal cues to trigger IMs. Naturalistic and retrospective studies 
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have focused more on environmental triggers, the perceptual details of which match key 
aspect of the IM (Kleim et al., 2013; Michael et al., 2005). The susceptibility of these 
memories in particular to visuo-spatial cues aligns with prevailing clinical theories about the 
sensory/perceptual nature of IMs being a reflection of peri-traumatic encoding divorced from 
its autobiographical context. And whilst the present studies do not provide a direct 
comparison of verbal versus other types of environmental cue, it does demonstrate that at 
least a proportion of IM triggers are likely to be verbal.  
There were some differences across the two studies in terms of the reported 
phenomenology of IMs, and the comparisons with IAMs. Most of the IMs reported in the 
present studies, however, do appear to be genuinely intrusive when compared to IAMs along 
a number of phenomenological characteristics. In Study 3a, IMs were rated as more vivid, 
more rehearsed and less pleasant than IAMs reported during the same task. These are 
expected phenomenological differences in these two types of memories. It was not, however, 
possible to replicate all of these results, and in Study 3b, IMs were rated as much more 
rehearsed than IAMs, but only marginally less pleasant, and comparable in terms of the 
vividness ratings given.   
4.8.3 Therapeutic effects 
 
 A number of different strands of research, including expressive writing (James W 
Pennebaker, 1997), autobiographical memory questionnaires (Boals et al., 2011; Rubin et al., 
2010), prolonged exposure (Brewin, 2003), and cognitive therapy (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998), 
suggest that interaction with the contents of IM might yield therapeutic benefits. The 
suggestion is that incorporation of the memory into the autobiographical memory narrative, 
and alteration of the appraisals associated with the memory, has the potential to reduce the 
repetitive and distressing nature of the memory.  
In the present study, however, this effect was not evident in Time 1 and Time 2 scores 
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on the BDI, STAI, HADS or mood ratings obtained before and after completing the vigilance 
task. This could be for a number of reasons, not least of which is the relatively short period of 
time that participants wrote about and answered questions regarding the content of their IMs 
(often just two to three minutes). The minimum time used in expressive writing tasks is 15 
minutes, with longer and more frequent engagement found to show stronger effects (see 
Pennebaker, 1997). To give a sense of completion time, the Autobiographical Memory 
Questionnaire used by Boals and colleagues contained 26 items, each rated on a seven-point 
scale whilst the Impact of Events Scale had 22 items. The thought probe questionnaire used 
in the present studies contained only 9 items, though one of them requested a description of 
thought (in this case IM) content. Even with multiple IM reports (reaching a maximum of six 
in the case of two participants in Study 3a), the shorter length (plus not having a significant 
focus on reappraisal of the memory) reduced the scope for a therapeutic effect. If therapeutic 
benefit from such activities is partly derived from monitoring thoughts over a period of time 
(in addition to engaging with them), then the relative brevity of the laboratory session in the 
present study (one hour) could also account for the lack of effect.  
 
4.8.4 Limitations and Future Directions  
 
 Review of the SuperLab files for both studies suggests that due to computer error, 
some of the cues did not follow their intended order of presentation. Whilst all participants in 
the experimental conditions of both studies were exposed to personalised cues (based on the 
IM reported at screening), this resulted in some participants being presented with the same 
personalised cue more than once. This was the case with four of the participants in Study 3a 
who reported an IM, and six of the participants in Study 3b who reported an IM. But on no 
occasion in either study did participants report an IM in response to a second instance of a 
personalised cue being presented. An additional two participants in Study 3a, along with 
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some of the abovementioned participants in both studies, appear to have been exposed to a 
personalised cue at a point in the presentation when it had been intended that they be exposed 
to a non-personalised cue (as well as the inverse). Interestingly, Study 3b in particular still 
showed a main effect of personalised versus non-personalised cues (within and between 
conditions), suggesting that this effect might have been even stronger had this handful of cue-
sequence changes not occurred.  
In addition, whilst the aim of the present study was to examine the impact of 
incidental verbal cues, personalised verbal cues and cognitive load on the triggering of IMs, 
this did not leave scope for a comparison between verbal cues and sensory perceptual cues. 
Given that it has been demonstrated that this method can be used to elicit IMs under 
laboratory conditions, even with verbal cues alone, a next logical next step would be a more 
direct comparison between verbal and pictorial cues. It has been shown that verbal cues are 
more effective than pictorial ones in triggering IAMs (Mazzoni et al., 2014). Some IM 
research in the clinic and in the lab has shown that pictures can be effective triggers (Krans et 




 The present studies represent the first time that a laboratory-based vigilance task, 
originally designed for the study of IAMs, has been applied to the study of IMs. Results show 
that it is possible to capture IMs under controlled laboratory conditions, and to do so using 
verbal cue phrases. The reduction in cue frequency in Study 3b made clear that personalised 
verbal cues are more effective at eliciting IMs than incidental cues, which chimes with 
current thinking in IAM research. The possibility of manipulating variables – particularly 




























Chapter 5: The role of triggers and ongoing activities in eliciting analogue 






























5.1 Introduction   
 
 The elusive nature of naturally occurring IMs, as well as the difficulty and ethical 
implications of using experimental manipulations in studying them, has resulted in many 
researchers using analogue methods. Often referred to as the ‘trauma film paradigm’, these 
methods have yielded interesting and replicable findings about such film-induced IMs. In 
brief, participants are asked to view a short film clip or static images that include distressing 
content, and then record any images from the film that pop to mind during the subsequent 
days (Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James et al., 2016). It is widely acknowledged that these film-
induced IMs cannot be directly compared to naturally occurring IMs, but investigation of the 
former are thought to offer some insight into the formation of the latter (Marks et al., 2018). 
There are some unaddressed research questions, however, response to which could go some 
way toward clarifying the extent to which these two phenomena can be usefully compared to 
each other. The first of these is around the nature of triggers in film-induced IMs, the 
exploration of which requires modification of the diary that has typically been used in 
trauma-film research, to align more closely in format to the diary used in IAM research.  
 As noted in Chapter 1, the primary aim of this area of research has been to clarify the 
underling mechanisms of IMs, through assessing which experimental manipulations appear to 
increase or reduce the frequency of film-related IMs. This has been accomplished through 
setting participants certain types of tasks before, during and after viewing of the film. This is 
done to determine if these tasks appear to have any impact on the subsequent frequency with 
which people report film-related IMs in the diary. It has been found that performing visuo-
spatial tasks (such as the completion of a tapping pattern, or playing the game Tetris) during 
and after the viewing of distressing film content, seems to interrupt the consolidation of 
analogue IMs, resulting  in fewer reports of such thoughts during the subsequent days of 
diary keeping. In contrast, completion of verbal task during the viewing of the film resulted 
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in an increase in the number of reported IMs (see Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; James 
et al., 2016). 
 This pattern of findings has been interpreted as supportive of the dual representation 
theory of PTSD (Holmes et al., 2004). The theory claims that trauma related IMs, as a 
symptom of PTSD, occur because peritraumatic dissociation at the time of the event results in 
enhanced sensory encoding, combined with impoverished encoding of contextual and 
verbally accessible memory. These two memory traces, joined together under normal 
circumstances, become decoupled from one another. This sensory data, devoid of any 
verbally accessible contextual memory for the situation in which the traumatic event 
occurred, results in the repetitive, unwanted IMs that so many experience after the traumatic 
event. Therefore, interrupting this encoding with a visual spatial task, it is argued, will result 
in fewer subsequent IMs. And similarly, interrupting the verbal, contextual coding with a 
concurrent task, will contribute to an enhanced sensory perceptual encoding, resulting in a 
higher frequency of IMs (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Brewin, 2015). 
 Because the primary focus has been on frequency and the mediating influence of 
prior, concurrent or post-film tasks, the structure of the diary given to participants has been 
quite simple, without including many of the items that would normally be found in an IAM 
diary. Indeed, the majority of studies have used diaries which only sought to measure the 
frequency of IMs, and in a smaller number of cases – distress (see Marks, Franklin, & 
Zoellner, 2018). Very few studies have sought to measure a broader range of variables, and 
none (to our knowledge) have assessed triggers for IMs, concurrent tasks, or concentration 
levels at the time that IMs were experienced in everyday life.  
 How soon after viewing the film (i.e., the analogue trauma) do these memories begin 
to intrude upon consciousness? The pattern of recording film-related IMs in the diary shows 
quite consistently that the majority of such IMs are reported in the first few hours after 
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viewing the film, and taper off thereafter (James, Lau-Zhu, Clark, et al., 2016). In addition, 
available data from laboratory based studies of film-related IMs suggests that self-reports of 
such thoughts are highest during the period immediately following the viewing of the film 
(Green, Strange, Lindsay, & Takarangi, 2016b). Relatedly, it would be interesting to know if 
higher initial reports of IMs immediately following the film are predictive of higher reports in 
the days following (in the diary). There is some reason to believe that this would be the case. 
In a study of involuntary and intrusive musical imagery, Hyman et al. (2015) asked a group 
of psychology student participants to listen to a series of songs over the course of several 
weeks (one during each classroom session), and rate them along a number of scales (for 
familiarity, likability etc). At the following classroom session they were asked to report how 
often they had noticed the song playing in their mind over the intervening days. They found 
that participants who reported having the song in their mind as they left the initial lab session, 
later reported experiencing it much more frequently in the days following.   
 Questions have also been raised about the validity of self-reports of analogue IMs. 
Initial speculation was based on evidence from mind-wandering research that human can lack 
meta-awareness of the contents of our thoughts (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Given the distressing nature of IMs, however, it is by no 
means a foregone conclusion that people would similarly lack meta-awareness of the 
occurrence of this type of cognition. Two such studies sought to test this by asking 
participants to monitor their thoughts whilst performing a reading task after viewing a 
distressing film, and report any instances of an image from the film coming to mind. In one 
condition, however, participants were also intermittently stopped during the reading task 
(probed) and asked to report the contents of their mind. In this condition, between 25% and 
29% of participants reported that they were thinking about the film when randomly probed in 
this fashion, leading researchers to conclude that participants may have lacked meta-
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awareness for the occurrence of at least some analogue IMs (Takarangi et al., 2017, 2014). 
From this it might be inferred that such induced IMs occur more frequently after viewing the 
film than previously suggested by diary reports alone, though some subsequent findings have 
suggested this might be overestimated if researchers assume that all probe caught IMs are 
new cognitions as opposed to continuations of thoughts that were previously self-reported 
(Green et al., 2016b).  
 Questions also remain about the cues or triggers for such film-induced IMs. Oulton 
and Takarangi (2018) asked participants to view a series of distressing images and then 
complete a computer-based vigilance task. During the task, participants were randomly 
allocated to one of three conditions in which they were exposed to single cue phrases related 
to the images (e.g. knife), cue phrases in triplets (e.g. skull, sick, hunger) or no cue phrases at 
all. Participants were instructed to press a key to indicate that they had experienced an 
involuntary cognition related to the images (either intrusive memories or involuntary 
elaborative cognitions) and then asked to record the contents of this on a subsequent screen. 
When the content of these involuntary cognitions was analysed, it was found that participants 
in the no-cue condition reported fewer IMs than participants either in the single or triplet cue 
conditions. The latter two conditions, however, did not differ from each other in the number 
of IMs elicited (despite predictions that single cues would be more likely to elicit IMs). This 
resonates with findings from Vannucci et al. (2017) which showed that exposure to verbal 
cues was more likely to trigger periods of mind-wandering when compared to the absence of 
verbal cues. In addition, they also found that verbal cues prompted more instances of mind-
wandering about the past when compared to participants who were not exposed to any cues.  
 Whilst there has been some exploration of cuing for analogue IMs under controlled 
laboratory conditions, there has been little investigation of this in a naturalistic environment. 
This would seem a fruitful line of enquiry, given how it might facilitate comparison between 
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the triggers for such cognitions, and the triggers for naturally occurring IMs as well as IAMs. 
Whilst it has been shown that the majority of triggers for IAMs are environmental in nature 
and are often based on abstract and verbal information (Mace, 2004), the picture is less clear 
for IMs generally, and analogue IMs in particular. Whilst there is some evidence that cues for 
naturally occurring IMs are sensory perceptual in nature (Ehlers et al., 2004), there has been 
little investigation of this with regard to analogue IMs. Therefore, a key aim of the present 
study was to examine the nature of these triggers as well as concurrent activities reported by 
participants. An additional aim was to determine if the reported triggers were primarily 
sensory-perceptual in nature, or if they aligned with the pattern identified with IAMs where 
slightly larger (or comparable) proportions of triggers have been reported as being more 
verbal and abstract than sensory-perceptual (Mace, 2004; Schlagman, Schulz, & 
Kvavilashvili, 2006).  
 Intrusive memories are often based on highly vivid mental images of the original 
traumatic event (Brewin et al., 2010). Certain naturalistic (e.g. peritraumatic dissociation) and 
experimental (e.g. concurrent verbal tasks during the viewing of distressing imagery) 
conditions seem to facilitate the formation of these highly vivid, image-based IMs. But in 
terms of individual differences, some questions remain about whether people who have a trait 
tendency toward the use of visual imagery are more likely to experience IMs. With regard to 
standard autobiographical memories, a relationship has been found between high levels of 
vividness and object imagery, and greater frequency of involuntary and voluntary 
autobiographical memory retrieval. In individuals with high levels of object imagery, IAMs 
were also more detailed and vivid (Vannucci, Pelagatti, Chiorri, & Mazzoni, 2015). On this 
basis, it might be anticipated that people who are found to score higher on scales of imagery 
would also report more frequent and vivid IMs relative to people to who score low on such 
scales. And there have been some resonant findings with regard to flashbacks and nightmares 
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in people diagnosed with PTSD, where the frequency of these correlated positively with 
visual imagery ability (Bryant & Harvey, 1996).   
 Finally, content and length of the films has also varied considerably in these 
experiments. Some studies have used thematically consistent content, but a majority are using 
a compilation of clips of varying content including road traffic accidents and other dangerous 
incidents (e.g., elephant stampede). One study, however, found that exposure to thematically 
consistent content (in this case, an assault) yields more film-related IMs than varied content 
(Weidmann, Conradi, Gröger, Fehm, & Fydrich, 2009). The length of many trauma films has 
been 9 to 10 minutes or more, though more recently some studies have used shorter formats 
(James et al., 2016).  
 Given the above mentioned, under-explored areas in research using the trauma-film 
paradigm, there are a number of questions driving the present studies. Firstly, what are the 
reported triggers for analogue IMs, and do they follow a similar pattern of reported triggers 
for naturally occurring IMs as well as IAMs? Specifically, are the majority of triggers for 
analogue IMs environmental as is the case with IAMs, or are they reported as arising 
internally in response to participants’ own thoughts? Alternatively, maybe it is difficult to 
identify the triggers for such thoughts, as is the case with a small proportion of IAMs  
(Berntsen, 1996; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). Finally, IAMs have comparable 
proportions of triggers that are abstract/verbal and sensory/perceptual (Mace, 2004; 
Schlagman et al., 2006), but it is unclear whether this pattern will map onto analogue IMs.  
 Additional unaddressed questions relate to the tasks in which people report being 
engaged when their film-related IMs come to mind, and the level of concentration these tasks 
demand. In addition, what impact will a shorter, fragmented but thematically consistent film 
have on the frequency and content of IMs reported in both the lab and the diary in the days 
following? Will a relationship be evident between higher initial experience of IMs (in the lab 
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shortly after viewing the film) and higher reports of IMs in the diary in the days following? 
Finally, will a relationship be found between measures of mental imagery use and vividness 
and the frequency of IMs reported in the lab and diary?  
These questions were addressed in two separate trauma-film studies. The first pilot 
study (Study 4a) was exploratory in nature, recruiting 30 undergraduate participants and 
asking that they watch a 5-minute compilation of road safety advertisements and report any 
IMs they experienced in the lab shortly thereafter, and in a diary during the 72 hours 
immediately following the lab session. At the request of the ethics committee, participants 
were carefully screened for current symptoms of depression or PTSD. Given that the majority 
of trauma-film studies have used longer films with varied content, and limited recording of 
IM occurrence in the lab and IM phenomenology via the diary, the primary goals of this pilot 
study were: 1) to examine whether a 5-minute thematically consistent clip would elicit a 
reliable number of film based IMs in the lab and during the 72 hour period following the lab 
session similar to other studies that have used longer and more thematically varied clips; 2) to 
examine whether initial IM reports in the lab correlate with later reports in the diary; 3) to 
examine whether measures of mental imagery use and vividness correlate with frequency of 
IM reports in the lab and the diary; 4) to determine the triggers for IMs reported in the diary; 
5) to examine the phenomenology of IMs reported in the diary, namely the vividness of 
reported thoughts, concurrent ongoing tasks and participants’ concentration levels.  
With regard to Study 4a, a number of predictions were made. Firstly, it was predicted 
that participants would report environmental triggers for their film-related IMs with much 
greater frequency than their own thoughts or ‘no trigger’, but that unlike findings on ordinary 
IAMs, these triggers would be primarily sensory-perceptual in nature. In line with findings in 
IAM research, it was predicted that concurrent activities when IMs came to mind would be 
cognitively undemanding, and require little concentration for successful completion. Finally, 
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it was predicted that higher scores on measures of mental imagery use and vividness (in this 
case the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) and Spontaneous Use of 
Imagery Scale (SUIS)) would correlate with the frequency of IM reports in the lab and the 
diary.  
5.2 Method - Study 4a 
 
5.2.1 Design  
 
 The study followed an exploratory, observational design whereby all participants 
followed the same procedure and completed the same tasks.  
5.2.2 Participants 
 
 Participants were recruited opportunistically from the University of Hertfordshire 
Campus.  Pre-screening questionnaires were completed by 60 participants of which 30 (12 
males and 18 females) were invited to a laboratory session based on their fulfilment of the 
selection criteria (score of 2 or below on the Primary Care PTSD Screen (PC-PTSD; Prins, 
Ouimette, Kimerling, Camerond, et al., 2003) and 8 or below on the depression sub-scale of 
the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). This was 
done to ensure that only participants who were well (e.g., not in a state of heightened distress 
or experiencing poor mental health) were invited to the laboratory.  
Three participants did not return their diary booklets, and one did not complete any 
full diary entries. These were excluded from further analyses, resulting in a final sample of 
26. The mean score on the PC-PTSD was 0.73 (SD=0.92, range 0-3)15, whilst mean scores 
on the anxiety and depression subscales of the HADS were 7.0 (SD=3.58, range 0-13) and 
3.73 (SD=2.15, range 0-8) respectively. Participants also completed the Spontaneous Use of 
 
15 One participant, out of 26, scored 3 on the PC-PTSD. When this was examined against their scores on the 
HADS it was deemed unlikely that they were experiencing symptoms of PTSD, and in fact more likely that they 
did not read the instructions properly for how to complete the PC-PTSD. For this reason, they were allowed to 
proceed with their participation.  
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Imagery Scale (SUIS; M=37.73, SD=8.39, range 23-53) and the Vividness of Visual 
Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; M=36.0, SD=7.91, range 21-56). Participant ages ranged 
from 18 – 24 years (M=20.27, SD=1.34), with 15 females and 11 males.  
5.2.3 Materials 
 
Primary Care PTSD Screen (PC-PTSD; Prins et al., 2003; see Appendix XII): This is 
a 4-item measure developed for use in primary care settings to offer a quick and un-intrusive 
means of determining whether patients may have some symptoms of PTSD. As the name 
suggests, this is not a diagnostic tool in its own right, but can help clinicians determine 
whether further testing is warranted. Respondents give ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to 4 questions 
about whether they have experienced symptoms such as nightmares, avoidance, heightened 
vigilance or detachment over the past month in response to a traumatic event. Typically, 
indicating yes to three or more of the questions is sufficient to trigger follow-up evaluation 
for PTSD. The PC-PTSD showed good retest reliability at development, with a high 
correlation (Pearson’s coefficient of 0.83, p<.001) between initial scores and one month 
follow-up (pre-treatment). The validity of the measure was reflected in the similarly high 
Spearman correlation (0.83, p<.001) between the results of the PC-PTSD and the Clinician 
Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS).  
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983): See Study 
3b (Chapter 4; Appendix XI).  
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003; see 
Appendix XIII): This is a 12-item questionnaire used to measure the extent to which people 
spontaneously use imagery in daily life. Respondents rate each item as 1 to 5 depending on 
how much they feel it applies to them (1 = never appropriate, 3 = appropriate about half the 
time, 5 = always completely appropriate). Sample items are “I prefer to read novels that lead 
me easily to visualize where the characters are and what they are doing instead of novels that 
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are difficult to visualize,” or “When I first hear a friend's voice, a visual image of him or her 
almost always springs to mind”. The overall scores are derived from adding up responses on 
the 5-point scale for each question. The minimum score is therefore 12 and the maximum is 
60, with higher scores indicating higher use of mental imagery in daily life.  
The SUIS demonstrated a high level of internal consistency at development, with all 
items on the scale correlating highly with each other (coefficient of 0.98 or greater; Reisberg 
et al., 2003). Subsequent analysis with a Dutch translation of the scale largely replicated these 
reliability results across 3 different samples (=0.76, =0.72, =0.72 respectively). In terms 
of scale validity, that study furthermore found a significant inverse correlation between the 
SUIS and the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ: the inverse relationship 
being a function of the way the latter measure is scored – see below; Nelis, Holmes, Griffith, 
& Raes, 2014). 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973; see Appendix 
XIV): This is a 16-item scale used to measure the vividness of mental imagery. Respondents 
are presented with a mental image prompt - such as the face of a friend or relative who they 
often see, a rising sun, a shop they often visit, and a country scene – and asked to respond to a 
series of questions regarding the resultant image that comes to mind. For example, after being 
asked to “visualize a rising sun” and “consider carefully the picture that comes before your 
mind's eye“, respondents are asked to rate the vividness of their mental imagery following 
statements such as “The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky” or “The sky clears 
and surrounds the sun with blueness.” Responses to each item are on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = 
perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision; 2 = clear and reasonably vivid; 3 = moderately 
clear and vivid; 4 = vague and dim; 5 = no image at all, you only "know" that you are 
thinking of the object), and are added together to determine final score. Overall scores range 
from 16 to 80, with lower scores indicating higher levels of vividness in the mental imagery. 
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The reported retest reliability of the VVIQ was good (coefficient of 0.74), as was the split-
half reliability (coefficient of 0.85; Marks, 1973). Subsequent analysis has found the measure 
to show high internal consistency (=0.91) and good construct validity, reflected in 
significant Pearson correlations (p<0.01) with both Gordon Test of Visual Imagery Control 
and the Bett’s Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (Campos & Pérez-Fabello, 2009; Marks, 
1989).  
Film Clips: The film was a shortened version of that used by Holmes, James, Coode-
Bate, and Deeprose (2009). Instead of varied subject matter (cutting a face, elephant 
stampede, etc), only the clips relating to road safety were retained, resulting in a 5-min film 
consisting of 5, thematically consistent clips.   
• ‘It’s 30 for a reason’ (2005): A young girl is leaning against a tree on the side 
of a suburban street, with blood dripping out of her ear. Her voice explains 
that if she is hit at 40 miles per hour there is an 80% chance she will die. The 
clip continues in reverse sequence, as the blood disappears from her face, her 
bones crack back into place, and her body slides back into the centre of the 
street. The clip ends with the girl sitting up and taking a sharp breath, 
presumably the moment just before she was hit by the car.  
• 2) ‘Pay Attention or Pay the Price’ (2002): A teenage boy and girl flirt with 
each other via text message as they leave school separately, accompanied by 
friends. They eventually spot each other across the road. She sends a final text 
to him, and as he is reading it, he steps into the road and is hit by a van. The 
girl screams. The windscreen of the van shatters upon impact with the boy’s 
body. He is thrown in front of the van and lands heavily on the pavement, 
blood escaping from his mouth. The clip cuts away to a casket being carried at 
the boy’s funeral, and ends by focusing the girl’s face as she is crying. 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• 3) Anti-Drink/Drive [Shame] (2000): This television advertisement features 
two parallel narratives that intersect at the end. In one, a father is playing with 
his young son and daughter in their back garden. In another, a young man is 
playing football with friends, and then is shown drinking at the pub after the 
game. As the young man is driving home from the pub his wheel catches on a 
verge. The car rolls over and crashes through the fence of the garden in which 
the father and children were playing. The young boy is run over by the car, 
and the clip ends with the father holding the young boy’s lifeless body and 
crying, with the driver looking on.   
• 4) ‘No Seatbelt, No Excuse’: A teenage couple (boy and girl) are picked up in 
a car by some friends. A narrator’s voice advises that today the boy (Michael) 
is going to hit the girl so hard that she will end up with brain damage. Shortly 
after this the car is involved in a collision. All passengers except the Michael 
are wearing seatbelts. In slow motion, his body is jerked violently forward and 
backward. His head makes contact with that of his girlfriend, and then shatters 
the car door window. The clip cuts away to an emergency medical technician 
communicating over a radio. He says that three people in the vehicle have 
died, and one is in critical condition, and that this is the result of one passenger 
not wearing a seatbelt.  The clip ends with 3 body bags in view, and a member 
of emergency services shutting the van door.  
• 5) ‘The Faster the Speed, The Bigger the Mess’: A young couple are 
embracing as she is sat on a stone wall, and he stands in front of her. A car 
careens around the corner, flips over, and slides across the road, pinning the 
couple to the wall. The young woman screams while her boyfriend is 
motionless. The clip cuts away her being treated in hospital, and the young 
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man’s parents identifying his body in the morgue. The penultimate scene 
features the young woman in court as the driver of the vehicle is sentenced. 
We learn from a final scene that he was speeding but swerved to avoid a 
border collie in the road. The clip ends showing her in a wheelchair, visiting 
her boyfriend’s grave.  
Emotion and Involvement Scales: Immediately before and after watching the film, 
and at the end of the session, participants rated the degree to which they were feeling certain 
emotions on a series of 7-point Likert scales (1=not at all, 4=moderately, 7=very much) by 
indicating how angry, happy, anxious, sad, and disgusted they were feeling (adapted from 
Weidmann et al., 2009). In addition, immediately after watching the film, on similar 7-point 
scales (1=not at all, 4=moderately, 7= very much) participants indicated how distressing they 
found the entire film clip, and how involved they felt in the events depicted.  
Diary of film-related IM (see Appendix XV): All participants received A5 booklets in 
which to record any memories or images from the film that popped to mind over a 3-day period 
following the first meeting. The diaries consisted of 32 pages, though participants were advised 
that if they ran out of pages, they would be provided with another booklet.  
Each page consisted of 11 questions that participants had to answer either in their own 
words or choosing an option from a rating scale. In question one, participants had to record 
the time and date that the IM was experienced, and in question two the time and date it was 
recorded in the diary. In question three they provided a brief written description of the film-
related image or memory that popped to mind, and in question four indicated whether there 
was any trigger (in your thoughts, in the environment, no trigger). If there was a trigger, they 
were asked to describe what it was question five. Participants also described the activity they 
were involved in (question six) and rated their levels of concentration (1=not at all, 5=fully 
concentrating; question seven). Vividness was rated on a 7-point scale (1=very vague, 
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almost no image, 7=extremely vivid, almost like normal vision; question eight). In question 
nine, participants indicated their mood prior to experiencing the memory (1=extremely 
negative, 4=neutral, 7=extremely positive), and in question ten how distressing they found 
the memory (1=not distressing at all, 4=moderately distressing, 7=extremely distressing). 
Finally, participants were asked what effect the memory from the film had on their mood 
(1=no effect, 4=neutral, 7=it made me feel a lot worse; question eleven).  
A grid was printed in the inside front cover of the diary, divided according to the 
number of days of diary-keeping (in this case 4 days of the week, spanning a 72-hour period). 
Participants were advised that if enough time elapsed between experiencing a film-related IM 
and having an opportunity to record it such that they felt un able to recall details such as what 
they were doing at the time, how vivid the memory was etc, they had the choice of placing a 
tick in this gird next to the corresponding day. It was emphasised that full entries were always 
preferable, but that they could place as many ticks in this grid as they needed to in order to 
best reflect the true frequency of their film-related IM. 
Debriefing questionnaire: After returning the diary, all participants answered several 
questions designed to measured compliance with the diary method. For example, participants 
had to indicate how many days (out of 3) they forgot to keep a diary with them. If there was a 
reason they did not keep the diary with them every day, participants were asked to indicate 
this. They were then asked how difficult they found keeping a diary of their film related IMs 
(very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat difficult, very difficult), and what percentage of all 
film-related IMs they experienced were recorded in the diary. If they deliberately did not 
record some of their film related IMs in the diary, they were asked the reason for this. 
Finally, participants were asked whether they found the process of diary keeping at all useful 




 Initial participant screening using the PC-PTSD and the HADS was conducted online 
through Qualtrics. Along with online screening questionnaires, participants also completed 
the SUIS and the VVIQ, though scores on these did not form part of the inclusion/exclusion 
criteria. Eligible participants were invited to take part in the study, and those that accepted 
were tested individually in a psychology laboratory. 
 On the day of testing, participants were advised several times that the content of the 
film was potentially distressing in nature, and that they could withdraw at any point without 
consequence. Those who had personal experience of an automobile accident – as something 
they or someone close to them had experienced – were strongly advised not to participate in 
the study.  
 Before watching the film, participants were given particular verbal instructions about 
how to view it:  
These films clips you are about to watch include scenes of road traffic accidents, which 
may contain some graphic details, and which may be unpleasant to watch. If at any point 
you would like to stop the film please tell me straight away.  
 
For the next 5 minutes, we will show you a film. It is important that you keep 
concentrating on what is happening in each scene. Please try to watch each scene 
completely. If possible, try not to get distracted from the film, do not turn your head or 
look away. While watching the film, please imagine yourself being a close witness at the 
scene. For the purpose of our study, it is important that you let go of whatever reactions 
you may have and that you do not suppress them. 
 
The researcher confirmed one final time with the participant that they were ready, started the 
film, and then left the room. However, immediately before starting the film, the researcher 
asked participants to complete the 7-point scales (1=not at all, 7=very much) to measure the 
degree to which they were feeling angry, happy, anxious, sad and disgusted. When the 
researcher re-entered the room after the film screening, participants were asked to complete 
these again, along with two additional 7 points scales to measure feelings of distress, and the 
extent to which participants felt involved in the events depicted in the film clip. The researcher 
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then left the room for an additional 2 minutes, under the guise of filing away the scales. Upon 
returning, however, participants were asked if they experienced any memories or images from 
the film while they had been on their own. If they had done, they were asked which specific 
portions of the film came to mind, and how many times over the 2-minute period.  
 The entire lab session lasted approximately half an hour. At the end, participants were 
given the diary to record their film-related IMs over the 72 hours immediately following the 
end of the lab session, along with detailed instructions about how to do so. The date of the lab 
session and the time they were to begin recording were written on the front of the diary, as well 
as the date and time that they were to finish (e.g., if the lab session ended at 1:30 pm participants 
would begin recording immediately when they left, and finish exactly 72 hours later). The 32-
page structured diary had 11 questions to which participants were asked to respond each time 
they experienced a film-related IM. To clarify, film-related IMs were defined as “spontaneous 
images, sounds or thoughts that you may have about specific scenes from the film, which pop 
into your mind without you trying to recall anything.”   
Thorough precautions were taken to ensure the wellbeing of participants. Before 
leaving the lab, they were given details of support services (on and off-campus) in the event 
that they found the film unduly distressing. To ensure that their emotional state had returned 
closer to baseline, they were given one final set of 7-point scales on which to rate how angry, 
happy, anxious, sad and disgusted they were feeling. In the event that a participant did become 
highly distressed, provision was made for them to speak to a clinical psychologist affiliated 
with the research team. At no point, however, was this necessary.  
Before participants left the lab session, a date and time for the second meeting was set, 
as close as possible to the time that participants stopped recording their film-related IMs. At 
the second meeting, participants returned their diary and completed a final set of mood scales. 
They then completed a short debriefing (compliance) questionnaire about their adherence to 
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the diary keeping and what, if anything, they felt they gained from the experience. Before 
leaving they were given a final debrief sheet, and the opportunity to ask any questions they 
may have had.  
5.3 Results - Study 4a 
 
All participants viewed the compilation of road traffic accidents and kept the diary of 
their film-related IMs for 72 hours. For all inferential analysis, the alpha level was set to 0.05. 
In cases where Mauchley’s Test was found to violate the assumption of sphericity, degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser ( <.75) or Huyhn Feldt ( >.75) estimates 
of sphericity (Field, 2013).  
5.3.1 Manipulation Checks and Diary Compliance  
 In order to examine the emotional impact of the film, the three collection points (Time 
1 - just before the film, Time 2 - just after the film and Time 3 - the end of the lab session) for 
the five emotions (anger, happiness, anxiousness, sadness and disgust) that participants rated 
during the lab session (on a 7-point scale) were entered into a series of one-way repeated 
measures ANOVAs. The results are presented in Table 5-1. Participants registered a 
significant change overall in each of the five emotions. Bonferroni corrected pairwise 
comparisons show a significant change between scores recorded at Time 1 and Time 2 (with 
ratings for anger, anxiousness, sadness, and disgust going up after viewing the film, and 
ratings for happiness going down; all p<0.03). There was also a significant difference 
between Time 1 and Time 3 in the ratings given to happiness, disgust (both p=.001) and 
sadness (p=.049) suggesting that people remained significantly less happy and significantly 
more disgusted and sad when they left the lab than when they arrived. The mean disgust 
rating, however, dropped from Time 2 to Time 3 (p=.001), suggesting people improved 
appreciably since the moment just after watching the film. This was also true for the Time 2 
and 3 collection points for sadness (p=.008) and anxiousness (p=.001).  Even though the film 
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had a measurable impact on these mood scales, the mean ratings remained relatively low 
throughout (always below the mid-point for negative emotion). Overall this suggests a 
relatively minor impact of the film on mood.  
Table 5-1: Mean (SD) ratings for each emotion as a function of collection time, along with 
the results of a one-way, repeated measures ANOVA.c  
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 F p 2 
Angry 1.35 (0.71) a 2.00 (1.28) b 1.57 (0.84) 6.34 .004 0.22 
Happy 4.70 (1.11) a, b 3.30 (1.49) b 3.78 (1.59) 19.69 .001 0.47 
Anxious 2.17 (1.07) a 2.91 (1.24) b 2.00 (0.74) 8.15 .001 0.27 
Sad 1.61 (0.99) a, b 2.87 (1.52) b  2.13 (1.52) 12.36 .002 0.36 
Disgusted 1.17 (0.39) a, b 2.91 (1.12) b 1.91 (0.95) 32.63 .001 0.60 
a Reliably different from Time 2 
b Reliably different from Time 3 




Compliance with the diary task was good overall, with only three participants 
reporting that they failed to keep the diary on one of the three days of diary keeping, resulting 
in a low mean number of days that the diary was not kept (M=0.19, SD=0.49). Participants 
estimated that, out of a total number of intrusions experienced over the 72-hour period, they 
managed to record an average of about 79% of film related IMs (SD=25.11; range=2.00 to 
100.00).  
5.3.2 Number of Film Related Intrusions Reported in the Lab and in the Diary 
 
 One aim of Study 4a was to examine the frequency with which participants reported 
IMs shortly after viewing the film, whilst still in the lab, and how this compared to IM reports 
in the diary during the 72 hours following the lab session. To this end, during the lab session 
participants were left on their own for two minutes after watching the film, and subsequently 
asked if any images from the film came to their mind during that period of time. Out of 26 
participants, 22 (85%) indicated that this was the case. The mean frequency of film related 
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IMs reported during this 2-minute period was 2.73 (SD = 2.14, range 0 - 9, median = 2.5). 
By comparison, all 26 participants returned their diary to a member of the research team, 
resulting in 90 full diary entries (M = 3.46, SD = 1.92, range 1 - 9, median = 3.0) and 69 
ticked entries (M = 2.65, SD = 3.37, range 0 - 11, median = 1.5), totalling 159 IMs (M = 
6.04, SD = 4.26, range 1-15, median = 5.0).  
5.3.3 Number of IMs recorded in the diary each day 
 
In addition to overall recording frequency in the diary, the number of IMs reported 
per day was examined, to determine whether frequency declined over time. Because 
participants recorded their film-related IM in a diary for 72 hours, the recording per day is 
divided into 4 to reflect the day they were given the diary, the two intervening (24 hr) days, 
and the day they returned it.  The results of two, separate one-way, repeated measures 
ANOVAs showed the significant main effect of day for fully recorded entries F(3, 54) = 
6.62, p = .001, 2 = 0.27, but not for ticked entries F(2.11, 38.01) = 2.01,  p= 0.15, 2 = 0.10. 
Planned comparisons revealed a significant drop in the frequency of full diary entries 
between the first and second days of diary keeping (p = 0.03), but not between the second and 
third days (p = 0.35), or the third and fourth days (p = 0.41). In other words, the number of 
IMs reported on day one was higher than day two, three, and four, all of which did not differ 
from each other (see Figure 5-1).  
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Figure 5-1: Mean frequency of full and tick diary entries, as a function of day.  
 
5.3.4 Reported Triggers for IMs  
 
For each of the film-related IMs reported in the diary, participants indicated whether 
they believed this to be triggered by something in their environment, by their own thoughts, 
or as having no trigger. The proportion of triggers within each of these categories, out of total 
number of IMs recorded, was entered into a one-way ANOVA with trigger category 
(environment, own thought, no trigger) as a within subject variable. Results show a main 
effect of trigger type F(1.71, 42.83) = 6.73, p = .004, 2 = .21 (see Figure 5-2). Pairwise 
comparisons (LSD) revealed that the proportion of environmental triggers was higher than 
the proportion of own thought triggers (p<.001), but not reports of ‘no trigger’ category (p =. 
26). The proportion of ‘no trigger’ reports, however, was significantly higher than own 
























Figure 5-2: Means of proportions of trigger type reported in the analogue IM diary.  
 
In those cases where participants reported a trigger as either environmental or their 
own thoughts, they were asked to describe the trigger in their own words. These were coded 
according to the scheme developed by Mace (2004) into abstract/verbal, sensory/perceptual, 
physiological/emotional state, and unclassifiable/undecided. The abstract/verbal category 
refers to instances where a memory is triggered by one’s own thoughts, or by a written word 
or words detected in the immediate environment (e.g. “article about a car accident” or 
“conversation about driving”). Conversely, the sensory/perceptual category pertains to 
objects, smells and sounds in the environment (e.g. “walking past a car next to a fence” or “in 
a car and driver was texting whilst driving”). Physiological/emotional state triggers arise 
from one’s own experience of one’s physical body (e.g. hunger, pain) or emotions (e.g. 
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anger, sadness). Those triggers that could not be categorised into one of the above were 
coded as unclassifiable/undecided.   
The mean proportion of each type of trigger (out of the total number of triggers 
reported) was calculated by participant and entered into independent samples t-test. The mean 
value of these proportions across 22 participants is represented in Figure 5-3 (four of the 
participants reported all of their thoughts as having no trigger and were therefore excluded 
from the analysis). None of the cases were coded as arising from a physiological/emotional 
state, nor were any deemed unclassifiable. The results of the independent samples t-test 
showed the difference in proportion to be significant t(21) = -3.27, p = .004 (see Figure 5-3).  
 
 
Figure 5-3: Mean proportions of trigger reports as a function of modality.  
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5.3.5 Conditions in which IMs were reported to occur  
In each diary entry, participants were asked to describe the activity in which they 
were engaged when the IM came to mind. These were coded as either habitual tasks that did 
not require a high level of concentration (e.g., walking, eating lunch, washing dishes) or 
controlled activities requiring a higher level of focus (e.g., doing revision, editing a film, 
talking to a friend; see Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). For each participant, the proportion 
of IMs recorded during habitual tasks and the proportion of IMs recorded during controlled 
activities were calculated. A mean proportion of 48.74 (SD = 35.61) of these activities were 
coded as habitual, while a mean proportion of 51.26 (SD = 35.61) were coded as controlled. 
The results of a paired samples t-test on these mean proportions showed this difference to not 
be significant t(24) = -0.18, p = 0.86.  
In addition, the mean concentration rating reported was 2.85 (SD = 1.23). Examining 
the distribution of concentration ratings that participants gave across the 5-point scale (1=not 
concentrating at all, 5=fully concentrating) showed that the mean proportion of IMs that 
participants reported while being in a state of low concentration (points 1 and 2 on the scale), 
medium concentration (point 3 on the scale) and high concentration (points 4 and 5 on the 
scale) were 37.78 (SD = 35.56), 25.55 (SD = 33.29) and 34.72 (SD = 36.23), respectively.  
These were entered into a one-way, repeated measures ANOVA, but no significant 
differences were found (F<1). Effectively, these means indicate that the majority of IMs 
memories were reported to occur when participants experienced low to medium levels of 
concentration on the tasks at hand which is reflected in the overall mean concentration rating 
reported above. 
5.3.6 Correlations Between Imagery Scores and Frequency of Reported IMs 
It was predicted that higher reported levels of vividness of mental imagery would 
correlate with more frequent reports of film-related IMs in the lab and in the diary, as well as 
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higher levels of reported distress and involvement after viewing the film. Spearman’s 
correlations (one-tailed) were conducted on SUIS and VVIQ scores and IM frequency as 
reported in the lab and diary (see Table 5-2). In terms of reported frequency of IMs, the only 
significant relationships found were between the number of full diary entries and VVIQ 
scores (p=.014), as well as between the total number of entries (full entries plus tick entries) 
and VVIQ scores (p=.027). 
Table 5-2: Correlations between imagery scales and frequency of IM reporting.  
  
Spontaneous Use of 
Imagery Scale (SUIS) 
Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (VVIQ) 
Post-film IM -.164 -.231 
Full diary entries .068 -.431*1 
Tick diary entries  .025 -.168 
Full + Tick diary entries  .106 -.382*1 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
1 The response scale on the VVIQ means that lower scores equal higher levels of vividness (e.g. 1 = 
perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision; 5 = no image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of 
the object). 
 
5.3.7 Additional Findings 
 
5.3.7.1 Correlations of Frequency, Distress and Involvement Ratings  
 
There was not a significant correlation between the frequency of fully recorded and 
ticked diary entries of IMs rs(25) = -.254, p = 0.105. The number of fully recorded IMs and 
ticks also did not correlate with the number of IMs reported immediately after watching the 
film in a 2-minute waiting period in the laboratory rs(25) = .099, p = 0.32, and rs(25) = -0.25, 
p = 0.11, respectively (both tests were one-tailed).  
Overall mean ratings of distress taken just after viewing the film were 5.08 (SD = 
1.20) a seven-point scale. Overall mean ratings of involvement were 3.88 (SD = 1.75) on an 
identical scale.  Spearman’s correlations (one-tailed) between these post-film distress and 
involvement rating and IM frequency showed no significant relationships (see Table 5-3). 
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Table 5-3:  Spearman’s correlation’s between IM frequency as reported in the lab and diary, 
and participants’ ratings of involvement and distress in the laboratory.  
  Post-Film Distress Post-Film Involvement 
Lab reports  -0.17 -0.16 
Full diary entries 0.09 -0.09 
Tick diary entries  .220 .171 
Full + Tick diary entries  .049 .131 
 
5.3.7.2 Characteristics of IMs reported in the diary 
 Film related IMs reported in the diary were rated on a number of scales, including 
vividness of reported IMs, distress, self-assessed mood prior to experiencing the IMs, and the 
impact that IMs had on their mood. Mean ratings on each scale were calculated for each 
participant by averaging the ratings on a scale for a total number of film-related IMs reported 
by the participant. The mean ratings across all participants are presented in Table 5-4. Each 
measure was on a 7-point scale, as outlined in the method section, with higher numbers 
indicating greater vividness, positivity (in the case of participants’ assessed mood prior to 
experiencing the memory), distress, and how much worse experiencing the memory made 
them feel. 
 
Table 5-4: Mean ratings, (SD, range) for IMs reported in the diary over the 72 hours of diary  
keeping.  
  Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Vividness 4.14 1.50 1.00 7.00 
Distress 3.35 1.61 1.00 7.00 
Mood before IM 4.32 0.94 2.00 7.00 
Impact on Mood 2.68 1.65 1.00 6.67 
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Ratings for vividness are somewhat lower than might be expected in the case of IMs 
(Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011). And distress ratings are below the median, highlighting 
possible experiential differences between these and naturally occurring IMs.  
5.3.7.3 Film Clips Reported 
 
We also examined potential differences in the frequency with which participants 
reported particular film clips as the basis for their IMs. The mean frequency with which each 
of the five clips in the film was reported in the lab, in the diary, and overall, is represented in 
Table 5-5. These were entered into a 2 (context: Lab vs Diary) x 5 (Clip number) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors. There was no significant main effect of 
context (F<1), showing no difference in the frequency of clip reports in the lab versus the 
diary. There was, however, a main effect of clips F(2.26, 56.37)=9.69, p<.001, 2=.279, but 
no interaction between context and clips F(2.94, 73.55)=1.28, p=.288, 2=.049. Bonferroni 
adjusted pairwise comparisons showed that Clip 5 was reported more frequently than Clip 1 
(p=.004), Clip 2 (p<.001) and Clip 4 (p=.021), but not Clip 3 (p=.340). There were no 
differences in the frequency of reporting between the other clips.  
 
Table 5-5: Mean frequency (SD) with which each of the film clips was reported in the lab and 
the diary.   



























      
 
It is difficult to say with certainty whether this result arises because of recency effects 
or the emotional impact of the film clips. The mean distress ratings per clip derived from 
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participants’ diary entries suggests that clip 5 was least distressing overall (M=3.18, SD= 
1.48, n=13). Clip 3 was given the highest mean distress rating (M=4.08, SD= 1.68, n=12), 
whilst ratings for clip 1 (M=3.43, SD= 1.10, n=7), clip 2 (M=3.60, SD= 1.94, n=8) and clip 4 
(M=3.96, SD= 2.10, n=8) fell somewhere in between.  
5.4 Discussion - Study 4a 
 
 Several important findings emerged from this study. Firstly, it was found that a brief, 
5-minute compilation of thematically consistent clips resulted in participants reporting a 
reliable number of IMs in the diary, comparable to previous studies with longer or 
thematically more varied film clips (James, Lau-Zhu, Clark, et al., 2016).  It was also found 
that the majority of triggers for film-related IMs were environmental as opposed to internal 
(own thought) or having no identifiable trigger. Of these triggers, the majority were sensory-
perceptual as opposed to abstract/verbal or reflective of a physiological/emotional state. This 
pattern is what might be expected of naturally occurring IMs (Kleim et al., 2013), but differs 
substantially from the pattern previously found for IAMs (Mace, 2004; Schlagman, 
Kvavilashvili & Schulz, 2007). The enhanced number of reported IMs which had no apparent 
triggers compared to internal triggers is also different from a pattern that has typically been 
reported in the literature on ordinary non-intrusive IAMs(Berntsen, 1996; Schlagman & 
Kvavilashvili, 2008). In relation to the nature of ongoing activities, there was no difference in 
the frequency with which participants reported being engaged in habitual versus controlled 
activities when their film-related IM came to mind. Finally, there was no relationship 
between IM frequency and distress/involvement ratings, or IM frequency and scores on the 
SUIS. There was, however, a relationship between VVIQ scores and full diary entries, with 
higher vividness ratings correlating significantly with IM frequency (Vannucci et al., 2015). 
Taken together, these findings have important implications for research on IMs using 
a trauma-film paradigm. They suggest that an IAM diary format can be easily adopted and 
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used in research on analogue IMs, and that this can facilitate examination of a number of 
theoretically and practically important research questions. This was the first study of this 
kind, however, with relatively small participant numbers.  The aim of Study 4b was therefore 
to replicate these initial results on a larger sample of 64 participants. The procedure and 
materials used in Study 4b were almost identical to those used in Study 4a except that after 
watching the film all participants completed a brief 5-minute version of the vigilance task 
(see Studies 3a and 3b, Chapter 4). The presence or absence of film-related cue phrases was 
manipulated, as well as the inclusion or exclusion of instructions to stop the vigilance task 
and report the experience of film-related IMs.      
However, a surprisingly low number of task-unrelated thoughts were reported during 
the vigilance task (whether film-related or film-unrelated) and the manipulation did not seem 
to have significant impact on diary reports of IMs when compared to the results obtained in 
Study 4a (with some minor exceptions, see below). Therefore, analyses reported in the results 
section will not consider this manipulation, and only the number of IMs reported in the diary 
will be reported and analysed. It was predicted that the diary results would replicate those 
found in Study 4a, particularly with regard to IM frequency, trigger reports and trigger 
modality, as well as the nature of ongoing tasks.  




 All participants completed identical tasks, including viewing the same 5-minute road 
safety advertisement compilation as in Study 4a, and recording any film related-IMs in a 
structured diary for 72 hours.  
5.5.2 Participants 
 
 Participants were recruited from the University of Hertfordshire using an 
advertisement posted to the University intranet (StudyNet), and from outside the University 
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through personal contacts. Of 64 participants, 45 were female (19 male). The average age 
was 25.29 (M = 5.99, range 18 - 44). Participants represented a range of occupations, 
including student, shop assistant, registered nurse, mechanic, teaching assistant, chef, and 
local government officer.  
5.5.3 Materials and procedure 
 
The materials used in Study 4b were identical to study 4a, except for the use of the 
short vigilance task which participants completed immediately watching the film. When 
participants first arrived in the laboratory they were asked to complete the PC-PTSD, to 
determine whether they were experiencing sufficient post traumatic symptoms to warrant 
clinical follow-up. Whilst no participants were excluded on this basis, if any had answered 
yes to three or more questions on the 4-item scale, they would have been advised that they 
were not eligible to participate, and signposted accordingly.  
 All eligible participants were reminded from the outset that the study was examining 
the effects of attention and concentration on the frequency of intrusive memories in everyday 
life. They were given an information sheet, asked to provide informed consent, and were 
advised several times that the content of the film was potentially distressing in nature, and 
that they could withdraw at any point without consequence. Those who had personal 
experience of an automobile accident – as something they or someone close to them had 
experienced – were strongly advised not to participate in the study.   
After completing the vigilance task, all participants were given the diary to record 
their film-related IMs over the 72 hours immediately following the end of the lab session, 
along with detailed instructions about how to do so. The date of the lab session and the time 
they were to begin recording were written on the front of the diary, as well as the date and 
time that they were to finish (e.g. if the lab session ended at 1:30 pm participants would begin 
recording immediately when they left, and finish exactly 72 hours later). As in Study 4a, 
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film-related IMs were defined as “spontaneous images, sounds or thoughts that you may have 
about specific scenes from the film, which pop into your mind without you trying to recall 
anything.”    
At the second meeting, participants returned their diary, completed a short debriefing 
(compliance) questionnaire about their adherence to the diary keeping and what, if anything, 
they felt they gained from the experience. Before leaving they were given a final debrief 
sheet, and the opportunity to ask any questions they may have had.  
5.6 Results - Study 4b 
 
 All participants viewed the film, and kept the diary of film-related IM for 72 hours. 
The alpha level for determining statistical significance was set at 0.05. In cases where 
Mauchley’s Test was found to violate the assumption of sphericity, degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser ( <.75) or Huyhn Feldt ( >.75) estimates of sphericity 
(Field, 2009). 
5.6.1 Manipulation Checks and Diary Compliance 
 
 During the lab session, participants rated five emotions (anger, happiness, 
anxiousness, sadness and disgust) on a 7-point scale (1=not at all, 4=moderately, 7=very 
much) at the three different time points (time 1=just before the film, time 2=just after the film 
and time 3=the end of the lab session). The ratings for these emotions were entered into a 
series of one-way repeated measures ANOVAs. The results are presented in Table 5-6. 
Participants reported a significant change overall in each of the five emotions. Pairwise 
comparisons (LSD) showed a significant change between scores recorded at Time 1 and 
Time 2 (with ratings for anger, anxiousness, sadness, and disgust going up after viewing the 
film, and ratings for happiness going down; all p<.001). There was also a significant 
difference between Time 1 and Time 3 in the ratings of anger (p=.001), happiness (p=.009), 
sadness and disgust (both p<.001) suggesting that people remained significantly less happy 
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and significantly more angry, disgusted and sad when they left the lab than when they 
arrived. From Time 2 to Time 3, however, there was a significant drop in anger, anxiousness, 
sadness and disgust ratings, and a significant rise in happiness ratings (all p<.001) suggesting 
that people improved appreciably since the moment just after watching the film. Even though 
the film had a measurable impact on these mood scales, the mean ratings remained relatively 
low throughout (except for sadness ratings, always below the mid-point for negative 
emotion). Overall, this suggests an immediately significant, but overall relatively minor 
impact of the film on participants’ mood.  
 
Table 5-6: Mean (SD) ratings for each emotion as a function of collection time, along with 
the results of a one-way, repeated measures ANOVA. 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 F p 2 
Angry 1.28 (0.65)a,b 2.70 (1.81)b 1.67 (1.11) 32.74 .001 0.34 
Happy 4.53 (1.59)a,b 2.79 (1.28)b 3.97 (1.31) 35.51 001 0.36 
Anxious 2.34 (1.44)a 3.22 (1.69)b 2.34 (1.37) 14.16 .001 0.18 
Sad 1.45 (0.79)a,b 4.11 (1.69)b 2.03 (1.27) 101.2 .001 0.62 
Disgusted 1.11 (0.31)a,b 3.47 (1.97)b 1.83 (1.15) 65.71 .001 0.51 
a Reliably different from Time 2 
b Reliably different from Time 3 
 
 There was a reasonable rate of diary compliance, with 52% of participants reporting 
that they kept the diary with them all of the three days. An additional 7% said they had the 
diary with them 2.5 out of three days, and 26% said they had it two out of three days. When 
asked what percentage of experienced IMs participants managed to record in the diary, 
participants reported a mean of 85.43% (SD=20.78) (for similar findings in diary studies of 
IAMs, see Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018). 
5.6.2 Film-related IMs reported in the diary 
  All 64 participants returned their diary, reporting a total of 221 entries. However, 
unlike Study 4a, 7 participants (11%) returned blank diaries, indicating that they had not 
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experienced any film related IMs. An additional two participants made only one entry each 
that were excluded from analysis – in one case because it was recorded several days after the 
72-hour diary-keeping period had ended, and in another case because the participant reported 
a dream rather than a film-related IM. Five additional diary entries were excluded from 
further analysis, four because they also fell outside of the 72 hour diary keeping window, and 
one because it was an autobiographical memory triggered by the film content rather than an 
analogue IM. This resulted in a total of 214 film related IMs in the full diary (M= 3.34, SD= 
3.31, range 0-16). In addition, 30 participants (47%) reported a total of 134 tick entries in the 
diary (M = 2.09, SD = 4.58, range 0 - 34). The combined total of full and tick diary entries 
was 348 IMs (M = 5.44, SD = 6.99, range 0 - 50).16  
In addition to overall recording frequency, the mean number of IMs reported per day 
was examined (see Figure 5 - 4). The results of a one-way, repeated measures ANOVA 
showed the main effects of day for both fully recorded IM entries F(2.46, 152.3) = 16.87, p < 
.001, 2=.21, and for ticked entries F(2.77, 174.2) = 9.79, p < .001, 2 = .14.  
With regard to full entries, pairwise comparisons (LSD) revealed a significant 
increase in the frequency of entries between the first and second days of diary keeping (p = 
.026), and a significant drop from the second to the third days (p < .001). The frequency of 
entries on the third and fourth days were not significantly different (p = .11). The frequency 
of entries on the first day was greater than the third (p = .009) and fourth days (p < .001). 
With regard to ticked entries, pairwise comparisons showed no difference between 
days one and two (p = .71). The frequency of tick entries dropped from Day 2 to Day 3 (p = 
.02) and from Day 3 to Day 4 (p = .003).  
 
16 Means are based on the full sample of 64 participants.  
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Figure 5-4: Mean frequencies of full and ticked entries as a function diary keeping day. 
 
5.6.3 The role of triggers in eliciting IMs  
 
For each of the film-related IM reported in the diary, participants indicated whether 
they believed this thought to be triggered by something in their environment, by their own 
thoughts, or as having no trigger. The proportion represented by each category of trigger 
(environment, own thought, no trigger) for each participant was entered into a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA. There was a main effect of trigger type F(2, 108) = 10.85, p < 
.001, 2 = .167 (see Figure 5.5).17 Pairwise comparisons (LSD) revealed that the proportion 
of environmental triggers was higher than the proportion of own thought triggers (p < .001), 
and reports of ‘no trigger’ (p = .006). Unlike the results of Study 4a, however, the proportion 
of ‘no trigger’ reports, was not significantly higher than own thought triggers (p = .14).  
 
 
17 Because seven participants did not report any film related IMs in the diary, and two participants had their 




























Figure 5.5: Means of proportions of trigger type reported for IMs in the diary.  
 
As in Study 4a, reported triggers were also coded according to the scheme developed 
by Mace (2004) into abstract/verbal, sensory/perceptual, physiological/emotional state, and 
unclassifiable/undecided. None of the reported triggers were coded as referring to 
physiological/emotional states, so this category was excluded from analysis. The mean 
proportion of the remaining three types of trigger was then calculated by participant and 
entered into a one-way repeated measures ANOVA. The mean proportions of these trigger 
categories across 49 participants is represented in Figure 5.6.18 This analysis resulted in a 
significant main effect of trigger type F(1.69, 81.37) = 15.73, p < .001, 2 = .25. Pairwise 
comparisons (LSD) revealed that sensory/perceptual triggers were reported much more 
frequently than abstract/verbal triggers (p=.004) or triggers that were deemed unclassifiable 
 
18 Six additional participant who did not report any triggers for their film related IMs were excluded from this 
analysis, leaving a total of 49 participants.  
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(p < .001). There were also many more reports of abstract/verbal than unclassifiable triggers 
(p = .03).  
 
 
Figure 5-6: Mean proportions of different types of triggers, coded according to trigger 
modality.   
 
5.6.4 Conditions in which IMs were reported to occur  
 
For each participant, the proportion of IMs recorded during habitual tasks and during 
controlled activities were calculated. A mean proportion of activities coded as automatic or 
habitual was 61.6 (SD = 33.78) and the mean proportion of controlled activities was 38.40 
(SD = 33.79). The results of a one-way ANOVA on these mean proportions showed this 
difference to be significant F(1, 54) = 6.49, p = .014 2 =.11. 
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In addition, the mean concentration rating reported was 3.11 (SD = 0.96). Examining 
the distribution of concentration ratings that participants gave across the 5-point scale (1=not 
concentrating at all, 5=fully concentrating) showed that the mean proportion of IMs that 
participants reported while being in a state of low concentration (points 1 and 2 on the scale), 
medium concentration (point 3 on the scale) and high concentration (points 4 and 5 on the 
scale) were 32.33 (SD = 34.99), 27.71 (SD = 30.74) and 42.08 (SD = 39.97), respectively.  
These were entered into a one-way, repeated measures ANOVA, but no significant 
differences were found F(2, 108) = 1.24, p = 0.29, 2 = .02.  
 
5.6.5 Additional Findings 
 
5.6.5.1 Correlations of Frequency, Distress and Involvement Ratings  
 
With regard to IM frequency, there was a significant positive correlation between the 
frequency of fully recorded and ticked diary entries r(55)s= .27, p=.046.19 This contrasts with 
the lack correlation between these two variables in study 4a, suggestion that the initial study 
perhaps lacked sufficient power.   
Overall mean ratings of distress and involvement taken just after viewing the film 
were 5.26 (SD = 1.39) and 4.80 (SD = 1.40), respectively, using identical 7-point rating 
scales. Spearman’s correlations between these post-film distress and involvement ratings and 
IM frequency are presented in Table 5-7. Statistically significant correlations emerged only 
for ticked entries and involvement ratings, as well as distress ratings and combined full and 
tick entries.  
 
19 Participants who did not report any IMs were excluded from this analysis. The correlation in the full sample 
was also positive but only marginally significant r(64)s= .24, p=.058.   
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Table 5-7:  Spearman’s correlation’s between IM frequency as reported in the diary, and 
involvement and distress ratings given in the lab. For all results n=64.  
  Post-Film Distress Post-Film Involvement 
Full diary entries .20 -.12 
Tick diary entries  .22       .33** 
Full + Tick diary entries    .28*   .07 
*Alpha level .05 
**Alpha level .001 
 
5.6.5.2 Characteristics of IMs reported in the diary 
 Film related IMs reported in the diary were rated on a number of scales, including 
vividness of reported IMs, distress, self-assessed mood prior to experiencing the IMs, and the 
impact that IMs had on their mood. Mean ratings on each scale (across the total number of 
reported IMs) were calculated for each participant. The mean ratings across all participants 
are presented in Table 5-8. Each measure was on a 7-point scale, with higher numbers 
indicating greater vividness, distress, positivity (in the case of participants’ mood prior to 
experiencing the memory), and how much worse experiencing the memory made them feel. 
 
Table 5-8: Mean ratings, (SD, range) for IMs reported in the diary over the 72 hours of diary 
keeping.  
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Vividness 4.32 1.23 1.40 6.68 
Distress 3.66 1.27 1.0 6.0 
Mood before IM 4.26 0.68 3.0 6.0 




5.6.5.3 Film Clips Reported 
 
The mean frequency with which each of the clips was reported in IMs recorded in 
diaries (as well as unclassifiable cases) is presented in Figure 5-7. These were entered into a 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA. The results showed a main effect of film clip F(4.10, 
221.6) = 5.25, p < .001, 2 = .09. Pairwise comparisons (LSD) showed that Clip 5 was 
reported more frequently than Clip 1 (p = .04), Clip 2 (p < .001) and marginally more than 
Clip 4 (p = .06), but not Clip 3 (p = .10). There were also many more instances of people 
reporting IMs based on Clip 5 than IMs that were unclassifiable in terms of the clip to which 
they were related (p < .001). In addition, Clip 3 was reported more frequently than Clip 2 (p 
< .001) as well as unclassifiable clips (p = .001).  
 
Figure 5-7: Mean frequency with which each of the clips was the basis for the reported IM, 
as well as the frequency of unclassifiable reports.  
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5.7 Overall Discussion  
 
 Several important findings emerged from Studies 4a and 4b. First, it is possible to 
reliably induce IMs with a brief (5 minute) thematically consistent film, with content that is 
mild enough to have been shown on television. Second, a full structured diary such as that 
used in IAM research does offer replicable data on the triggers for analogue IMs, as well as 
ongoing activities, concentration levels, and other phenomenology. With regard to triggers in 
particular, novel insight has been gained into the comparability of these IMs with naturally 
occurring IMs, as well as IAMs.  
5.7.1 IM frequency and reporting pattern 
 
 In both studies, participants reported comparable mean frequencies of IMs in the 72 
hours following the lab session. Examination of PANAS scores collected in the lab showed 
that the film had exerted the expected emotional impact, which nonetheless seemed to 
dissipate quickly – usually by the end of the lab session. Though exposure to distressing 
content is a requirement of the paradigm – and participants consent to viewing this material – 
it was worth exploring lowering the threshold in terms of both the film length and strength of 
content.  
 Study 4a showed the expected, gradual reduction in the frequency of IM reports over 
the four calendar days of diary keeping. Perhaps most notably, the majority of these were 
reported during the remainder of the day on which the film was viewed (Day 1) and tapered 
off significantly thereafter. This aligns with what has been found in a majority of trauma film 
studies (see James et al., 2016; see also Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018). By contrast, in 
Study 4b participants reported significantly more full entries on Day 2 than any other day of 
diary keeping. However, the same pattern was not evident with regard to tick entries. One 
possible and interesting explanation of this reduction of IMs in the first day of the study is 
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that it was due to participants completing a brief 5-minute vigilance task immediately after 
watching the film, which is akin to using an interference paradigm to test the predictions of 
dual-representation theory of IMs in PTSD. The majority of studies using this paradigm have 
measured IM frequency following the completion of a visual-spatial or verbal task, but rarely 
one that combines the two. The vigilance task that participants completed in the present 
studies incorporated both elements. Whilst visual spatial tasks have typically been thought to 
impede the frequency of IMs, and verbal task increase the frequency (though not as 
consistently), it might be the case that in concert they delay the point in time after which 
these memories begin to intrude. It could reasonably be expected, however, that if this were 
the case, the reporting pattern would be replicated with the tick diary entries.   
5.7.2 Triggers and concurrent activities 
 
 In both Studies 4a and 4b, participants reported being engaged in relatively automatic 
activities when their film-related IM came to mind, though the first study reported a slightly 
lower proportion of such activities, as well as a lower mean concentration level. Nonetheless, 
it would appear to be the case that IMs – at least analogue IMs – come to mind under 
conditions similar to naturally occurring IAMs (e.g., Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
 Similarly, the triggers reported for analogue IMs in both studies follow a similar 
pattern to IAMs in terms of high proportions of triggers that were environmental in nature. In 
comparison, relatively few IMs were reported as triggered by participants’ own thoughts. In 
both studies, however, there was a slightly higher proportion of ‘no trigger’ reports than is 
typically found in IAM research (Berntsen, 1996, 1998; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). 
It may be the case that participants struggle more to identify cues for analogue IMs, as has 
been claimed to be the case with naturally occurring IMs in clinical populations. Because of 
peri-traumatic dissociation, and insufficient narrative contextualisation of sensory detail 
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associated with the memory, it is thought that some triggers for IMs match peripheral details 
from the environment at the time of the event (Ehlers et al., 2004, 2002). This in turn can 
make it more difficult for people experiencing trauma related IMs to identify what precisely 
triggered their memory. It could be the case that similar cognitive mechanisms are at work in 
the case of analogue IMs.   
 Finally, the coding of the reported triggers using the scheme developed by Mace 
(2004) produced novel results showing that in both studies a significant majority of triggers 
were coded as sensory/perceptual rather than abstract/verbal. Whilst this might be expected 
given the highly visual nature of IMs, it is nonetheless an interesting finding in terms of the 
comparability of these analogue IMs to naturally occurring IMs. The finding in the present 
study also stands in contrast to findings in IAM research, in which the majority of triggers are 
abstract and verbal (Mace, 2004; Schlagman et al., 2007).  
5.7.3 Correlations 
 
 The pattern of correlations was inconsistent between the two studies. For example, in 
Study 4a, the number of full diary entries did not correlate with the number of tick diary 
entries. In Study 4b these two variables did correlate suggesting that the finding from Study 
4a may be the result of low power. This could potentially also explain the lack of correlation 
with scores on the SUIS and VVIQ, which have been shown to previously correlate with the 
frequency of nightmares and flashbacks in people with PTSD (Bryant & Harvey, 1996).  
The results of other correlational analyses (between reporting frequency and 
distress/involvement ratings)  were non-significant in Study 4a, and in Study 4b significant 
results emerged with regard to the frequency of tick entries in the diary (or combined full and 
tick entries). It is difficult to account for these results, and adequate explanation will require 
further research in future.  
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5.7.4 Reporting of different clips 
 
 In both studies, clip 5 of the young couple, sitting on a wall during the moments 
before an automobile accident, was the most frequently reported. It seems safest to assume 
that this was a recency effect, as it was the last out of all clips shown. It is interesting, 
however, that the second most frequently reported clip in both studies was the third, of the 
young boy who is playing football in his garden when a car comes crashing through the 
fence. Whilst this was not the only clip involving a child, it suggest (perhaps unsurprisingly) 
that there is something particularly distressing about this content which led to it more often 
forming the basis of IMs.  
5.7.5 Limitations 
 
 There are limitations to both studies. In Study 4a numbers were relatively low which 
may have resulted in insufficient power for some of the analyses. In Study 4b, as noted 
above, the initial experimental manipulation did not yield any results and was therefore 
excluded from further analysis. The inclusion of the vigilance task in the experimental 
procedure may have impacted the diary results in unanticipated ways – namely with regard to 
the distribution of IM reports over the 72 hours of diary keeping.   
5.7.6 Conclusion  
 
 The present studies offer useful initial insight into the comparability of analogue IMs 
to naturally occurring IMs and IAMs. This is particularly the case with regard to triggers, 
ongoing tasks and concentration levels, but also other aspect of phenomenology such as 
ratings of vividness and distress. This comparison was made possible by the incorporation of 
an IAM style diary into the trauma film paradigm in a way that – to our knowledge – has not 
been previously done. These findings obviously require further investigation and replication 
before more robust conclusions can be drawn. One way that this might be pursued is through 
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a within subjects study of analogue IMs and IAMs, which will facilitate even more direct 
comparison along some of these variables. The results of such a study will be reported in 






















Chapter 6: Comparing Involuntary Autobiographical Memories and Trauma 



























 The studies described in previous chapters have demonstrated the prevalence of IMs 
in non-clinical samples, and that methods traditionally associated with IAM research can 
inform us about the frequency and phenomenology of IMs (whether naturally occurring and 
trauma film induced). However, these studies did not directly address the key questions in 
research on IMs about their underlying mechanisms and their relationship with IAMs. The 
final study presented in this thesis will examine this question by reporting results of a study 
that aimed to directly compare IAMs with analogue IMs.  
There is an ongoing debate in the literature about how best to account for the 
occurrence of IMs. Do they rely on the same cognitive architecture as autobiographical 
memory generally, or are they the output of a separate system? This has sometimes been 
posited as a debate between advocates of a single system model, versus proponents of a 
special mechanisms view (e.g., the dual representation theory) (e.g. Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; 
Brewin, 2014, 2016; Rubin, Berntsen, Ogle, Deffler, & Beckham, 2016). Some recent 
findings have been argued to lend support to the special mechanisms view, by finding that a 
period of wakeful rest versus an undemanding (0-back) vigilance task, following exposure to 
an analogue trauma, showed different impact on the frequency of reported IMs, but not the 
quality of voluntarily retrieved memories. Specifically, wakeful rest resulted in fewer IMs 
relative to completion of the vigilance task, but yielded no difference in the frequency of 
voluntarily retrieved (deliberate) memories (Hørlyck, Bisby, King, & Burgess, 2019).  
It has been well evidenced that IAMs are a feature of a typical autobiographical 
memory system. In diary studies they have been found to occur on average between 2 and 6 
times per day  (Berntsen, 1996; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008), though one study that 
asked participants to record their IAMs using a mechanical clicker found that people reported 
a mean frequency of 22.13 IAMs over a 1-day period (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2011). 
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Theoretically, it has been argued that IAMs access the same episodic memory base as 
deliberately retrieved memories, but instead of an intentional, top-down search, they are 
triggered by exposure to internal or external cues and brought to mind through an associative, 
bottom up spreading activation processes (Berntsen, 2010; Conway, 2005; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). IAMs were not a subject of study 
until relatively recently, with research focusing predominantly on voluntarily recalled 
autobiographical memories (see Berntsen, 1996, 1998, 2010).  Accumulating evidence has 
shown that IAMs are more specific than voluntarily retrieved AMs, in addition to eliciting 
stronger emotional and physical response, and having greater impact on mood (Berntsen, 
1998; Hall & Berntsen, 2008; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
The differences between IAMs and IMs is a subject of debate.  It has been also 
suggested that they might be represented on a continuum with IAMs occupying one end of a 
spectrum of low intrusiveness and disruption, IMs the middle, and intrusive flashbacks, 
characteristic of PTSD, the other extreme end of this continuum (Kvavilashvili, 2014). Whilst 
it could be argued that IMs – for the most part - have not been studied with the same 
methodological rigor as IAMs, there would appear to be some important differences between 
the two. Firstly, IAMs can consist of positive, negative, or neutral content, whereas IMs have 
mostly negative content, although sometimes they can also be positive (see Bywaters et al., 
2004). In addition, IAMs are not repetitive and disruptive as is the case with IMs, and they 
vary more in vividness (from low to high), whereas IMs tend to be high in vividness. 
 Triggers for IAMs have been widely investigated, with replicable results across 
different studies using both diary and laboratory methods. For example, findings show that 
the majority of triggers are fairly easy to identify and often refer to external cues in one’s 
environment, although internal thoughts and feelings can also trigger such memories, and in a 
limited number of cases no triggers are reported (Berntsen, 1996; Schlagman et al., 2007). In 
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the case of laboratory-based methods, verbal cue phrases reported as triggers for IAMs are 
more often negative than neutral or positive, though when examining memory content and 
cue valence there are also strong congruency effects (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). 
Specifically, IAMs retrieved in response to positive cues were rated as more pleasant than 
IAMs retrieved in response to neutral cues, which similarly were rated more pleasant than 
IAMs retrieved in response to negative cues. In addition, despite the popular view of IAM 
triggers being more sensory-perceptual in nature (as exemplified by Marcel Proust’s story 
about the Madeleine cookie and the cup of tea eliciting strong childhood memories), it has 
been found that the majority of IAM triggers are in fact verbal in nature rather than sensory 
perceptual or related to a physiological or emotional state (Mace, 2004).  
 Less is known about triggers for IMs, due mainly to the methods used to study them, 
which have been largely retrospective and based on interviews and questionnaires (Michael 
et al., 2005; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999; Reynolds & Brewin, 1998; Speckens et al., 2007). It 
has been suggested that triggers for naturally occurring IMs in PTSD share important 
characteristics with peripheral features of the environment in which the traumatic event 
occurred (particularly features present just before the main traumatic event), with triggers 
therefore acting as ‘warning signals’ of impending danger (Ehlers et al., 2004, 2002). 
Another retrospective study found that the most frequently reported trigger for IMs - across a 
sample that included participants with PTSD, depressed with trauma, and depressed without 
trauma - were one’s internal ruminative thoughts and there were no group differences in this 
respect (Birrer, Michael, & Munsch, 2007). In contrast, a more recent diary study of IMs in 
traumatised participants with and without PTSD found that over half of the cues across both 
groups were environmental, but only 18% could be classified as abstract/verbal (Kleim et al., 
2013).  
 226 
 As for analogue IMs, induced in participants through the trauma film paradigm, there 
has been very little investigation of triggers. Indeed, most studies using this paradigm have 
asked participants to record the frequency with which they experienced film-related IMs (and 
sometimes associated characteristics such as vividness and distress), but have failed to ask 
participants to report triggers (see James et al., 2016). That being said, a recent study using 
this paradigm did ask for such reports in the diary that participants kept for 7 days after 
viewing the distressing film content. In the first of 3 experiments, it was found that 90% of 
reported cues across the sample were external, though no distinction appears to have been 
made with regard to whether they were sensory-perceptual or abstract/verbal (Lau-Zhu et al., 
2019).  
Divergence between IAMs and analogue IMs in the pattern of reported triggers might 
lend support to a special mechanism view, whilst similarity in trigger patterns may lend 
support to the unitary system perspective. This extends to other features of the context in 
which IMs come to mind, including ongoing activities and reported concentration levels. It 
seems plausible that the oft reported disruptiveness of IMs could mean that they can arise 
when people are engaged in attentionally demanding and undemanding activities (in contrast 
to IAMs, which are more likely to arise under the latter conditions (Brewin et al., 2010; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Schlagman et al., 2006). Furthermore, a comparison of IAMs and 
analogue IMs could provide some insight into the degree to which naturally occurring and 
analogue IMs are comparable.  
At the same time, little is known about whether the baseline frequency with which 
people experience IAMs may be a predictor for the frequency of IMs, and by extension, 
PTSD. In terms of the inverse relationship, available evidence suggests that PTSD may 
impact the frequency of IAMs experienced. One study recruited participants with and without 
PTSD who had nonetheless experienced a traumatic event that met Stressor Criterion A from 
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the DSM-IV (Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2017). They were asked to record their IAMs in a diary for 
one week. The memories were then subjected to a content analysis to determine which were 
trauma related and which were not. The PTSD group recorded fewer involuntary memories 
overall than the non-PTSD group, but also fewer non-trauma memories and more trauma 
memories than the non-PTSD group.  
 The present study, therefore, compared the frequency and phenomenology of IAMs 
and analogue IMs within one sample of participants using a within subjects design. 
Participants first completed a 3-day structured diary of their IAMs, and upon returning the 
diary were asked to watch a brief compilation of road safety advertisements and keep a 
structured diary of film-related IMs for 3 days. This part of the study was almost identical to 
the method and materials used in Study 4a. The adoption of this design facilitated 
examination of the relationship between the frequency of IAMs and analogue IMs, in 
addition to within-subjects comparison of reported triggers for both IAM and IMs, as well as 
ongoing tasks, concentration levels and phenomenology. 
A number of predictions were made. First of all, it was hypothesised that there would 
be a positive correlation between the number of recorded IAMs and IMs. This prediction was 
based on findings from questionnaire studies showing that self-reported frequency of IAMs 
correlated positively with several measures of emotional distress including symptoms of 
PTSD, anxiety, depression, and rumination (Berntsen, Rubin, & Salgado, 2015; del Palacio-
Gonzalez & Berntsen, 2019). Similarly, in line with previous findings from IAM research 
(Vannucci et al., 2015) as well as results presented in Study 4a, it was hypothesised that the 
frequency of reported IAMs and IMs would correlate positively with vividness of visual 
imagery scales.  Furthermore, it was anticipated that the majority of triggers for both IAMs 
and IMs would be reported as environmental, but in line with findings of Studies 4a and 4b, a 
greater proportion of IM triggers would be reported as sensory/perceptual than abstract/verbal 
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(the latter were predicted to make up the majority of IAM triggers). Finally, it was expected 
that both types of memory would occur under similar conditions of relatively low 





A within-subjects design was used whereby all participants completed all components 
of the study. The independent variable was the type of memory recorded in the diary (IAMs 
versus analogue IMs).   
6.2.2. Participants 
 
Participants were students at the University of Hertfordshire recruited from the Online 
Psychology Research Participation (SONA) system.  The final sample consisted of 40 
participants (9 male, 31 female) with a mean age of 22.98 year (SD = 4.93, range = 19 - 39). 
All participants included in the final sample scored 2 or below on the Primary Care PTSD 
Screen (PC-PTSD) and 11 or below on depression and anxiety sub-scales of the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). The mean score on the PC-PTSD was 0.88 (SD = 
0.88, range 0-2), whilst mean scores on the anxiety and depression subscales of the HADS 
were 5.95 (SD=2.60, range 1-11) and 3.08 (SD=1.77, range 0-8) respectively. Participants 
also completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), the mean score for 
which was 33.5 (SD = 7.11, range 16 - 48).  
6.2.3 Materials 
 
Primary Care PTSD Screen (PC-PTSD; Prins et al., 2003): See Studies 4a and 4b 
(Chapter 5; Appendix XII).  
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS: Zigmond & Snaith, 1983): See 
Studies 3b, 4a and 4b (Chapters 4 and 5; Appendix XI). 
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Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973): See Studies 4a and 
4b (Chapter 5; Appendix XIV).  
Diary of Involuntary Autobiographical Memories (see Appendix XVI): All 
participants received diaries in the form of A5 booklets to record any IAMs that came to 
mind during the first phase of diary keeping. Diaries had 24 identical pages, each of which 
contained eleven questions about the content and phenomenology of the IAM reported. 
Question 1 asked participants to record the date and time that they experienced their IAM, as 
well as the date and time that they recorded it, whilst question 2 asked that they provide a 
written description of their memory in the space provided. Question 3 asked participants to 
rate the vividness of their IAM on a scale from 1 to 7 (1=very vague, almost no image; 
7=extremely vivid, almost like normal vision), whilst question 4 asked participants to 
indicate whether the memory that came to mind was triggered by (a) their own thoughts, (b) 
something in the environment, or (c) there was no trigger. In cases where participants circled 
(a) or (b), they were asked to provide a written description of the trigger for question 5. In 
question 6, they were asked to indicate where they were and what they were doing when the 
IAM came to mind, and in question 7 – to rate how much they were concentrating on this 
activity (1=not at all; 7=fully concentrating). Question 8 asked participants to rate their 
mood prior to experiencing this memory (1=extremely negative; 4=neutral; 7=extremely 
positive), and in question 9, participants indicated how pleasant or unpleasant they found the 
memory (1=very unpleasant; 4=neutral; 7=very pleasant). Question 10 asked what effect, if 
any the IAM had on participant’s mood (1=made me feel a lot worse; 4=had no effect; 
7=made me feel a lot better). Question 11 asked that they indicated whether the memory was 
of (a) a general event or (b) a specific event. Question 12 asked that participants indicated 
when the original event (on which the memory was based) occurred, and question 13 asked 
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participants to indicate if they had ever had a memory of this event before by circling one of 
five options (never; once or twice; a few times; several times; many times).  
Diary of Film-Related IMs: See Studies 4a and 4b (Chapter 5; Appendix XV).  
Film Clips: The film clip was a shortened version of that used by Holmes, James, 
Coode-Bate and Deeprose (2009). Instead of varied subject matter (cutting a face, elephant 
stampede, etc), only the clips relating to road safety were retained, resulting in a 5-min film 
consisting of 5, thematically consistent clips (see Studies 4a and 4b, Chapter 5). 
 Post-film IM Questions: Whilst still in the lab, following the film viewing of road 
safety advertisements, participants were asked if they had experienced any images from the 
film popping to mind during a 2-minute period when they were left alone. If they indicated 
that images from the film had come to mind, they were asked by the researcher what these 
were, and their frequency.  
Emotion, Involvement and Bodily Reaction Scales: Immediately before and after 
watching the film, and at the end of the session, participants rated the degree to which they 
were feeling certain emotions on a series of 7-point Likert scales (1=not at all, 4=moderately, 
7=very much) by indicating how angry, happy, anxious, sad, and disgusted they were feeling 
(adapted from Weidmann, et al., 2009). In addition, immediately after watching the film, on 
similar 7-point scales (1=not at all, 4=moderately, 7=very much) participants indicated how 
distressing they found the entire film clip, and how involved they felt in the events depicted. 
These were identical to scales used in Studies 4a and 4b. In addition, in Study 5, participants 
had to also rate the degree to which they experienced bodily sensations in response to the 
film (1=not at all, 4=moderately, 7=very much).   
Debriefing Questionnaire: After returning the both IAM and IM diaries, all 
participants answered several questions designed to measure compliance with the diary 
method (see also the questionnaire used for Studies 4a and 4b). Participants had to indicate 
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how many days (out of 3) they forgot to keep a diary with them, and the reason for this. They 
were asked how difficult they found keeping a diary of their IAMs or film related IMs (very 
easy, somewhat easy, somewhat difficult, very difficult), and what percentage of all memories 
they experienced were recorded in the diary. If they deliberately did not record some of their 
memories in the diary, they were asked the reason for this. Finally, participants were asked 
whether they found the process of diary keeping at all useful and if so why, and were given 
space to record any additional comments. 
6.2.4 Procedure 
 
 All prospective participants were asked to complete the PC-PTSD and HADS online 
(via Qualtrics) before being invited to the laboratory, to ensure they were not experiencing 
heightened symptoms of post-traumatic stress, depression or anxiety. As noted above, all 
participants invited to the lab (and thus included in the final data set) scored 2 or below on 
the PC-PTSD and 11 or below on the anxiety and depression subscales of the HADS. At this 
time participants also completed an online version of the VVIQ.  
 The study consisted of three sessions. For the first, eligible participants were invited 
to a brief (15 minute) laboratory session in the morning, where they were given written 
information on all parts of the study and asked to provide informed consent. This included a 
written and verbal definition of IAMs and how they differ from IMs. They were then given 
the 24-page IAM diary, and asked to record all instances of this type of thought coming to 
mind over 3 days.  They began this period of time immediately upon leaving the lab. It was 
emphasised to participants that there were no expectations that they record a certain number 
of IAMs (e.g. a minimum or maximum number). It was most important, rather, that they 
monitored their thoughts, and attempted to faithfully record all instances of IAMs naturally 
coming to mind. Participants were asked to make entries as soon as possible after noticing 
their IAM, but it was acknowledged that it would not be possible to immediately record an 
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entry in all cases (if, for example, they were in a meeting or driving a car). Where sufficient 
time elapsed after the IAM coming to mind, such that a full diary entry was difficult due to 
forgetting some aspects of the experience, participants were instructed to instead place a tick 
in the grid printed on the inside cover of the diary.  
 After one week, participants returned to the lab for a 30-minute session in the 
morning. They initially returned the IAM diary, and completed a debriefing questionnaire on 
their compliance with the recording procedure. They were then asked to watch the same 5-
minute compilation of road safety advertisements used in Studies 4a and 4b. Immediately 
before and after watching the film, participants rated five emotions (anger, anxiousness, 
disgust, happiness and sadness) on 7-point scales. They completed ratings of distress, 
involvement and bodily sensations on similar, 7-point scales following the viewing of the 
film.  In addition, after the end of the film, the researcher left the lab for 2-minute under the 
guise of fetching the IM diary for the participant to take away. When the researcher returned, 
they asked the participant if any images of the film had come to mind during the 2-minute 
period. Where this had been the case, these were recorded by the researcher. Then 
participants were given the IM diary in which they were asked to record any film related 
images which came to mind over the 3 days following the lab session. As with the IAM 
diary, participants were asked to start monitoring their thoughts and recording in the diary 
immediately following the lab session. Participants came to the lab a final time (15-minute 
session) to return the IM diary and complete a second debriefing questionnaire to assess their 
compliance with the IM recording task. After this, participants were fully debriefed on all 
aims of the study and signposted to additional support should they need it.  
6.3 Results 
 
 All participants completed the 3 days of IAM diary keeping, followed by a laboratory 
session during which they viewed the compilation of road safety advertisements, and a 3-day 
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period of film-related IM diary keeping. For all analyses the alpha level for determining 
statistical significance was set at 0.05. In cases where Mauchley’s Test was found to violate 
the assumption of sphericity, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser ( 
<.75) or Huyhn Feldt ( >.75) estimates of sphericity (Field, 2013).  
6.3.1 Manipulation Checks and Diary compliance 
 
In order to examine the impact of the film, participants were asked to complete rating 
scales for five emotions (anger, happiness, anxiousness, sadness and disgust) just before and 
just after watching the film. The scales were 7-points with higher ratings indicating greater 
intensity with which that emotion was experienced (1=not at all, 4=moderately, 7=very 
much). These were entered into a series of one-way repeated measures ANOVAs. The results 
are presented in Table 6-1. Participants reported significant increases in their ratings for 
anger, anxiousness, sadness and disgust, and a significant decrease in their happiness rating.  
 
Table 6-1: Mean (SD) ratings for each emotion as a function of collection time, along with  
the results on a one-way repeated measures ANOVA. 
 Time 1 Time 2 F p 2 
Angry 1.48 (0.78)  3.4 (1.95)  39.39 .001 .502 
Happy 4.85 (0.98)  2.83 (1.38)  73.55 .001 .653 
Anxious 2.0 (1.63)  3.60 (1.99)  24.12 .001 .382 
Sad 1.85 (1.44)  4.35 (2.01)   47.33 .001 .548 
Disgusted 1.18 (0.59)  4.30 (2.09)  76.03 .001 .661 
 
 
There was a good rate of compliance in both diary keeping tasks, with 35 of 40 
participants reporting that they kept the IAM diary with them during all of the 3 days, and 32 
of 40 participants in the IM diary condition reporting the same. Across the sample, the mean 
number of days that the IAM dairy was not completed was 0.25 (SD = 0.71), whilst the mean 
number of days that the IM diary was not completed was 0.40 (SD = 0.87). The results of a 
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paired-samples t-test showed this difference to be non-significant t(40) = -.85, p = .40. In the 
IM diary task, participants estimated that they recorded a mean proportion of 71.6 (SD = 
29.1) of all film-related IMs experienced.20  
6.3.2 Reporting frequency in IAM and IM diaries 
 
 Participants recorded a total of 257 IAMs and 93 film-related IMs. In addition, there 
were 151 tick entries in the IAM diary and 59 tick entries in the IM diary, for a total of 408 
IAMs and 152 IAMs reported. All participants reported at least one IAM, but there were six 
participants who did not report any film-related IMs.  
 
Table 6-2: Mean frequency, SD and range of diary entries.  
 Mean SD Range 
IAM full entries 6.43 3.86 2-24 
IAM tick entries 3.78 4.39 0-18 
Total IAMs 10.2 5.47 2-25 
IM full entries a 2.33 2.04 0-9 
IM tick entries 1.48 2.14 0-9 
Total IMs 3.8 2.75 0-10 
a Values are based on the entire sample, including 6 participants who did not report any film-related IMs 
 
 
The mean frequencies for the IAM and IM diaries (see Table 6-2) were entered into a 
2 memory type (IAM vs. IM) by 2 recording type (full vs. tick) repeated measures ANOVA. 
Results showed a significant main effect of memory type F(1, 39) = 53.36, p < .001, 2 =.58, 
with more IAMs reported than IMs. There was also a main effect of recording type F(1, 39) = 
8.51, p = .006, 2 = .18, with more full entries recorded than tick entries. Finally, the 
interaction between memory type and recording type approached significance F(1, 39) = 
 
20 Due to experimenter error, this question was omitted from the IAM debriefing questionnaire. 
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3.34, p = .075, 2 = .08, which is reflective of smaller differences in the frequencies of full 
and tick entries in the IM diary than in the IAM diary condition.  
 The distribution of memories recorded across the three days is presented in Table 6-3. 
These were entered into a 2 memory type (IAM vs. IM) by 2 recording type (full vs. tick) by 
3 recording day (Day 1 vs. Day 2 vs. Day 3) repeated measures ANOVA. Apart from the 
significant effects reported in the 2-way ANOVA above, there was no main effect of 
recording day F(2, 78) = 2.43, p =.095, 2 = .06, nor was there an interaction between 
memory type and day (F < 1), or recording type and day F(1.64, 63.9) = 1.61, p = .21, 2 = 
.04. Finally, there was no interaction between the three factors of memory type, recording 
type and day F(2, 78) = 1.41, p = .25, 2 =.04.  
 
Table 6-3: Mean (SD) frequency of memories reported in the diary, distributed by day of 
diary keeping.  
 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 
IAM (Full Diary) 2.33 (1.35) 2.25 (1.72) 1.85 (1.53) 
IM (Full Diary) 0.98 (1.03) 0.75 (0.90) 0.60 (0.84) 
IAM (Tick Diary) 1.2 (1.45) 1.23 (1.51) 1.35 (2.14) 
IM (Tick Diary) 0.63 (1.0) 0.53 (0.96) 0.33 (0.66) 
 
6.3.3 Triggers for IAMs and IMs 
 
 In both the IAM and IM diary tasks, participants were asked to indicate whether their 
reported memory was triggered by something in the environment, their own thoughts or 
whether they could not detect a trigger. The mean proportions of each type or trigger were 
entered into a 2 memory type (IAM vs. IM) by 3 trigger type (environment vs. thoughts vs. 
no trigger) repeated measures ANOVA. Because mean proportions were used, this analysis 
did not result in the main effect of memory type (F<1), but there was a significant main 
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effect of trigger type F(1.78, 58.74) = 33.64, p <.001, 2 = .51. Follow up comparisons 
showed that regardless of memory type, participants reported more environmental triggers 
than thought triggers (p < .001) or instances of no trigger (p < .001). Reports of thought 
triggers and no trigger did not differ from each other (p = .92).   
This main effect of trigger type, however, was qualified by a significant memory by 
trigger type interaction F(2, 66) = 4.08, p = .02, 2 = .11 (see Figure 6-1). Tests of simple 
main effects showed that a proportion of memories reported to be triggered by the 
environment was marginally higher for IAMs than for IMs (p = .053). By contrast, a greater 
proportion of IMs was reported to have no trigger than IAMs (p = .011). Finally, IAMs and 
IMs did not differ in the proportions of thought triggers reported (p = .63). 
  
 
Figure 6-1: Mean proportions of trigger type as a function of memory type (IAM vs IM).  
 
Descriptions of triggers, recorded by participants, were also coded according to the 
scheme developed by Mace (2004) into the categories of abstract/verbal, sensory/perceptual, 
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deemed unclassifiable, and this category was removed from further analysis. The mean 
proportion with which each category of trigger was reported was entered into a 2 memory 
type (IAM vs. IM) by 3 trigger category (abstract vs. sensory vs. state) repeated measures 
ANOVA. Results again showed no effect of memory type (F = 1.00) but a highly significant 
main effect of trigger category F(1.04, 29.18) = 30.73, p < .001, 2 = .53. Post hoc 
comparisons between mean proportions showed that physiological/emotional state triggers 
were reported much less frequently than abstract/verbal triggers (p = .001) or 
sensory/perceptual triggers (p = .001), which did not differ from each other (p = .18).  
There was a marginally significant interaction between memory type and trigger 
category F(1.07, 30.07) = 3.02, p = .09, 2 =.10 (see Figure 6-2). Because of the medium 
effect size, tests of simple main effects were carried out. For IAMs, equal proportions of 
abstract/verbal and sensory/perceptual triggers were reported (p = 1.00), and both were 
higher than physiological/emotional state triggers (p < .001). In contrast, for IMs the 
proportion of sensory/perceptual triggers was higher than abstract/verbal, and this difference 





Figure 6-2: Mean proportions of trigger categories reported as a function of memory type.  
 
6.3.4 Conditions in which IAMs and IMs are reported to occur 
 
 For each IAM and IM reported in the diaries, participants indicated what activity they 
were engaged in when the memory came to mind. These were subsequently coded as either 
automatic/habitual (therefore requiring few cognitive resources for successful completion, 
e.g. ‘washing up’, ‘taking a shower’ or ‘walking the dog’) or controlled and therefore 
requiring sustained attention (e.g. ‘talking with my cousin’, ‘revising’ or ‘watching a film’). 
In the IAM diary, the mean proportion of automatic activities reported was 48.17 (SD = 
25.49) whilst the mean proportion of controlled activities was 51.82 (SD = 25.49). In the IM 
diary, the mean proportion of automatic activities was 69.63 (SD = 37.26) whilst the mean 
proportion of controlled activities was 30.36 (SD = 37.26), suggesting that IMs were much 
more likely to be experienced under low cognitive load. The results of a 2 memory type 
(IAM vs. IM) by 2 ongoing activity (automatic vs. controlled) within subjects ANOVA found 
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automatic activity overall than controlled activities. Because the analysis was run on 
proportions, SPSS did not calculate F values for memory type, but there was a memory by 
type of activity interaction F(1, 33) = 10.74, p = .002, 2 = .25. Tests of simple main effects 
showed that for IAMs there was no difference in the frequency with which automatic and 
controlled activities were reported (p = .68), but more automatic activities were reported than 
controlled in the IM diary condition (p=.004; see Figure 6-3).  
However, the mean concentration ratings for ongoing tasks reported in the IAM diary 
and IM diary were 3.09 (SD=0.81) and 3.19 (SD=0.91), respectively, and did not 
significantly differ from each other (F<1).   
 
 
Figure 6-3: Mean proportions of automatic and controlled activities.  
 
6.3.5 Phenomenology  
 
 Memories reported in the IAM and IM diaries were also rated along a number of 
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memory, and impact on mood. The mean ratings given for each variable is presented in Table 
6-4 as a function of diary type, along with the results of a series of one-way, repeated 
measures ANOVAs. Perhaps unsurprisingly IAMs were rated as more pleasant than IMs, and 
had a more positive impact on mood. There were no differences in baseline mood (just before 
the IAM or IM recorded in the diary was experienced) or vividness.  
 
Table 6-4: Mean rating (SD) for each variable as a function of diary type, along with the 
results of a one-way ANOVA.  
 IAM IM F df a p 
Vividness 5.39 (0.99) 5.09 (1.15) 2.13 1,33 .15 
Mood before 4.58 (0.79) 4.35 (0.93) 2.72 1,33 .11 
Pleasantness 4.99 (.99) 2.47 (0.94) 93.12 1,33 .00 
Impact on mood 4.66 (0.72) 3.06 (0.55)  94.23 1,33 .00 
a Of the total sample of 40 participants, six did not report any film related IMs in the diary  
 
6.3.6 Correlational Analyses 
 
6.3.6.1 IM and IAM Frequencies  
   
 To examine the relationship between the frequency of IAM and IM reports, a series of 
two-tailed Spearman’s correlations were run on the frequency of full and tick diary entries for 
both types of memory and reports of IM frequency in the lab shortly after watching the film 
(see Table 6-5). The only significant positive relationship found was between the number of 




Table 6-5: Spearman correlations (two-tailed) between diary and lab reports of IAMs and 
IMs.  














    
Tick IAM Entries 
 
-.12 1.0    
Lab IMs 
 








-.11 .47** -.02 -.00 1.0 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
6.3.6.2 IM and IAM frequencies and ratings of visual imagery, distress, involvement and 
bodily sensations 
At the online screening stage, participants were asked to complete the VVIQ to test 
the degree of vividness with which they typically experience mental imagery. Table 6-6 
shows Spearman’s correlations between IM and IAM frequency and VVIQ scores as well as 
participants’ ratings of emotional distress and involvement as well as bodily sensations 
evoked by watching the film clip in Session 2. For IMs, the table shows correlations both for 
the frequency of reported IMs in the lab immediately after watching the film and IMs 
recorded in the diary. None of the correlations for IAMs were significant. However, for IMs, 
significant positive correlations were obtained between the number of IM reports in the lab 
and VVIQ scores (p=.03), and between distress scores and full diary entries (p=.002). There 




Table 6-6: Spearman’s Correlations between imagery, distress and involvement scales and 








Full IAM Entries -.23 -.01 -.03 -.02 
Tick IAM Entries -.21 .25 .01 .06 
Lab IMs    -.34*1 .28 .21 .15 
Full IM entries -.01     .47** .09 .39** 
Tick IM entries  .02 .09 -.08 .097 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
1 The response scale on the VVIQ means that lower scores equal higher levels of object imagery (e.g. 1 = 





 The present study used a within-subjects design to compare the frequency, triggers 
and phenomenology of IAMs and analogue IMs over two separate, 3-day periods of diary 
keeping. To our knowledge no previous study has employed such a design to examine this 
particular relationship. Several important findings were obtained. Firstly, reports of IAMs in 
the present study were significantly higher than reports of IMs. However, the frequency of 
recorded IAMs was not predictive of the frequency of IM reports. In addition, environmental 
triggers in both diary conditions were reported most frequently, but reports of no-trigger were 
higher in the IM diary condition. When triggers were coded according to the scheme 
developed by Mace (2004), IAMs arose in response to abstract/verbal triggers as often as 
they did in response to sensory/perceptual triggers, but in the IM diary condition 
sensory/perceptual triggers were reported more frequently than abstract triggers. In terms of 
the conditions under which involuntary memories arose, more IMs were reported whilst 
participants were engaged in automatic/habitual activities, whereas the proportions of 
automatic versus controlled activities were comparable in the case of IAM reports.  
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6.4.1 IAM and IM reports in the diary 
 
 Neither IAM nor analogue-IM frequency reports were markedly different from results 
obtained in previous diary studies of each cognitive phenomenon. Given that the IAM diary 
was completed first, and the order with the IM diary was not counterbalanced, there was no 
reason to believe that IAM frequency results would not replicate previous findings. And 
indeed the mean frequency of 10.2 IAMs (combined full and tick entries) over 3 days falls 
within the range of previous diary studies (Berntsen, 1996; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; 
Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
 Of greater interest was the frequency of analogue IMs. There are a number of other 
factors which can impact on the frequency of IMs, including the film used and individual 
differences (see Marks, Franklin, & Zoellner, 2018; Weidmann, Conradi, Gröger, Fehm, & 
Fydrich, 2009). In addition, as noted previously, studies using the trauma film paradigm have 
mainly sought to manipulate prior, concurrent, and subsequent tasks to examine the effect of 
this manipulation on IM frequency. Control conditions in these studies with no additional 
task have resulted in approximately 4.5 to 7 IMs over a week-long period of diary keeping  
(Deeprose et al., 2012; Holmes et al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2004). By contrast, studies 4a and 
4b of the present thesis had mean reports of 6.04 (SD= 4.26) and 5.43 (SD= 6.97) IMs – 
respectively – over three-day periods of diary keeping. These included both full entries and 
tick entries. But the lower rate of IM reports in the present study (M=3.80, SD=2.75; both 
tick and full entries) suggests a possible order effect, whereby the initial period of IAM diary 
keeping could have resulted in fewer film related IM reports in week 2 of the study. 
However, the results of a one-way ANOVA comparing mean IM reporting frequencies across 
the three studies was not significant F(2, 129) = 1.62, p = .20.  
 It was anticipated that the frequency of IAM reports would be predictive of the 
frequency of analogue-IM reports but this did not appear to be the case. The only significant 
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positive relationship that emerged was between tick entries in the IAM and IM diaries. There 
was no significant relationship between the frequency of full entries in the IAM and IM 
diaries, nor between the frequency of combined full and tick entries in each diary. These 
results suggest possible differences in the processes that give rise to IMs versus IAMs, which 
may be further reflected in the different in types of triggers reported for each type of memory.      
6.4.2 Triggers and circumstances in which IAMs and IMs arise  
 
The observed differences between IAMs and IMs in terms of types of reported 
triggers may have significant implications for the debate between single versus separate-trace 
theories of IMs (Lau-Zhu et al., 2019). Whilst Mace (2004) found that the majority of IAM 
triggers (68%) were abstract and verbal, it has also been found that the proportions of this 
type of trigger versus sensory/perceptual triggers are roughly equal (Schlagman et al., 2007). 
The greater susceptibility of analogue IMs to being triggered by sensory/perceptual cues 
seems to lend initial support to the separate-trace position, namely, the dual representation 
theory. Indeed, the sensory-based nature of IMs – because of their lack of contextualisation in 
the autobiographical memory narrative due to peritraumatic dissociation – suggests that they 
would be more likely to be cued by similar sensory information. That this appears to be the 
case in the present study also lends further support to the use of the trauma film paradigm as 
an appropriate approximation of naturally occurring IMs (Brewin et al., 2010; Brewin, 
Huntley, & Whalley, 2012; James, Lau-Zhu, Clark, et al., 2016).  
Additional evidence for possible differences in underlying mechanisms of IMs and 
IAMs comes from the data on the type of activities that participants reported to have been 
engaged in at the time they experienced these involuntary memories. Although mean 
concentration ratings were comparable in the IAM and IM diary conditions, there were 
important differences in the frequency of automatic versus controlled activities reported. In 
the IM diary condition, a large proportion of the reported ongoing activities were automatic 
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in nature (70%), whereas the proportions of automatic versus controlled concurrent activities 
were comparable in the IAM diary condition (i.e., 48% vs. 52%, respectively). In other 
words, the results appear to suggest somewhat counterintuitively, that when people are 
engaged in controlled (i.e., attentionally demanding activities) they are more likely to 
experience an ordinary (non-intrusive) IAM than IM. Given that IM are probably more 
highly activated than representations of ordinary IAMs, our initial expectation was that IM 
would come to mind during the cognitively demanding ongoing activities as easily as during 
automatic less demanding activities whereas IAMs would be more susceptible to the nature 
of ongoing activities (i.e., would be more likely to be experienced during undemanding and 
demanding ongoing activities). However, this was not the case. The results therefore suggest 
that the frequency with which people experience IMs could be reduced if they were engaged 
in cognitively demanding ongoing activities, and could have practical implications for 
therapeutic interventions.  
It is noteworthy, however, that there is evidence in the literature on IMs, suggesting 
that increased cognitive load can result in a failure to supress IMs, leading to an increase in 
their frequency (Aikins et al., 2009; Nixon, Cain, Nehmy, & Seymour, 2009). Whilst this was 
found to be the case with both analogue and naturally occurring IMs, the discrepant results as 
compared to the present study may be a function of the method used – namely a cognitive 
load induction – which was not employed in the present study. It is obvious therefore, that 
studying the role of contextual factors (i.e., triggers and the attentional demands of 
concurrent activities) of IMs in everyday life should become an important avenue for future 
research.   
6.4.3 Phenomenology  
 
In the present study, some ratings of phenomenology recorded in both diaries aligned 
with what might be expected, whilst others did not. In particular, it would not be expected 
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that vividness ratings in the IAM diary task would surpass those in the IM diary task. This is 
likely to be attributable to the fact that the analogue IMs in the present study are based on a 
film viewed several hours to days ago. The (episodic) memory for the film is unlikely to be 
as vivid as real lived experience of autobiographical event, independent of the emotional 
valence of the memory. In addition, lower pleasantness ratings for IMs and greater negative 
impact on mood aligned with predictions of the study.   
6.4.4 Limitations  
 
 In the present study all participants completed the IAM diary before watching the 
trauma film and completing the IM diary. A counterbalancing of the order in which the diary 
tasks were completed was seriously considered, but was not pursued. The primary reason for 
this was a desire to avoid participants reporting memories from the film in the IAM diary. 
This seemed a plausible risk given that many analogue studies have employed a week of 
diary keeping in which participants have reported IMs beyond the first three days of 
recording (James, Lau-Zhu, Clark, et al., 2016).  Given that participants in Studies 4a and 4b 
completed almost an identical IM diary without having to keep an IAM diary in the previous 
week, it was possible to assess the possible effects of lack of counterbalancing on the number 
of recorded IMs across the present study and Studies 4 a and 4b. Although the mean number 
of recorded IMs in the present study was numerically lower than IMs recorded in Studies 4a 
and 4b, the difference was not statistically significant. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the 
number of recorded IMs would have been higher than reported by participants in the present 
study if they did not have to keep the IAM diary in week 1. For example, in a fully  
counterbalanced two week diary study that involved one week of recording IAMs and one 
week of involuntary semantic memories (mind pops), Kvavilashvili and Mandler (2004) 
found that participants reported significantly fewer IAMs in the second week (following 
mind pop recording) than they did during the first week (though there was no such effect for 
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 Through a within-subjects comparison of IAMs and analogue IMs, the present study 
may offer some insight into the relationship between the IAMs and naturally occurring IMs. 
This is perhaps most clearly the case with regard to the data on triggers as well as ongoing 
activities, the results of which support the use of the trauma film paradigm as appropriate 
experimental approximation of naturally occurring IMs. Further research is required to 
examine the relationship of IAMs and naturally occurring IMs in both clinical and non-
clinical populations in terms of frequency, triggers and phenomenology. A clearer picture of 
the nature of IMs in daily life and how they relate along these variables to IAMs, will 





























































 In this chapter, I will first summarise the main aims of the thesis and the key findings 
that emerged from the studies described in Chapters 2 to 6. This will be followed by a more 
detailed discussion of the main methodological and theoretical implications of each of these 
key findings. The chapter will conclude by discussing some of the limitations of the present 
findings and suggesting possible avenues for future research.  
7.1 Aims 
The present thesis had four primary aims. The first was to examine the feasibility and 
implications of applying diary and laboratory-based methods, typically used in IAM research, 
to the investigation of IMs. A very small number of studies have so far used a diary method 
to investigate naturally occurring IMs (Berntsen, 2001; Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Kleim et al., 
2013; Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011; Williams & 
Moulds, 2007). It has been used more extensively to study trauma-film induced analogue 
IMs, but in the majority of these studies it has been used in a truncated format, with the 
primary aim of capturing the frequency of IMs, with perhaps a few additional variables 
(James, Lau-Zhu, Clark, et al., 2016). Moreover, given that most research on IMs has been 
based on retrospective interview and questionnaire methods, the present thesis also 
attempted, for the first time, to elicit and capture naturally occurring IMs under controlled 
laboratory conditions (Studies 3a and 3b).  
Another key aim of the present thesis was to provide new evidence of the viability 
and merit of studying naturally occurring IMs in non-clinical populations, both for purposes 
of better understanding them as a feature of everyday cognition, but also to offer insight into 
their clinical manifestation. In the substantial body of research on IMs, there are only a 
limited number of studies that have recruited primarily non-clinical samples (i.e., not as a 
control condition; Brewin, Christodoulides, & Hutchinson, 1996; Bywaters, Andrade, & 
Turpin, 2004; Yeung & Fernandes, 2020). This would seem to place additional (and 
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unnecessary) burden on clinical populations when a considerable amount can be inferred 
about clinical manifestations of IMs by studying their non-clinical presentation. At the same 
time, research on IMs in non-clinical populations has merit in its own right, given the 
mounting body of evidence that this is a common cognitive phenomenon (Yeung & 
Fernandes, 2020).  
A third aim was to examine the triggers for naturally occurring and analogue IMs, and 
the conditions under which they occur, as a means of inferring the extent to which they can 
be reasonably compared to each other, and to IAMs. There is a considerable amount of 
evidence that the majority of IAMs are triggered by environmental (external) cues and to a 
lesser degree by internal cues (i.e., one’s own thoughts) with a much smaller percentage of 
IAMs reported to have no identifiable trigger (Berntsen, 1998; Mace, 2004; Schlagman & 
Kvavilashvili, 2008; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004, Study 4). Due to the relative lack of 
diary research on IMs (or lack of more detailed diary-recording in the case of analogue IMs) 
there has been little investigation of IM triggers, some notable exceptions aside (Kleim et al., 
2013; Lau-Zhu et al., 2019). The present research aimed to address this gap in the literature 
by asking participants across several studies to identify a trigger for their analogue or 
naturally occurring IMs each time they completed a full diary entry. Findings have 
implications for how we understand the relationship of IMs to IAMs, and whether they arise 
from divergent or similar cognitive mechanisms. This in turn has potential implications for 
how IMs are understood and treated in clinical settings, namely as a feature of depression and 
PTSD.  
A final aim was to test the therapeutic effects of structured interaction with the 
contents of IMs, in the form of a diary (Study 2) but also briefer completion of IM 
questionnaires during a laboratory-based vigilance task (Studies 3a and 3b). Evidence 
suggests that structured interaction with the contents of IMs can result in reduced distress 
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associated with such memories. This has been demonstrated with therapeutic techniques such 
as trauma focused CBT as well as EMDR (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998; Gunter & Bodner, 2008). 
It has also been demonstrated with questionnaire completion regarding distressing memories 
(Boals et al., 2011; Rubin et al., 2010) and more recently with a structured electronic diary 
that prompted people to complete the PCL-C several times per day over a period of two 
weeks (Dewey et al., 2015). Moreover, there is also evidence to show that having the 
opportunity to talk about a stressful video (e.g. the Nazi Holocaust) versus not being able to 
talk about it resulted in fewer retrospective reports of IMs about the film over the subsequent 
2-day period (Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 2000). The present thesis therefore aimed to compare 
the therapeutic effects of in-person disclosure and questionnaire completion about IMs and an 
extended (two week) period of diary keeping, to determine which variable appeared to have 
the greater impact on various indices of psychopathology (e.g., depression, anxiety).  
 
7.2 Main Findings 
7.2.1 Findings related to naturally occurring IMs in non-clinical populations 
The occurrence of IMs in non-clinical populations was identified some time ago 
(Brewin et al., 1996), and yet this non-clinical manifestation of a widely acknowledged 
clinical phenomenon remain under-explored. This is somewhat understandable, given some 
researcher’s access to clinical populations, and the particular imperative to study the most 
distressing and debilitating manifestations of IMs. And for researchers without access to 
clinical populations, the trauma film paradigm offers the opportunity to conduct minimal 
participant screening (to ensure that people are well enough to take part). In light of the 
above, the present thesis has attempted to make a case for further investigation of IMs in non-
clinical populations, and empirically establish the implications (and merit) of doing so. 
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The results of the study presented in Chapter 2 offered some insight into the 
prevalence of IMs in a population of undergraduate psychology students.  The circulation of 
an online questionnaire yielded a large number of individual IM reports. This was the pool 
from which participants in the studies presented in Chapter 4 were selected for invitation to 
the laboratory (the participants in Chapter 3 were recruited separately). The results obtained 
from the four studies across Chapters 2-4 suggest that although there may be some 
differences between IM presentation in non-clinical and clinical populations, studying IMs in 
non-clinical samples would seem to have much to teach us about IMs in clinical populations.  
The coding of IMs, reported in Chapter 2, into the content categories devised by 
Reynolds and Brewin (1999) allowed for direct comparison with the clinical populations 
recruited for their study. Analysis showed a significant difference in the content categories 
into which IMs reported in Chapter 2 fell, and the sample recruited by Reynolds and Brewin 
(1999) who had depression or PTSD. Despite this, there were also broad and notable 
similarities. These two clinical diagnoses also differed from each other along this variable. 
The difference between the clinical groups is perhaps understandable, given that a key 
criterion for the diagnosis of PTSD is the experience of a life event that threatens with death, 
serious injury or sexual violence, either against oneself or a relative or close friend. The range 
of life events that can precipitate the onset of depression is broader (and the events sometimes 
more distal) even if that spectrum includes experiences that would meet Criterion A for 
PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Brewin, 1998).  
The notable overlaps between the IM content categories reported by Reynolds and 
Brewin's (1999) clinical samples and the non-clinical population recruited for Studies 1-3 
(described in Chapters 2 to 4) speaks to the viability of studying IMs in the general 
population. Moreover, the results for these studies would not seem to simply be an artefact of 
the (primarily student) population accessed. Indeed, rates of depression among students have 
 253 
been found to be comparable to their peers in the general population (Quince, Wood, Parker, 
& Benson, 2012).  In addition, the proportion of students that have experienced a Criterion A 
stressor (84%; Vrana & Lauterbach, 1994) has been found to be similarly comparable to rates 
found in the general population (with results showing a prevalence of between 67% and 89%; 
Bernat, Ronfeldt, Calhoun, & Arias, 1998; Cusack et al., 2019; Kilpatrick et al., 2013).  And 
whilst there were no measures of psychopathology collected for online IM questionnaire in 
Study 1 (Chapter 2), such measures were collected for laboratory-based Studies 3a and 3b 
(with participants recruited from the sample of the retrospective survey Study 1) as well as 
for diary Study 2 (in which the majority of the participants were also undergraduate students). 
BDI scores in the latter study in particular suggest mild to moderate dysphoria and mean 
PCL-C scores were above the widely used cut-point of 45. Taken together, these results 
speak to the viability of studying IMs in a general student population, but also adopting non-
clinical participant recruitment for IM research in the future.   
Thus, important new findings were obtained about the frequency and nature of IMs in 
a young adult population. As with IAMs, the frequency of IMs in daily life appears to vary as 
a function of the method employed. Retrospective data from Study 1 suggests a mean 
frequency of three to four times per week which largely squares with previous retrospective 
studies with clinical populations (Hackmann et al., 2004; Speckens et al., 2007). The 
retrospective frequency data from the present thesis was replicated in the smaller samples of 
participants in Studies 3a and 3b. Few studies, however, have sought to measure the true 
frequency of IMs using a diary (Kleindienst et al., 2017; Kvavilashvili, Sari, Fong, & Brewin, 
in preparation; Priebe et al., 2013; Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011; Williams & Moulds, 
2007). These studies found a mean IM frequency per week ranging from 5.78 (Rubin et al., 
2011) to 22 in non-clinical populations (Kvavilashvili et al., in preparation), to 74.5 in a 
sample with PTSD (Priebe et al., 2013). The present study used a paper diary which has been 
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found in IAM research to yield a higher number of reports than some electronic formats 
(namely smartphones; Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018) even if a small proportion of these 
are triggered by the diary itself (Kleim et al., 2013). In the two-week diary study  (Study 2, 
Chapter 3), the mean frequency of fully recorded IM entries ranged from 5.64 (SD=3.24) to 
7.37 (SD=8.83) across the two IM-recording conditions (IM-interview/diary and IM-
keywords/diary), though the frequency of tick entries was considerably higher - 9.86 
(SD=13.95) and 8.32 (SD=11.64), respectively. These results provide further evidence that 
people in the general population experience fairly frequent IMs, which appear to be 
comparable to some clinical reports obtained retrospectively (Hackmann et al., 2004; 
Speckens et al., 2007) though not necessarily those obtained with a diary (Kleindienst et al., 
2017; Mihailova & Jobson, 2020; Priebe et al., 2013).  
Whilst frequency can be an important measure of the disruptiveness of an IM, and the 
potential for resultant distress, it is just one metric by which to assess this. Indeed, evidence 
from a number of studies suggests that the defining feature of IMs experienced in PTSD – 
which distinguishes them from IMs experienced as part of depression or in non-clinical 
populations - is the sense of ‘nowness’ that accompanies them (Brewin, 1998; Kleim et al., 
2013). Nevertheless, retrospective data from Study 1 (Chapter 2) shows that a considerable 
majority of participants (69%) reported experiencing their IM with a sense of reliving the 
event rather than just looking back at the past. And whilst a specific reliving question was not 
asked in Study 2 (Chapter 3), a question in the diary regarding bodily sensations could be 
interpreted as a proxy for this. Of all the IMs reported across the IM-interview/diary and IM-
keywords/diary conditions of Study 2, 53% were accompanied by bodily sensations. This was 
significantly higher than 20% of involuntary PMs that were reported to be accompanied by 
bodily sensations in the IM-interview/PM-diary condition. In summary, although these results 
suggest that the degree of ‘reliving’ with which IMs are experienced may differ between 
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people with PTSD and those without, they would still appear to be a quality characteristic of 
IMs regardless of their clinical or non-clinical presentation. In addition, the medium to high 
distress ratings reported in Studies 1 and 2 of the present thesis largely align in degrees of 
severity with clinical samples (even if the use of different scales precludes direct comparison; 
Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). This lends further support to the practice of studying those 
instances of non-clinical IM presentation.  
7.2.2 Findings related to the triggers for naturally occurring and analogue IMs, and their 
relationship to IAMs 
A second aim of the present thesis was the examination of triggers for naturally 
occurring and analogue IMs. This was explored across six different studies, which 
incorporated both diary and laboratory methods. Triggers for naturally occurring IMs were 
examined using laboratory-based vigilance tasks and a diary method. The results of the 
laboratory Study 3a, in particular, strongly suggest that IMs largely result from exposure to 
meaningful cues in the external environment. This is reflected in the trigger reports for the 
experimental condition, with participants indicating that 79% of their IMs were triggered by 
environmental cues (i.e., the phrases on the screen) while the percentages of IMs triggered by 
internal cues (i.e., by participants’ thoughts) or coming to mind without any identifiable 
triggers constituted only 17% and 4% of reported IMs, respectively. In stark contrast, in the 
control condition in which participants were exposed to simple maths calculations during the 
vigilance task, 83% of triggers were reported as being internal (participants’ own thoughts) 
and only 17% as external. In addition, in Study 3b it was demonstrated that personalised 
verbal cues (based on an IM reported at screening) were more effective at eliciting IMs in the 
lab than non-personalised cues.  
The diary studies of naturally occurring and analogue IMs showed a broadly similar 
pattern of external/internal trigger reports, though analogue IMs appear to more often be 
reported as having no trigger. In the diary study for naturally occurring IMs (Study 2 in 
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Chapter 3), approximately half of IMs were reported as being triggered by environmental 
cues. Approximately one third were triggered by internal thoughts and the remainder (a mean 
proportion of 17.06 in the IM-interview/diary condition and 22.89 in the IM-keywords/diary 
condition) had no identifiable trigger. Findings from Studies 4a and 4b on analogue IMs 
showed a similar pattern in that approximately half of the reported triggers for IMs were 
environmental. But the mean proportion of IMs reported as having no identifiable trigger 
(36.26 in Study 4a and 28.69 in study 4b) was higher relative to reports of internal triggers 
(11.98 in Study 4a and 17.55 in Study 4b). This is a key way in which naturally occurring and 
analogue IMs differ, arguably reflective of the fact that analogue IMs have no true 
autobiographical element, even if they do approximate some of the decontextualized sensory 
quality of naturally occurring IMs.  
It is interesting that naturalistic IMs reported in Study 2 appear to follow a similar 
pattern of trigger reporting as IAMs (Berntsen, 1996; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008), 
though the proportion of environmental triggers is slightly lower than that found in other IM 
diary research. For example, Kleim et al. (2013) found that 80% of IM triggers reported by 
participants with PTSD and trauma without PTSD were environmental. These included 
people, places similar to where the trauma occurred as well as the actual trauma scene, 
newspaper and TV reports, conversations, and cues related to the study itself. Only 11% of 
cues were internal (physiological or trauma related thoughts), 8.9% as “other” and only 2% 
of IM reports were classed as having no identifiable trigger. This stands in sharp contrast to 
some retrospectively collected data suggesting that the majority of IM triggers are internal 
(Birrer, et al., 2007).  
The trigger reporting pattern for naturalistic and analogue IMs according the content 
categories developed by Mace (2004) was more varied. This was evident in Study 2, where 
the two IM diary keeping conditions diverged in the coding categories into which reported 
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triggers fell. Whilst roughly equal proportions of abstract/verbal and sensory/perceptual 
triggers were reported in the IM-interview/diary condition (43.75 versus 50.92), in the IM-
keywords/diary condition, there was a considerable difference between the two (65.63 versus 
29.11). The key difference between these two conditions was that participants in the IM-
interview/diary condition had an opportunity to disclose and rate their IMs with the 
researcher present, whilst participants in the IM-keywords/diary condition did not. The results 
from the IM-interview/diary condition align more with the proportions for IAMs found in 
Study 5 (49.74 abstract/verbal and 49.8 sensory/perceptual) as well as previous studies on 
IAMs (Mace, 2004; Schlagman et al., 2007). This suggests that the IM interview maybe be 
impacting the subsequent pattern of trigger reporting. By contrast, the IM-keywords/diary 
condition offered no opportunity for initial disclosure, but participants subsequently reported 
a greater proportion of abstract/verbal triggers. This runs counter to the prediction that the 
majority of IMs would have sensory/perceptual cues rather than abstract/verbal.  
Finally, the trigger content categories reported in Studies 4a and 4b (Chapter 5) for 
trauma-film induced IMs, largely aligned with those found for analogue IMs recorded in 
Study 5 (Chapter 6). Both showed a clear predominance of sensory/perceptual triggers 
(proportion of 76.4 in Study 4a and 57.3 in Study 4b), which was replicated in Study 5 
(proportion of 63.2). These heightened proportions of sensory/perceptual triggers align more 
with what might have traditionally been expected for naturally occurring IMs (e.g. Brewin, 
Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). But these results diverge from those 
obtained in Study 2, in which the IM-interview/diary condition showed relative parity 
between abstract/verbal and sensory/perceptual trigger reports, and the IM-keyword/diary 
condition showed an almost inverse reporting pattern to analogue IMs studies. These findings 
point to important differences between analogue and naturalistic IMs, but also between both 
types of IM and IAMs.  
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7.2.3 Findings related to the therapeutic benefit of diary keeping and questionnaire 
completion for naturally occurring IMs 
In the present thesis, evidence for the therapeutic benefit of engaging with the 
contents of IMs is overall mixed, but nevertheless it raises important questions that merit 
further investigation. This potential benefit was assessed via a diary study of naturally 
occurring IMs (Study 2) that lasted for two weeks, as well a much briefer interaction with 
contents of IMs in the course of a laboratory vigilance task (Studies 3a and 3b). The impetus 
for investigating this question lies at the convergence of number of research strands.  Firstly, 
whilst there is ample evidence for the therapeutic benefits of expressive writing (Pennebaker, 
1997), the outcomes of its application with people who have PTSD are mixed (Koopman et 
al., 2005; Sloan et al., 2011; Smyth et al., 2008). Similarly, diary keeping has been 
acknowledged as therapeutically beneficial in the treatment of a number of conditions (Cohen 
et al., 2013), and yet this has been empirically investigated in only a couple of studies in 
relation to IMs (Dewey et al., 2015; Kvavilashvili & Brewin, 2013). The present thesis 
therefore represented an attempt to draw together these strands and contribute to addressing 
this gap in the literature.  
The briefer interaction with IM contents tested in Studies 3a and 3b – for which 
participants completed a 9-item questionnaire regarding their thoughts at eight fixed points 
during a vigilance task – showed no therapeutic effect. Participants were stopped at eight 
points during the task - instead of being asked to report their IMs as they arose - in order to 
avoid demand characteristics. It was hypothesised that the participants who reported 
experiencing their nominated IM during the vigilance task might experience therapeutic 
benefit relative to participants who did not. It was predicted that this would be reflected in 
reduced BDI and STAI scores in Study 4a and reduced HADS score in Study 4b. Results of a 
mixed ANOVA, however, showed no main effects. Participants also rated their mood on a 9-
point scale before and after the vigilance task. Interestingly, in Study 3a participants who 
 259 
reported an IM during the task rated their mood lower overall (which could be predictive of 
their reporting an IM and/or the result of it) but this was not the case in Study 3b. The mean 
rating on the mood scale in both studies, however, was lower after the vigilance task relative 
to before, regardless of whether participants reported an IM during the task.  
In the case of the vigilance task it seems likely that the interaction was not sustained 
enough to produce the therapeutic benefit observed in other instances of engaging with the 
content of IMs. Only a small proportion of the thoughts reported were IMs, and participants 
reported thinking about things unrelated to their IMs in substantial number of thought probes. 
By contrast, studies exploring the impact of expressive writing on PTSD symptoms have 
engaged people in several writing exercises each of 20 minutes in duration over one day 
(Smyth et al., 2008), three consecutive days (Sloan et al., 2011), or four weeks (Koopman et 
al., 2005). Participants were furthermore asked to reflect on the emotions related to the event 
about which they were writing. Whilst these studies did not produce a reduction in PTSD 
symptoms, participants in the expressive writing conditions showed improvement in 
measures of depression (Koopman et al., 2005) and mood overall (Smyth et al., 2008). Even 
the AMQ that Rubin, Boals and colleagues asked participants to complete contained a 
number of items, and would have required participants to focus on IM content for a sustained 
(if undefined) period of time (Boals et al., 2011; Rubin et al., 2010). And EMDR involves 
asking participants to maintain the aversive memory content in mind whilst engaging in the 
prescribed eye-tracking task (Shapiro, 2001).  
Rather than the conclusive lack of effect observed in the laboratory study, Study 2 
produced mixed results in terms of therapeutic effect. It was predicted that the diary of 
involuntary PMs would provide a control condition to demonstrate the clear benefit of 
recording IMs in the diary. In addition, the inclusion of an interview and written disclosure 
about the content of IMs at the beginning of the IM-interview/diary condition but not the IM-
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keyword/diary condition was designed to assess the impact of this relative to the diary 
keeping alone.  
The two conditions that underwent the preliminary IM interview (the IM-
interview/diary and IM-interview/PM-diary conditions) showed some numeric improvement 
(if not statistically significant in all cases) relative to the condition that did not undergo the 
preliminary interview (the IM-keywords/diary condition). The strongest therapeutic effect, 
however, was observed in the IM-Interview/PM Diary condition. With regard to Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) scores, group differences did not reach statistical significance, 
but it was evident that the main effect of time of administration was driven primarily by the 
drop in scores reported in the IM-Interview/PM-diary condition (and to a lesser extent by the 
drop observed in the IM-interview/diary condition). With regard to the PTSD Checklist – 
Civilian Version (PCL-C) results showed that experimental condition had a significant effect 
on scores obtained at the end of the two-week period of diary keeping, with the IM-
interview/PM-diary condition showing significantly lower scores. This result appears to have 
been primarily driven by lower scores at Time 2 on the Criterion B (intrusion) subscale.  
There are a number of points to consider regarding these results. The first is why the 
condition that did not offer participants the opportunity to discuss their IM in the lab showed 
an almost total lack of improvement in their BDI, STAI and PCL-C scores. The second point 
relates to why the IM diary – shown in other studies to produce therapeutic benefit – did not 
do so in the present thesis. Finally, why is it that the PM Diary condition appears to have 
shown the greatest improvement in measures of psychopathology relative to the other 
conditions, particularly when it was intended to be a control condition? These will be 
discussed in turn.  
With regard to the first point, the results suggest there is something particular about 
in-person disclosure that may contribute to overall therapeutic benefit (e.g., see Lepore et al. 
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2000). This has resonance with clinical evidence that the strength of the therapist-client 
relationship is predictive of therapeutic outcome, across different methods of therapeutic 
intervention (Martin, Garske, & Davis, 2000). Whilst the researcher-participant interaction in 
the study under discussion was insufficient to develop a relationship as such, evidence for the 
centrality of the therapeutic alliance speaks to the importance of human interaction for the 
achievement of improved outcomes. In addition, people’s assessment of their traumatic 
experience – and what they believe it says about them and their place in the world – has been 
identified as key to the maintenance of PTSD symptoms, of which IMs are a central 
component (Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Many of these 
assessments – about one’s weakness, unworthiness, lack of value – arguably engender 
feelings of shame, which has been found to be predictive of PTSD symptom severity 
(Bannister, Colvonen, Angkaw, & Norman, 2019; Cunningham, Davis, Wilson, & Resick, 
2018).  And in some clinical settings failure to disclose experiences or beliefs about the self 
that may underlie feelings of shame, result in the maintenance of those feelings (Swan & 
Andrews, 2003). Therefore, the mitigation of shame through disclosure may in turn result in 
an ability to reassess – at least to some degree – the meaning that the individual has assigned 
to their having gone through this traumatic experience. Recording memories in the diary 
without first discussing them with the experimenter would have offered insufficient 
opportunity to examine these assessments, perhaps resulting in the almost complete lack of 
change in psychopathology measures in this condition.  
In addition, as noted above, the instructions often given to participants in the 
expressive writing research ask that they reflect on their emotional response to the event in 
question. There were no such instructions in Study 2 of the present thesis, either for the IM 
nomination in the lab or the reporting of IMs in the diary. Participants were asked to focus on 
the details of the memory in both cases, and were given relatively little space to write about it 
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(one third of a side of A4 in the lab, and just a portion of a side of A5 in the diary). The 
emotional processing that has been posited as one theoretical explanation for the effect of 
expressive writing, may not have been fully activated for both reasons of time and 
instructions given to participants (Sloan & Marx, 2004).  
But there were still some modest indications of therapeutic benefit in the IM-
interview/diary condition. Was this simply a function of the initial disclosure and 
questionnaire completion, or were these results at all enhanced by the diary? There is 
evidence to suggest the latter, but two variables that may have impacted on this are the length 
of the diary-keeping period, and the mode of data collection. In an Ecological Momentary 
Assessment (EMA) study, Dewey et al. (2015) collected data from participants for two 
weeks, asking that they completed electronic versions of the PCL-C when prompted to do so 
at several points during the day. They found that when comparing PCL-C scores taken at 
baseline and at the end of the study, there was a significant drop. It would therefore seem that 
the length of diary keeping alone does not explain the lack of effect in the study presented in 
Chapter 3. It may be this, combined with the request that participants monitor their thoughts 
and record as many of their IMs as possible, which could have overburdened them and 
counteracted any therapeutic benefit. Other studies of IMs in clinical and non-clinical 
populations have limited the number of entries per day to avoid this (though they were not 
looking at the before and after effects of recording IMs; Kleim et al., 2013). The effect of this 
combination of length and method of IM collection (event-based rather than time-based; see 
Rattel et al., 2019) may help to explain how Kvavilashvili and Brewin (2013) observed an 
improvement in psychopathology scores after one week diary of event based diary keeping. 
A two week event-based diary might have exceeded the “optimal dose” of exposure to IM 
content (Echiverri, Jaeger, Chen, Moore, & Zoellner, 2011).  
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 A remaining question, therefore, is why the PM diary combined with the IM 
interview, appears to have had the greatest therapeutic effect. Indeed, results suggest that 
having the opportunity to disclose the content of one’s IM, followed by the tracking of one’s 
future oriented thoughts, may be a particularly adaptive combination for a reduction of IMs. 
This may both command cognitive resources that would otherwise be devoted to IMs, but 
also be adaptive for their orientation toward concrete plans in the future. It has been 
suggested that the majority of our future thinking is highly pragmatic and primarily focussed 
on fairly short-term goals and plans, rather than thinking about more abstract or hypothetical 
scenarios and events (Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2020). Indeed, the latter mode of thinking 
has been shown to be more common in dysphoric mood (Plimpton et al., 2015). Conversely, 
goals have been shown to be important to overall wellbeing, with satisfaction derived from 
making progress towards achieving goals as well as arriving at the end result (MacLeod, 
2017). The mean baseline scores for the diary Study 2, presented in Chapter 3, were well 
within the range previously accepted for dysphoria (16 or above, see Kvavilashvili & 
Schlagman, 2011). It therefore seems plausible that therapeutic benefit was derived from 
engaging participants in an activity which was concrete, goal-oriented, and likely to result in 
goal completion. Indeed, several participants reported informally that they found the PM 
diary keeping to be a useful (e.g. “I enjoyed keeping a diary and think I will invest in one to 
track how I'm coping with plans I make” and “Realising that I had formed intentions made 
me want to get things done more proactively and also heightened my self-awareness and 
confidence”).  
 Finally, there is a notable divergence between the subjective measures for 
improvement that were recorded at the end of the diary study (as part of the compliance 
questionnaire) and the results obtained from analysing the pre-and post-diary keeping scores 
on the BDI, STAI and PCL-C. Namely, a majority of participants in the IM-keywords/diary 
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condition (53%) reported that recording their IMs in a diary made them feel worse overall, 
while they showed virtually no change before and after on the above-mentioned scales. 
Despite this, only 31% of participants in this condition reported that the diary keeping had no 
effect on their mood. Conversely, a majority of participants in the IM-interview/diary 
condition (46%) reported that the IM diary-keeping made them feel better overall, with only 
36% reporting no effect. Whilst participants in this condition showed numeric improvement 
on measures of depression, anxiety and PTSD between the first and second administration, 
this change was not significant. Finally, 73% of participants in the PM Diary condition 
reported that diary keeping had no impact on their mood, with only 27% reporting an 
improvement. Paradoxically, this was the condition that showed the greatest level of 
objective improvement as measured by the BDI and PCL-C (though only the latter measures 
showed change that differed significantly from the other two conditions).  
 These findings resonate with those of Kvavilashvili and Brewin (2013) who found 
that participants in their study (who kept diary of IMs for one week – either full entries plus 
tick as in Chapter 3, or ticks alone) reported improved mood if they kept the full diary 
(M=5.31, SD=1.25 on a 7-point scale – 1=made me feel a lot worse, 4=no effect, 7=made me 
feel a lot better). For the tick-only diary, participants gave a mean rating of 3.86 (SD=0.66), 
indicating little to no effect (but falling slightly on the negative side of the scale). This was 
despite the fact that both conditions showed a significant improvement in BDI and STAI-
State scores when comparing the beginning of the diary keeping to the end.  
Whilst a subjective sense of improvement is arguably important, the finding of the 
present thesis combined with those of Kvavilashvili and Brewin (2013) raise the possibility 
that participants may experience depression, anxiety and PTSD symptom reduction of which 
they are not fully aware. It is perhaps unsurprising given the demonstrated lack of meta-
awareness for thoughts (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007; Takarangi et al., 2014), 
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that there might be similar phenomenon for emotion and overall psychological health. In 
addition, certain cognitive distortions associated with depression and PTSD – namely the 
retrieval of over-general autobiographical memories – are known to be key in maintaining 
these conditions but also predictive of them (Barry, Sze, & Raes, 2019; Hitchcock, Werner-
Seidler, Blackwell, & Dalgleish, 2017). That this cognitive style can persist in the absence of 
clinical symptoms provides further evidence of a possible divergence between subjective and 
objective measures of psychological health. This in turn supports a clinical practice of 
collecting both subjective and more objective measures during the course of a particular 
intervention, as a means of gauging its effectiveness.  
7.3 Methodological and Theoretical Implications  
 The present thesis has made a number of novel methodological contributions to the 
study of IMs. The first of these is the use of a paper, IAM-style diary for event-based 
recording of IMs. This method has yielded important findings about the frequency, 
phenomenology, and triggers of IAMs, and in the present thesis has been shown to do the 
same with regard to IMs. Measures of frequency would seem to vary depending on the type 
of diary (electronic versus paper; Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018), recording method 
(event-based versus time-based) and length of the diary keeping period (Kleindienst et al., 
2017; Priebe et al., 2013). Nevertheless, evidence suggests that event-based recording in a 
paper diary (as used in the present thesis) yields good approximation of the frequency of IMs 
for which participants are meta-aware, though this format could perhaps be optimised going 
forward with a shorter diary keeping period (see below). In addition, this provides valuable 
information regarding triggers for IMs and the emotional and physical responses to them, for 
which there is a limited amount of real-time (as opposed to retrospective) empirical data. And 
an event-based diary is particularly useful for capturing this fleeting detail.  
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 Similarly, adopting an IAM-style diary for the study of analogue IMs in Studies 4a 
and 4b in the present thesis has facilitated the capture of detail regarding the conditions under 
which these cognitions come to mind, namely triggers and concurrent activates. This allows 
for comparisons with naturalistic IMs and IAMs along these variables, thereby contributing 
to our understanding of what can be inferred from the study of analogue IMs.  
 In addition, Studies 3a and 3b demonstrate that it is possible to elicit naturally 
occurring IMs under controlled laboratory conditions. The feasibility of doing this with IAMs 
has long been demonstrated (Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2018; Kvavilashvili & 
Schlagman, 2011; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008), and deemed possible because of the 
bottom-up, associative way in which they are triggered and brought to consciousness, making 
them susceptible to more abstract and language-based cues in the environment (Berntsen, 
2009). By contrast, it has traditionally been thought that IMs are more susceptible to being 
triggered by sensory/perceptual information, because of their lack of autobiographical (or 
episodic) context, which is the result of peri-traumatic dissociation during the event itself 
(Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Brewin, 2014; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). But 
Studies 3a and 3b amply demonstrated that it is possible to trigger naturally occurring IMs 
with cue phrases under controlled conditions. Furthermore, personalising those cue phrases, 
based on an IM reported at screening, makes them more likely to elicit the target IM. This 
effect is arguably enhanced by limiting the number of cues overall and thus potential 
competition for attentional resources. This preliminary finding lays the groundwork for future 
research that could aim to manipulate a range of different variables (e.g. cognitive load 
during the vigilance task, time available for retrieval) in order to better illuminate the 
conditions under which IMs come to mind.  
 The use of a brief, thematically consistent, and relatively mild (e.g. created for prime-
time television) film clip in Studies 4a and 4b has been shown to be effective at eliciting and 
 267 
IM frequency comparable to previous studies (James, Lau-Zhu, Clark, et al., 2016). Whilst 
briefer clips have been used before these have either not been thematically consistent 
(Verwoerd, Wessel, & de Jong, 2012) or have incorporated violent film content that would 
not be suitable for a prime-time audience (Nixon et al., 2009; Wessel, Huntjens, & Verwoerd, 
2010; Wessel, Overwijk, Verwoerd, & de Vrieze, 2008). This makes possible the study of 
analogue IMs using film content that optimises participants’ time, but also lowers the distress 
threshold associated with viewing that content. Furthermore, the compilation of road safety 
advertisements allows for manipulating the order of presentation to explore the variables that 
inform subsequent IM content (e.g. whether the frequency with which images from the film 
are reported as analogue IMs is a function of recency or content).  
 Finally, the results presented in this thesis have theoretical implications for our 
understanding of the relationship between IMs and IAMs. As noted previously, some 
cognitively oriented researchers argue that IMs are a predicable (if enhanced) output of a 
normally functioning autobiographical memory system (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Berntsen, 
Willert, & Rubin, 2003; Rubin et al., 2008). The clinical view has been that IMs are the 
output of a separate if closely related memory system, which is engaged during a distressing 
or traumatic event, and which maintains the intrusiveness of the memory through failure to 
situate the sensory content within broader autobiographical narrative (Brewin et al., 2010; 
Brewin, 2014; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Both the trigger data across a number of studies and 
the within subjects study of analogue IMs and IAMs (Study 5) offer new insight on this 
debate. Indeed, with regard to the latter study in particular, there was no relationship found 
between the frequency of IAMs and analogue IMs, suggesting they are the outputs of 
different systems. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that analogue IMs are images from a 
film rather than actual lived experience, and therefore cannot be considered autobiographical 
in the same way. Analogue IMs are, however, considered a good approximation of 
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naturalistic IMs and there is evidence to support this (James, Lau-Zhu, Clark, et al., 2016; 
Marks et al., 2018). The disassociation between the IAMs and analogue IMs provides some 
evidence for the view that IAMs and naturalistic IMs are also outputs of separate systems.   
The picture is slightly complicated, however, by the data on triggers. These 
similarities in the proportions of external (environmental) and internal (own thought) triggers 
in naturalistic IMs and IAMs could be interpreted as suggesting some overlap in the retrieval 
mechanisms for each type of cognition (Berntsen, 2009; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
The pattern for analogue IMs differed only slightly, with a greater proportion of entries 
reporting ‘no trigger’ that was the case for naturalistic IMs and IAMs. Trigger reports for 
these three types of cognition according to the coding categories developed by Mace (2004) 
diverge more sharply, and suggest important differences in the cognitive architecture 
underlying each. Analogue IMs, for example, appear to be more often triggered by 
sensory/perceptual information than abstract or verbal. Again this is perhaps unsurprising 
given that they represent sensory data divorced form a life story or autobiographical 
narrative.  
By contrast, the triggers for IAMs have been shown to divide quite equally between 
abstract/verbal and sensory/perceptual, with some data suggesting the former may even be 
slightly more frequent (Mace, 2004; Schlagman et al., 2007). This was the pattern of trigger 
reports in the IM-interview/diary condition in Study 2, but the IM-keyword/diary condition 
showed a much greater proportion of abstract/verbal trigger reports. It would therefore appear 
to be the case that not having the opportunity to disclose, discuss and rate IMs in the lab with 
the researcher (and only nominating them with keywords) resulted in these IMs being 
susceptible to triggering  by a broader range of verbal information. This could still be 
considered reflective of the lack of incorporation into autobiographical narrative. But instead 
of this lack of incorporation resulting in greater susceptibility to IM cuing by 
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sensory/perceptual information, it produced a broadening of the associative networks that can 
bring memory content to consciousness (Berntsen, 2009; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
This could be another mechanism by which IMs retain intrusiveness, in a manner not fully 
accounted for by prevailing clinical and cognitive theories.  
7.4 Limitations and Future Directions 
 The findings of the present thesis reflect some limitations but also avenues for future 
research. Firstly, there is a need for more diary studies of naturally occurring IMs, to create a 
fuller picture of their nature and phenomenology. As noted above there are only a handful of 
studies that have aimed to measure the frequency of these IMs through unrestricted 
participant reporting (i.e. event based sampling - EBS). The timeframe for doing so has 
varied from three days (Kleindienst et al., 2017) to one week (Kvavilashvili et al., in 
preparation; Williams & Moulds, 2007) or even two weeks (Rubin et al., 2011). Results from 
a recent diary study of IAMs suggests that the length of the diary keeping period can also 
impact the frequency of diary entries made.  Laughland and Kvavilashvili (2018) found that 
asking participants to record their IAMs for one day yielded significantly higher frequency of  
reports when compared to the first day of a 7-day diary study. This resonates with the finding 
of Priebe et al. (2013) that time-based experience sampling (in response to prompts every two 
hours), over a three day period, resulted in higher IM frequency reports than self-initiated 
event-based sampling. It seems most likely that these higher reported frequencies are a result 
of participants noticing and reporting cognitions that they would otherwise not notice or 
chose not to report. These findings therefore suggest that limiting the period of time that 
participants have to monitor their thoughts facilitate greater focus on the task and arguably 
better meta-awareness. 
Particularly for IMs, which can occur at varying frequencies, the reduction of the 
diary keeping period carries with it the risk that participants will not experience any IMs 
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during that time interval dictated by the study. One way to address this could be the adoption 
of an online screening procedure such as that used in Studies 3a and 3b. This would facilitate 
more targeted recruitment of participants who report (albeit retrospectively) experiencing 
above a certain number of IMs in a day or a week. This would then make it easier for the 
researcher to manipulate the period of diary keeping, whilst being more confident of 
capturing IMs during these reduced recording intervals. As noted earlier, Priebe et al. (2013) 
asked participants to record their IMs for three days. It would be interesting to compare this 
to results obtained from a one day diary study of IMs, or possibly an even shorter interval 
(Laughland & Kvavilashvili, 2018).  
The results regarding triggers raise interesting questions about mechanisms that result 
in IMs coming to consciousness. The patterns reported in the present thesis would seem to 
suggest some alignment between naturally occurring IMs and IAMs in terms of the types of 
cues that produce these cognitions. But if more robust theoretical inferences are to be drawn, 
these results need to be replicated using either the present or similar coding scheme designed 
to highlight the types of cues to which IMs are most susceptible.  
 Finally, the results of the present thesis regarding the therapeutic benefit of recording 
IMs were unexpected and merit further investigation. The potential for recording future 
oriented cognitions to have therapeutic benefit (particularly following discussion or 
disclosure of the content of a distressing IM or IMs) raises interesting questions about the 
impact of goal completion on mental health and general well-being. It also raises questions 
about the optimal level of interaction with IM content to achieve therapeutic benefit. Is it 
possible to ‘over-expose’ someone to the content of their IM, such that the potentially 
constructive aspects of this practice tip over into something more aligned with 
unconstructive, ruminative thought (Watkins, 2008)? Or perhaps it is less a question of 
volume of interaction and more the way that it is structured. Perhaps monitoring – as 
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facilitated by the diary task – produces benefit only up to a certain point, after which effort 
must be made to amend the processing style (Watkins & Roberts, 2020). These important 
questions merit further research.  
7.5 Conclusion  
 The present thesis aimed to apply methods from IAM research to the study of IMs 
whilst recruiting non-clinical participants. Results suggest some interesting convergence 
between IMs and IAMs in terms of reported triggers. Results also suggest that in person 
discussion/disclosure of IM content may have greater benefit than diary completion, though 
the results of this may be maximised if the diary task focuses on a different type of future 
oriented cognition like involuntary PMs. Overall, these results make an important initial 
contribution to our understanding of IMs which merit further investigation and replication. 
They also raise interesting and novel avenues for future research into this important topic. 
While IMs would appear to be a widespread experience, a greater understanding of their 
occurrence will contribute to reducing the distress often associated with them whether 
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Appendix II: Diary of Intrusive Memories and Diary of Prospective Memories 














































Intrusive memory diary: 
 
1. When did you have the memory?     Time:____________  Date:____________ 
2. When did you record it?                     Time:____________     Date:____________ 





4. Was the memory triggered by something… (circle as appropriate) 
(a) in your thoughts 
(b) in your environment 
(c) there was no trigger – if so move to Question 6 
 
5. What was the trigger? 
 
 
6. Where were you, and what were you doing when the memory came to mind? 
 
 
7. How much were you concentrating on this activity? (circle as appropriate) 
  
       Not at all      1                     2                     3                     4                     5      Fully concentrating 
 
8. How vivid was this memory? (circle as appropriate)   
 
     Very vague,      1              2              3              4              5              6              7         Extremely  
 almost no image                                                                                                        viv id, almost like                           
                                                          normal vision                                                                                                                               
  
9. Did this memory evoke any emotions? (e.g., sadness, helplessness, guilt etc.) 
 No 
 Yes. Please specify:__________________________________________________ 
 
10. Did you experience any bodily sensations? (e.g., sweating, shaking, heart racing etc.) 
 No 
 Yes. Please specify:__________________________________________________ 
 
11. How long ago did the event in your memory take place? (Be  as specific as possible) 
 
 
12. Have you ever had a memory of this event before? (circle) 
 
 Never            Once or twice            A few times          Several times           Many times       
 
13. If you have experienced a memory of this event before, is this memory… (circle as appropriate) 
(a) exactly the same as previous memories of this event 





Prospective Memory Diary: 
1. When did you have the memory?      Time:____________       Date:____________ 
2. When did you record it?            Time:____________      Date:____________ 





4. Was the memory triggered by something… (circle as appropriate) 
(d) in your thoughts 
(e) in your environment 
(f) there was no trigger – if so move to Question 6 
 
5. What was the trigger? 
 
 
6. Where were you, and what were you doing when the memory came to mind? 
 
 
7. How much were you concentrating on this activity? (circle as appropriate) 
  
       Not at all       1                  2                  3                  4                  5       Fully concentrating 
 
8. How vivid was this memory? (circle as appropriate)   
 
     Very vague,       1            2            3            4            5            6            7       Extremely  
almost no image                                                                                              vivid, almost like                           
                                            normal vision                                                                                                                               
9. Did this memory evoke any emotions? (e.g., sadness, helplessness, guilt etc.) 
 No 
 Yes. Please specify:__________________________________________________ 
 
10. Did you experience any bodily sensations? (e.g., sweating, shaking, heart racing etc.) 
 No 
 Yes. Please specify:__________________________________________________ 
 
11. When did you originally form this intention?  (be as specific as possible, i.e., how many minutes, 
hours, days, weeks ago) 
 
 
12. When is this intention due to be performed? (be as specific as possible, i.e., how many minutes, 



































































Below is a list of questions relating to your experience of keeping a diary of intrusive 
memories.  
 
Some of the questions may seem to repeat sections of your diary entries. Please still provide 
an answer as the purpose of this questionnaire is to find out whether the use of a diary 
method worked well or not and whether you felt this was a useful and/or interesting 
experience. 
 
If you forgot some of the instructions about keeping the diary, or chose not to follow them, 
please answer honestly when completing the questionnaire. There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
 
1. Did you keep your diary with you every day?     
 
   Yes                           No 
 




2. If you did not keep your diary with you all the time was there a reason for this? If so, 





3. Did you find it easy or difficult to try to keep your diary with you at all times? 
  
 Very easy   Somewhat easy  Somewhat difficult     Very difficult     
      
4. Out of all the memories during the week, what was the percentage of memories (from 




5. If you deliberately did not record some of your intrusive memories, what was the 





6. How easy or difficult did you find it to record your intrusive memories using the diary 
provided? 
 
 Very easy  Somewhat easy   Somewhat difficult     Very difficult 
  
 




8. Did you find the process of recording your intrusive memories useful in any way? 
 






9. Do you feel that keeping a diary of your intrusive memories had any effect on your 
mood? 
 
Made me feel       1            2            3            4            5            6           7    Made me feel                                                             
 a lot worse                                               No effect                                        a lot better 
 
10. Do you feel that keeping a diary of your intrusive memories has affected your intrusive 
memories in terms of… 
 
a. Frequency (how often they occur):  
 
Overall more frequent Overall the same Overall less frequent  Not sure 
 
 
b. Intensity (how strong or powerful they are):  
 
Overall more intense  Overall the same Overall less intense  Not sure 
 
 
c. Controllability (how easy they are to control): 
 




11. Finally, please take this space to note down any other comments you have regarding 
the diary method or the effects of the diary for you. 
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Below is a list of questions relating to your experience of keeping a diary of involuntary 
memories.  
 
Some of the questions may seem to repeat sections of your diary entries. Please still provide 
an answer as the purpose of this questionnaire is to find out whether the use of a diary 
method worked well or not and whether you felt this was a useful and/or interesting 
experience. 
 
If you forgot some of the instructions about keeping the diary, or chose not to follow them, 
please answer honestly when completing the questionnaire. There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
  
1. Did you keep your diary with you every day?     
 
  Yes                           No 
 




2. If you did not keep your diary with you all the time was there a reason for this and, if so, please 





3. Did you find it easy or difficult to try to keep your diary with you at all times?   
 
Very easy               Somewhat easy     Somewhat difficult             Very 
difficult    
 
4. Out of all the memories during the week, what was the percentage of memories (from 0% to 
100%) that you managed to record in the diary? 
 
    
 









6. How easy or difficult did you find it to record your involuntary memories using the diary 
provided? 
 










8. Did you find the process of recording your involuntary memories useful in any way? 
 





9. Do you feel that keeping a diary of your involuntary memories had any effect on your mood? 
 
Made me feel       1            2            3            4            5            6           7    Made me feel                                                             
 a lot worse                                               No effect                                        a lot better 
 
10. Do you feel that keeping a diary of your future intention memories has affected your intrusive 
memories in terms of… 
 
a. Frequency (how often they occur):  
 




b. Intensity (how strong or powerful they are):  
 




c. Controllability (how easy they are to control): 
 






11. Finally, please use this space to note any other comments you have regarding the diary method 
or the effects of the diary for you. 
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A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. 
Read each statement and then cross the appropriate circle to the right of the statement 
to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which 











1. I feel calm………………………………………     
2. I feel secure……………………………………     
3. I am tense………………………………………     
4. I am regretful….………………………………     
5. I feel at ease……………………………………     
6. I feel upset……………………………………     
7. I am presently worrying over possible 
misfortunes….................................................... 
    
8. I feel rested……………………………………     
9. I feel anxious…………………………………     
10. I feel comfortable……………………………     
11. I feel self-confident…………………………     
12. I feel nervous…………………………………     
13. I am jittery……………………………………     
14. I feel ‘high strung’…………………………     
15. I am relaxed…………………………………     
16. I feel content…………………………………     
17. I am worried…………………………………     
18. I feel over-excited and ‘rattled’……………     
19. I feel joyful……………………………………     
20. I feel pleasant………………………………     
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Mood Questionnaire - Continued 
 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then cross the appropriate circle to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems 
to describe how you generally feel best.  
 Almost 
never 
Sometimes Often Almost 
always 
21. I feel pleasant……………………………………     
22. I tire quickly……………………………………..     
23. I feel like crying…………………………………     
24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to 
be………................................................................. 
    
25. I am losing out on things because I can’t make 
up my    mind soon enough………………….. 
    
26. I feel rested…...…………………………………...     
27. I am ‘calm, cool and collected’…………………..     
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I 
cannot overcome them………………………………. 
    
29. I worry too much over something that really 
doesn’t matter……………………………………….... 
    
30. I am happy………………………………………...     
31. I am inclined to take things hard………….....     
32. I lack self-confidence…………………………….     
33. I feel secure..……………………………………..     
34. I try to avoid facing a crisis or difficulty…….     
35. I feel blue...………………………………………     
36. I am content.……………………………………..     
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my 
mind and bothers me……………………………….. 
    
38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t 
put them out of my mind…………………………... 









































39. I am a steady person…………..……………….     
40. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think 
over my recent concerns and interests……. 
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Mood Questionnaire 2 
A number of statements are given below. Read each statement and then circle the 
number of the statement to indicate which best applies to you over the past 
week. There are no right or wrong answers so please answer honestly. 
 
A 
 0 I do not feel sad 
 1 I feel blue or sad 
 2a  I am blue or sad all the time and I can't snap out of it 
 2b I am so sad or unhappy that it is very painful 
 3  I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it 
 
B  
 0 I am not particularly pessimistic or discouraged about the future 
 1 I feel discouraged about the future 
 2a  I feel I have nothing to look forward to 
 2b  I feel that I won't ever get over my troubles 
 3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve 
 
C  
 0  I do not feel like a failure 
 1 I feel I have failed more than the average person 
 2a  I feel I have accomplished very little that is worthwhile or that means 
  anything 
 2b  As I look back on my life all I can see is a lot of failures 
 3  I feel I am a complete failure as a person (parent, husband, wife) 
 
D 
 0  I am not particularly dissatisfied 
 1a  I feel bored most of the time 
 1b  I don't enjoy things the way I used to 
 2  I don't get satisfaction out of anything any more 
 3  I am dissatisfied with everything 
 
E  
 0  I don't feel particularly guilty 
 1  I feel bad or unworthy a good part of the time 
 2a  I feel quite guilty 
 2a  I feel bad or unworthy practically all the time now 
 3  I feel as though I am very bad or worthless 
  
F  
 0  I don't feel I am being punished 
 1  I have a feeling that something bad may happen to me 
 2  I feel I am being punished or will be punished 
 3a  I feel I deserve to be punished 




 0  I don't feel disappointed in myself 
 1a  I am disappointed in myself 
 1b  I don't like myself 
 2  I am disgusted with myself 
 3  I hate myself 
 
H 
 0  I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else 
 1  I am very critical of myself for weaknesses or mistakes 
 2a  I blame myself for everything that goes wrong 
 2b  I feel I have many bad faults 
 
I 
 0  I don't have any thoughts of harming myself 
 1  I have thoughts of harming myself but I would not carry them out 
 2a  I feel I would be better off dead 
 2b  I have definite plans about committing suicide 
 2c  I feel my family would be better off if I were dead 
 3  I would kill myself if I could 
 
J 
 0  I don't cry my more than usual 
 1  I cry more now than I used to 
 2  I cry all the time now. I can't stop it 
 3  I used to be able to cry but now I can't cry at even though I want to 
 
K  
 0  I am no more irritated now than I ever am 
 1  I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to 
 2  I feel irritated all the time 
 3  I don't get irritated at all at the things that used to irritate me 
 
L  
 0  I have not lost interest in other people 
 1  I am less interested in other people now than I used to be 
 2  I have lost most of my interest in other people and have little feeling  
for them 




 0  I make decisions about as well as ever 
 1  I am less sure of myself now and try to put off making decisions 
 2  I can't make decisions any more without help 





 0  I don't feel I look any worse than I used to 
 1  I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive 
 2  I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance and they  
make me look unattractive 
 3  I feel that I am ugly or repulsive looking 
 
O  
0 I can work about as well as before  
1a It takes extra effort to get started at doing something 
1b I don't work as well as I used to 
2  I have to push myself very hard to do anything 
 3  I can't do any work at all 
 
P  
 0  I can sleep as well as usual 
 1  I wake up more tired in the morning than I used to 
 2  I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to  
sleep 
 3  I wake up early every day and can't get more than 5 hours sleep 
 
Q  
 0  I don't get any more tired than usual 
 1  I get tired more easily than I used to 
 2  I get tired from doing anything 
 3  I get too tired to do anything 
 
R  
0 My appetite is no worse than usual 
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be 
 2  My appetite is much worse now 
 3  I have no appetite at all any more 
 
S 
 0  I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately 
 1  I have lost more than 5 pounds 
 2  I have lost more than 10 pounds 
 3  I have lost more than 15 pounds 
 
T 
 0  I am no more concerned about my health than usual 
 1  I am concerned about aches and pains or upset stomach or  
constipation or other unpleasant feelings in my body 
2  I am so concerned with how I feel or what I feel that it's hard to think 
of much else 





 0  I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex 
 1  I am less interested in sex than I used to be 
2 I am much less interested in sex now 























































































Instructions: Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have 
in response to stressful life experiences. Please read each one carefully, put an “X” 
in the box to indicate how much you have been bothered by that problem in the last 
week. 
 
No.  Response Not at all 
(1) 








1. Repeated, disturbing 
memories, thoughts, 
or images of a 
stressful experience 
from the past? 
     
2. Repeated, disturbing 
dreams of a stressful 
experience from the 
past? 
     
3. Suddenly acting or 
feeling as if a stressful 
experience were 
happening again (as if 
you were reliving it)? 
     
4. Feeling very upset 
when something 
reminded you of 
a stressful experience 
from the past? 
     
5. Having physical 





reminded you of a 
stressful experience 
from the past? 
     
6. Avoid thinking about 
or talking about a 
stressful experience 
from the past or avoid 
having feelings 
related to it? 
     
7. Avoid activities or 
situations because 
they remind you of a 
stressful experience 
from the past? 
     
8. Trouble remembering 
important parts of a 
stressful experience 
from the past? 
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No.  Response Not at all 
(1) 








9. Loss of interest in 
things that you used 
to enjoy? 
     
10. Feeling distant or cut 
off from other people? 
     
11. Feeling emotionally 
numb or being unable 
to have loving feelings 
for those close to 
you? 
     
12. Feeling as if your 
future will somehow 
be cut short? 
     
13. Trouble falling or 
staying asleep? 
     
14. Feeling irritable or 
having angry 
outbursts? 
     
15. Having difficulty 
concentrating? 
     
16. Being “super alert” or 
watchful on guard? 
     
17. Feeling jumpy or 
easily startled? 

















































































































Stimuli/Event Name Cue-word Valence 
1.  NS002   Coffee Mug Neutral  
2.  NS003   Young free & single Positive 
3.  NS004   Going to a party Positive 
4.  NS005   Gaining insight Positive 
5.  NS007  Learning disability Negative 
6.  NS008  Disney World Positive 
7.  NS009  Good business Positive 
8.  NS010  Terrible nightmare Negative 
9.  NS011  Photocopying paper Neutral 
10.  NS012  Summer romance Positive 
11.  NS013  Feeling frustrated Negative 
12.  NS014  A square shape Neutral 
13.  NS016  Sports injury Negative 
14.  NS017  Small scissors Neutral  
15.  NS018  Healthy glow Positive 
16.  NS019  Valentines day Positive 
17.  NS020  Missed opportunity Negative 
18.  NS022  Bad music Negative 
19.  NS023  Sound of a whistle Neutral 
20.  NS024  Christmas presents Positive 
21.  NS026  Address book Neutral 
22.  NS028  Masking tape Neutral 
23.  NS030  Tube of superglue Neutral 
24.  NS031  Snake bite Negative 
25.  NS033  Boring job Negative 
26.  NS034  Losing money Negative 
27.  NS035  Going on holiday Positive 
28.  NS036  Finding money Positive 
29.  NS039  Over reacting Negative 
30.  NS040 Lock smiths Neutral 
31.  NS041  Crossing the road Neutral 
32.  NS042  Old family photographs Positive 
33.  NS045  Overhead projector Neutral 
34.  NS046  Garden shed Neutral 
35.  NS047  Paying fines Negative 
36.  NS048  Bedside lamp Neutral 
37.  NS049  Friendly boss Positive 
38.  NS050  Stars & stripes Neutral 
39.  NS051  Favorite painting Positive 
40.  NS052 TARG   Being ill Negative 
41.  NS057  Deliberate harm Negative 
42.  NS058  Ideal home Positive 
43.  NS060  Flat tire Negative 
44.  NS061  Head-lice Negative 
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45.  NS062  Filing a complaint Negative 
46.  NS063  Favorite teacher Positive 
47.  NS064  Drawing the curtains Neutral 
48.  NS066 Wall mirror Neutral 
49.  NS067  A big hug Positive 
50.  NS070 Red pen Neutral 
51.  NS071 Spot light Neutral 
52.  NS073 Flu symptoms Negative 
53.  NS075 Super smile Positive 
54.  NS076 Family pet Positive 
55.  NS077 Falling off a horse Negative 
56.  NS079 Tumble dryer  Neutral 
57.  NS080 Romantic walk Positive 
58.  NS082 Being followed Negative 
59.  NS083 Web page Neutral 
60.  NS084 Feeling homesick Negative 
61.  NS086 New relationship Positive 
62.  NS087 Road rage Negative 
63.  NS089 Music concert Positive 
64.  NS090 Family doctor Neutral 
65.  NS091 Forgotten appointment Negative 
66.  NS092 Red light Neutral 
67.  NS093 Flip flops Neutral 
68.  NS094 Lukewarm water Neutral 
69.  NS095 Drug addict Negative 
70.  NS096 Clear blue sky Positive 
71.  NS097 Smelly feet Negative 
72.  NS098 Skiing accident Negative 
73.  NS099 Bad breath Negative 
74.  NS100 Sitting on the fence Neutral 
75.  NS101 Nail clippers Neutral 
76.  NS102 Jealous behavior Negative 
77.  NS103 Window shutters Neutral 
78.  NS104 Nasty feeling Negative 
79.  NS105 Great fun Positive 
80.  NS106 Rectangular bookmark Neutral 
81.  NS107 Crying all night Negative 
 Thought Probe 1   
82.  NS110 Driving instructor Neutral 
83.  NS111 Lousy day Negative 
84.  NS112 Unexpected disaster Negative 
85.  NS113 Post man Neutral 
86.  NS114 Mop & bucket Neutral 
87.  NS115 Filing cabinet Neutral 
88.  NS117 Long hair Neutral 
89.  NS118 Devoted friend Positive 
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90.  NS120 Being content Positive 
91.  NS121 Local newspaper Neutral 
92.  NS122 Diary entry Neutral 
93.  NS123 Paint brush Neutral 
94.  NS125 Hand cream Neutral 
95.  NS127 Mean spirited Negative 
96.  NS128 Remaining neutral Neutral 
97.  NS129 Favourite food Positive 
98.  NS130 Feeling degraded Negative 
99.  NS131 London taxi Neutral 
100.  NS133TARG Daily chores Neutral 
101.  NS136 Fat cat Neutral 
102.  NS138 Best effort Positive 
103.  NS139 Shoe shop Neutral 
104.  NS141 A glass of wine Positive 
105.  NS143 Something for nothing Positive 
106.  NS144 Yellow pages Neutral 
107.  NS146 Freezing cold Negative 
108.  NS147 Stars at night Positive 
109.  NS149 Relaxing on a beach Positive 
110.  NS150 Rubix cube Neutral 
111.  NS151 Being bullied Negative 
112.  NS153 Chapped lips Negative 
113.  NS156 Horrible sound Negative 
114.  NS157 Fear of heights Negative 
115.  NS158 Grim reaper Negative 
116.  NS159 Nice atmosphere Positive 
117.  NS160 Easy life Positive 
118.  NS162 Place of work Neutral 
119.  NS163 Drawing lines Neutral 
120.  NS164 No solution Negative 
121.  NS167 Remote control Neutral 
122.  NS168 Laugh out loud Positive 
123.  NS170 Deck chair Neutral 
124.  NS171 Sense of discomfort Negative 
125.  NS173 Shopping basket Neutral 
126.  NS174 Light feather Neutral 
127.  NS175 No electricity Negative 
128.  NS177 Childhood nightmares Negative 
129.  NS178 Serving dish Neutral 
 Thought Probe 2   
130.  NS179 Being arrested Negative 
131.  NS180 Dry cleaning Neutral 
132.  NS181 Christmas tree Positive 
133.  NS182 Good news Positive 
134.  NS183 Family feud Negative 
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135.  NS184 Color paper Neutral 
136.  NS185 Failed driving test Negative 
137.  NS186 Value for money Positive 
138.  NS188 Coughing all night Negative 
139.  NS189 Being grateful Positive 
140.  NS190 Warm fire Positive 
141.  NS191 Washing hands Neutral 
142.  NS192 Financially secure Positive 
143.  NS193 Feeling refreshed Positive 
144.  NS194 Grandmothers birthday Positive 
145.  NS196 Getting divorced Negative 
146.  NS197 Looking good Positive 
147.  NS198 Exotic honeymoon Positive 
148.  NS200 Blocked drain  Negative 
149.  NS201 Computer disk Neutral 
150.  NS202TARG Having an argument Negative 
151.  NS203 Giving directions Neutral 
152.  NS204 Being greedy Negative 
153.  NS205 Perfect day Positive 
154.  NS207 Open-minded Positive 
155.  NS209 Opening blinds Neutral 
156.  NS212 Question mark Neutral 
157.  NS213 Sun burn Negative 
158.  NS214 Holiday home Positive 
159.  NS216 Sense of humor Positive 
160.  NS217 Family air loom Positive 
161.  NS218 Tender touch Positive 
162.  NS219 Having acne Negative 
163.  NS220 Making an appointment Neutral 
164.  NS221 Being punished Negative 
165.  NS222 Going to hospital Negative 
166.  NS224 Visiting an old friend Positive 
167.  NS226 Romantic dinner Positive 
168.  NS227 Attending a meeting Neutral 
169.  NS228 Eye infection Negative 
170.  NS231 Beautiful view Positive 
171.  NS232 Tin can Neutral 
172.  NS235 Bad karma Negative 
173.  NS236 Life time achievement Positive 
174.  NS238 Head over heels in love Positive 
175.  NS239 Family get together Positive 
176.  NS240 Favorite music Positive 
177.  NS241 Bad taste Negative 
178.  NS242 Good decision Positive 
179.  NS243 Locked out Negative 
180.  NS244  Setting alarm Neutral 
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181.  NS245 New clothes Positive 
182.  NS248 Stuck in an elevator Negative 
183.  NS249 Miracle Cure Positive 
184.  NS250 Falling down stairs Negative 
185.  NS251 White picket fence Neutral 
186.  NS252 Easy success Positive 
187.  NS254 Dinner with friends Positive 
188.  NS256 Aerobic class Neutral 
189.  NS258 Stepping out Neutral 
190.  NS259 Jet lag Negative 
191.  NS260 Successful career Positive 
192.  NS262 Brick house Neutral 
193.  NS263 Obtaining a degree Positive 
194.  NS265 Rocking chair Neutral 
195.  NS266TARG Delicious food Positive 
196.  NS268 Unable to cope Negative 
197.  NS270 Polishing furniture Neutral 
198.  NS272 Standing still Neutral 
199.  NS274 Villa in France Positive 
200.  NS275 Stubbed toe Negative 
201.  NS276 Note book Neutral 
202.  NS277 Wall paper Neutral 
203.  NS278 London Bridge Neutral 
204.  NS279 Delicious cocktail Positive 
205.  NS282 Santa Claus Positive 
206.  NS284 Parking ticket Negative 
207.  NS286 Fathers day Positive 
208.  NS287 Unable to adapt Negative 
209.  NS288 Sea sick Negative 
210.  NS290 Happy thoughts Positive 
211.  NS291 Wedding anniversary Positive 
212.  NS292 Sleeping bag Neutral 
213.  NS294 Drying clothes Neutral 
214.  NS295 Middle of the week Neutral 
215.  NS297 Name tag Neutral 
216.  NS299 Soap dish Neutral 
217.  NS300 Winning a prize Positive 
218.  NS302 Comfy chair Positive 
219.   Personalized Cue 1  
 Thought Probe 3   
220.  NS305 Being let down Negative 
221.  NS306 Happy memories Positive 
222.  NS307 Social security Neutral 
223.  NS308 Uncomfortable pillow Negative 
224.  NS310 Suicide attempt Negative 
225.  NS311 Car crash Negative 
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226.  NS312 Wanting for nothing Positive 
227.  NS313 Parents anniversary Positive 
228.  NS314 Winning a race Positive 
229.  NS315 Fresh bread Positive 
230.  NS317 World peace Positive 
231.  NS318 Receiving inheritance Positive 
232.  NS319 TV cabinet Neutral 
233.  NS320 Aiming high Positive 
234.  NS321 Terminal illness Negative 
235.  NS322 Feeling bored Negative 
236.  NS323 Circus clown Neutral 
237.  NS324 Bathroom cabinet Neutral 
238.  NS326 Post office Neutral 
239.  NS328 Birthday party Positive 
240.  NS329 Distant relative Neutral 
241.  NS330 Sunny day Positive 
242.  NS332 Hanging clothes Neutral 
243.  NS334 Bruised knee Negative 
244.  NS336 Computer desk Neutral 
245.  NS337 Feeling grumpy Negative 
246.  NS338 Best man Positive 
247.  NS339 Car seat Neutral 
248.  NS340 No sensation Negative 
249.  NS341 Old mirror Neutral 
250.  NS342TARG Chewing gum Neutral 
251.  NS343 Happy face Positive 
252.  NS344 Cup & saucer Neutral 
253.  NS345 Performing well Positive 
254.  NS346 Delayed flight Negative 
255.  NS347 Putting up a tent Neutral 
256.  NS349 Book shelves Neutral 
257.  NS351 Failing an exam Negative 
258.  NS352 New Years Eve Positive 
259.  NS353 Painful toothache Negative 
260.  NS354 Christmas decorations Positive 
261.  NS355 Suffering from vertigo Negative 
262.  NS356 Quick progress Positive 
263.  NS357 Asthma attack Negative 
264.  NS358 Exquisite dinner Positive 
265.  NS359 Full of regret Negative 
266.  NS360 Dangerous driving Negative 
267.  NS361 Feeling afraid Negative 
268.  NS363 Feeling lonely Negative 
269.  NS365 House fire Negative 
270.  NS366 Glue sniffing Negative 
271.  NS367 Sofa-bed Neutral 
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272.  NS369 Graduation ceremony Positive 
273.  NS370 Helpful comments Positive 
274.  NS371 Stung by a jellyfish Negative 
275.  NS372 Double decker bus Neutral 
276.  NS373 Winning the jackpot Positive 
277.  NS374 Something small Neutral 
278.  NS377 Country kitchen Neutral 
279.  NS379 Losing a race Negative 
280.  NS380 Shaving cut Negative 
281.  NS381 Losing your home Negative 
282.  NS382 Lack of energy Negative 
283.  NS383 Grandmothers cooking Positive 
284.  NS384 Walking into a room Neutral 
285.  NS385 Paper towel Neutral 
286.  NS387 Dinner at a good restaurant Positive 
287.  NS388 Good night sleep Positive 
288.  NS389 Cotton tablecloth Neutral 
289.  NS391 Picture frame Neutral 
290.  NS392 Friendly waiter  Positive 
 Thought Probe 4   
291.  NS393 Giving money to charity Positive 
292.  NS394 Run of the mill Neutral 
293.  NS395 Country pub Positive 
294.  NS396 Good fortune Positive 
295.  NS397 Soiled clothes Negative 
296.  NS398 Broken nose Negative 
297.  NS400 A loaf of bread Neutral 
298.  NS402 Hells angel Negative 
299.  NS404 Bow tie Neutral 
300.  NS405 Bad hair day Negative 
301.  NS407 Heart attack Negative 
302.  NS409 Cozy room Positive 
303.  NS411 Mixing paint Neutral 
304.  NS412 Comfy slippers Positive 
305.  NS413 Grandfather clock Neutral 
306.  NS415 Smashed window Negative 
307.  NS416TARG Achieving a goal Positive 
308.  NS417 TV presenter Neutral 
309.  NS418 Pool table Neutral 
310.  NS419 Feeling paranoid Negative 
311.  NS420 Shopping list Neutral 
312.  NS421 Frying pan Neutral 
313.  NS423 Childhood dreams Positive 
314.  NS424 Treasured friend Positive 
315.  NS425 Badminton court Neutral 
316.  NS426 Computer crashed Negative 
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317.  NS428 Having a picnic Positive 
318.  NS429 Brushing teeth Neutral 
319.  NS430 Sour grapes Negative 
320.  NS431 Children playing Positive 
321.  NS433 Big mistake Negative 
322.  NS434 Haunted house Negative 
323.  NS435 Feeling ecstatic Positive 
324.  NS436 Lack of motivation Negative 
325.  NS439 Receiving a letter Positive 
326.  NS440 Joining a union Neutral 
327.  NS441 Wooden beam Neutral 
328.  NS443 Receiving flowers Positive 
329.  NS445 Family reunion Positive 
330.  NS446 Being helpful Positive 
331.  NS448 Having no money Negative 
332.  NS449 Electric shock Negative 
333.  NS451 Parents meeting Neutral 
334.  NS453 First snow Positive 
335.  NS454 Oppressive regime Negative 
336.  NS455 Best friend Positive 
337.  NS456 Chased by police Negative 
338.  NS457 Place mat Neutral 
339.  NS458 Stolen car Negative 
340.  NS459 Muddy shoes Negative 
341.  NS461 Coat hangers Neutral 
342.  NS462 Big ego Negative 
343.  NS463 Satisfied client Positive 
344.  NS464 Ice-cream & fudge Positive 
345.  NS465 Prison sentence Negative 
346.  NS466 Highlighter pen Neutral 
347.  NS467 Poor hygiene Negative 
348.  NS468TARG Train driver Neutral 
349.  NS469 Traveling the world Positive  
350.  NS470 Shortage of food Negative 
351.  NS473 Accident site Negative 
352.  NS474 Falling out of bed Negative 
353.  NS476 Nasty smell Negative 
354.  NS477 Self doubt  Negative 
355.  NS478 Hospitable host Positive 
356.  NS480 Good genes Positive 
357.  NS482 Bull fighting Negative 
358.  NS483 Broken glass Negative 
359.  NS485 Lost keys Negative 
360.  NS486 Shop lifting Negative 
361.  NS487 Empty box Neutral 
362.  NS489 Being late Negative 
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363.  NS490 Feeling unwanted Negative 
364.  NS491 No response Negative 
365.  NS492 Black stapler Neutral 
366.  NS493 Sandy beach Positive 
367.  NS494 Lottery win Positive 
368.  NS495 Good luck Positive 
369.  NS497 Summer barbeques Positive 
370.  NS498 Severe allergies Negative 
371.  NS499 Good health Positive 
372.  NS500 Sleepless night Negative 
373.  NS502 Spiders web Neutral 
374.  NS503 Failed relationship Negative 
375.  NS504 Angry neighbor Negative 
376.  NS505 Being tormented Negative 
377.  NS506 Local business Neutral  
378.  NS508 Table lamp Neutral 
379.  NS510 Brown paper Neutral 
380.  NS511 Feeling ugly Negative 
381.  NS512 Dressing up Positive 
382.  NS514 Unable to concentrate Negative 
383.  NS515 Feeling optimistic Positive 
384.  NS516 Chatting with friends Positive 
385.  NS517 Hanging execution Negative 
386.    Personalized Cue 2  
 Thought Probe 5   
387.  NS519 Coming home Positive 
388.  NS520 Luxurious surroundings Positive 
389.  NS521 Feeling exhausted Negative 
390.  NS522 Cheese grater Neutral 
391.  NS523 Racist comment Negative 
392.  NS524 Suspicious behavior Negative 
393.  NS525 Toiletry bag Neutral 
394.  NS527 Generous offer Positive 
395.  NS528 Understanding friend Positive 
396.  NS529 Being loved Positive 
397.  NS530 Paper weight Neutral 
398.  NS531 Key chain Neutral 
399.  NS533 Being punched Negative 
400.  NS534 Fear of flying Negative 
401.  NS536TARG Noisy neighbors Negative 
402.  NS537 A million dollars Positive 
403.  NS539 Ink pen Neutral 
404.  NS540 Paper bag Neutral 
405.  NS541 Living life to the fullest Positive 
406.  NS543 Angry conversation Negative 
407.  NS545 Lavish banquet Positive 
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408.  NS546 Engagement party Positive 
409.  NS547 First time abroad Positive 
410.  NS548 Global warming Negative 
411.  NS550 Something amazing Positive 
412.  NS551 Panic attack Negative 
413.  NS553 Bumpy road Negative 
414.  NS555 Red bricks Neutral 
415.  NS556 Capital letter Neutral 
416.  NS557 Pocket thief Negative 
417.  NS558 Day off work Positive 
418.  NS559 Excellent singing Positive 
419.  NS560 Cancelled plans Negative 
420.  NS563 Expensive gift Positive 
421.  NS564 Town hall Neutral 
422.  NS565 Bee sting Negative 
423.  NS566 Receiving praise Positive 
424.  NS568 Having money to spare Positive 
425.  NS569 Salt & pepper Neutral 
426.  NS570 Grandfathers birthday Positive 
427.  NS571 Slap on the face Negative 
428.  NS573 Glass cabinet Neutral 
429.  NS574 Demanding parent Negative 
430.  NS575 Blue coat Neutral 
431.  NS576 Peace & harmony Positive 
432.  NS577 A suburban street Neutral 
433.  NS578 Plastic bag Neutral 
434.  NS579 Armed services Neutral 
435.  NS580 Helpful landlord Positive 
436.  NS583 Stomach ache Negative 
437.  NS584 Quality time Positive 
438.  NS588 Tying a knot Neutral 
439.  NS589 Fully content Positive 
440.  NS590 Being undermined Negative 
441.  NS591 Smiling face Positive 
442.  NS593 Garden tools Neutral 
443.  NS594 Glass bowl Neutral 
444.  NS595 Delinquent behavior  Negative 
445.  NS596 Receding hairline Negative 
446.  NS597 Being spoiled Negative 
447.  NS598 Shower curtain Neutral 
448.  NS599 Social Worker Neutral 
449.  NS600 Social outcast Negative 
450.  NS602 Summer time Positive 
451.  NS603 Skipping rope Neutral 
452.  NS606 Lost luggage Negative 
453.  NS608 Crashing into a lamppost Negative 
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454.  NS609 Box of matches Neutral 
455.  NS610 Shop assistant Neutral 
456.  NS611 Going blind Negative 
457.  NS613 Computer monitor Neutral 
458.  NS614TARG Christmas day Positive 
459.  NS615 Daily routine Neutral 
460.  NS617 Laughing with friends Positive 
461.  NS618 Cotton thread Neutral 
462.  NS619 Easter holiday Positive 
463.  NS620 A good book Positive 
464.  NS621 Lucky charm Positive 
465.  NS622 Clear skies Positive 
466.  NS623 First kiss Positive 
467.  NS624 Stained clothes Negative 
468.  NS625 Being carefree Positive 
469.  NS626 Broken leg Negative 
470.  NS627 A lying friend Negative 
471.  NS628 Making a drink Neutral 
472.  NS629 Getting married Positive 
473.  NS630 Lamp post Neutral 
474.  NS632 Short hair Neutral 
475.  NS633 Black stopwatch Neutral 
476.  NS634 Failed attempt Negative 
477.  NS636 Being betrayed Negative 
478.  NS638 Bad movies Negative 
479.  NS641 Heavy criticism Negative 
480.  NS642 Relaxing bubble bath Positive 
481.  NS643 White shoelace Neutral 
482.  NS644 Wallpaper paste Neutral 
483.  NS646 Dry mouth Negative 
484.  NS647 Expecting a baby Positive 
485.  NS648 Being overjoyed Positive 
486.  NS651 Blank postcard Neutral 
487.  NS653 Being robbed Negative 
488.  NS654 Bath mat Neutral 
489.   Personalized Cue 3  
 Thought Probe 6    
490.  NS657 Strawberries & cream Positive 
491.  NS658 Favorite show Positive 
492.  NS659 Office chair Neutral 
493.  NS660 Scent of perfume  Positive 
494.  NS661 Tap water Neutral 
495.  NS662 White board Neutral 
496.  NS663 A wish come true Positive 
497.  NS664 Sneaking around Negative 
498.  NS665 Exciting prospects Positive 
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499.  NS666 Horrible taste Negative 
500.  NS667 Chest of drawers Neutral 
501.  NS668 Collecting laundry Neutral 
502.  NS670 Being overweight Negative 
503.  NS671 Bad luck Negative 
504.  NS672 Receiving a gift Positive 
505.  NS674 Online banking Neutral 
506.  NS675 Pay raise Positive 
507.  NS676 Broken heart Negative 
508.  NS677TARG Getting lost Negative 
509.  NS681 Buttering bread Neutral 
510.  NS682 Dinner at a restaurant Positive 
511.  NS684 Computer keyboard Neutral 
512.  NS685 Feeling grumpy Negative 
513.  NS687 Terrible nightmare Negative 
514.  NS688 Sibling rivalry Negative 
515.  NS689 Extended holiday Positive 
516.  NS690 State of turmoil Negative  
517.  NS692 Great idea Positive 
518.  NS693 Getting a bonus Positive 
519.  NS694 Shopping in New York Positive 
520.  NS695 Fear of spiders Negative 
521.  NS696 Summer vacation Positive 
522.  NS697 Long weekend Positive 
523.  NS698 Broken jaw Negative 
524.  NS699 Water jug Neutral 
525.  NS701 Root canal treatment Negative 
526.  NS702 Plastic cutlery Neutral 
527.  NS703 Deep voice Neutral 
528.  NS704 Tall building Neutral 
529.  NS705 Headline news Neutral 
530.  NS706 Being chased Negative 
531.  NS707 Aircraft hanger Neutral 
532.  NS710 Opening door Neutral 
533.  NS714 Down in the dumps Negative 
534.  NS715 First love Positive 
535.  NS716 Breaking up Negative 
536.  NS718 Rushed decision Negative 
537.  NS719 Bomb alert Negative 
538.  NS720 Sharpening a pencil Neutral 
539.  NS723 Flooded home Negative 
540.  NS725 Feeling unhappy Negative 
541.  NS726 Brown envelope Neutral 
542.  NS728 Bells ringing Neutral 
543.  NS729 Black socks Neutral 
544.  NS731 Spilt milk negative 
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545.  NS732 Metallic paint Neutral 
546.  NS733 Broken nail Negative 
547.  NS734 Light bulb  Neutral 
548.  NS735 Brick wall Neutral 
549.  NS736 Stainless steel  Neutral 
 Thought Probe 7    
550.  NS739 Meeting room Neutral 
551.  NS740 Talk show Neutral 
552.  NS741 Excessive Sweating Negative 
553.  NS742 Doing nothing Neutral 
554.  NS743 Sense of identity Positive 
555.  NS744 Buying new shoes Positive 
556.  NS745 Plastic plates Neutral 
557.  NS746 Getting a bargain Positive 
558.  NS747 First car Positive 
559.  NS748 Wednesday afternoon Neutral 
560.  NS749 Seeing the sunrise Positive 
561.  NS750 Interesting conversation Positive 
562.  NS751 Traffic lights Neutral 
563.  NS752 Being in love Positive 
564.  NS753 Good company Positive 
565.  NS754 Feeling trapped Negative 
566.  NS755 Eating disorder Negative 
567.  NS756 Being creative Positive 
568.  NS757TARG Children playing in the park Positive 
569.  NS758 Watching sports Positive 
570.  NS759 Listening to music Positive 
571.  NS760 Receiving a bill Negative 
572.  NS763 Waste paper basket Neutral 
573.  NS766 Secluded beach Positive 
574.  NS767 Senseless tragedy Negative 
575.  NS768 Red lipstick Neutral 
576.  NS769 Goldfish bowl Neutral 
577.  NS770 Refreshing drink Positive 
578.  NS771 Performing arts Neutral 
579.  NS772 Offending a friend Negative 
580.  NS774 Walking down stairs Neutral 
581.  NS775 Quilt cover Neutral 
582.  NS777 Beautiful woman Positive 
583.  NS778 Moody people Negative 
584.  NS779 Feeling neutral Neutral 
585.  NS780 Head lights Neutral 
586.  NS781 Church wedding Positive 
587.  NS782 Tuesday afternoon Neutral 
588.  NS784 Buying your first home Positive 
589.  NS786 A wall clock Neutral 
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590.  NS787 Gun shot Negative 
591.  NS788 Insect bite Negative 
592.  NS790 Hand towel Neutral 
593.  NS791 A funny joke Positive 
594.  NS792 Being persecuted Negative 
595.  NS793 Bed linen Neutral 
596.  NS794 Beating the odds Positive 
597.  NS795 Lost earring Negative 
598.  NS798 Daydreaming Positive 
599.   Personalized Cue 4  
 Thought Probe 8   





























1.  NS002     
2.  NS003     
3.  NS004   Going to a party Positive 
4.  NS005     
5.  NS007  Learning disability Negative 
6.  NS008    
7.  NS009    
8.  NS010    
9.  NS011    
10.  NS012  Summer romance Positive 
11.  NS013    
12.  NS014    
13.  NS016  Sports injury Negative 
14.  NS017  Small scissors Neutral  
15.  NS018    
16.  NS019    
17.  NS020    
18.  NS022  Bad music Negative 
19.  NS023  Sound of a whistle Neutral 
20.  NS024    
21.  NS026    
22.  NS028  Young, free & single Positive 
23.  NS030    
24.  NS031    
25.  NS033  Boring job Negative 
26.  NS034    
27.  NS035  Going on holiday Positive 
28.  NS036    
29.  NS039  Over reacting Negative 
30.  NS040   
31.  NS041    
32.  NS042    
33.  NS045    
34.  NS046  Garden shed Neutral  
35.  NS047    
36.  NS048    
37.  NS049    
38.  NS050    
39.  NS051    
40.  NS052TARG1    
41.  NS057    
42.  NS058  Window shutters Neutral  
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43.  NS060    
44.  NS061    
45.  NS062  Filing a complaint Negative 
46.  NS063    
47.  NS064     
48.  NS066   
49.  NS067    
50.  NS070   
51.  NS071 Spot light Neutral 
52.  NS073   
53.  NS075   
54.  NS076   
55.  NS077   
56.  NS079   
57.  NS080   
58.  NS082   
59.  NS083 Web page Neutral 
60.  NS084   
61.  NS086 New relationship Positive 
62.  NS087   
63.  NS089   
64.  NS090 Family doctor Neutral 
65.  NS091 Forgotten appointment Negative 
66.  NS092   
67.  NS093   
68.  NS094   
69.  NS095   
70.  NS096   
71.  NS097 Smelly feet Negative 
72.  NS098   
73.  NS099   
74.  NS100 Crossing the road Neutral 
75.  NS101   
76.  NS102   
77.  NS103   
78.  NS104   
79.  NS105 Great fun Positive 
80.  NS106   
81.  NS107   
82.  NS110   
83.  NS111   
84.  NS112   
85.  NS113 Driving instructor Neutral 
86.  NS114   
87.  NS115   
 Thought probe 1   
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88.  NS117 Long hair Neutral 
89.  NS118   
90.  NS120 Being content Positive 
91.  NS121 Local newspaper Neutral 
92.  NS122   
93.  NS123   
94.  NS125   
95.  NS127 Overhead projector Neutral 
96.  NS128   
97.  NS129   
98.  NS130 Demanding parent Negative 
99.  NS131   
100.  NS133TARG2   
101.  NS136   
102.  NS138   
103.  NS139 Shoe shop Neutral 
104.  NS141   
105.  NS143 Road rage Negative 
106.  NS144   
107.  NS146   
108.  NS147   
109.  NS149   
110.  NS150 Rubix cube Neutral 
111.  NS151   
112.  NS153 Falling out of bed Negative 
113.  NS156   
114.  NS157   
115.  NS158   
116.  NS159   
117.  NS160 Losing money Negative  
118.  NS162   
119.  NS163   
120.  NS164 Stained clothes Negative 
121.  NS167   
122.  NS168   
123.  NS170   
124.  NS171 Music concert Positive 
125.  NS173   
126.  NS174   
127.  NS175 No electricity Negative 
128.  NS177   
129.  NS178 Serving dish Neutral 
130.  NS179   
131.  NS180   
132.  NS181   
133.  NS182 Coffee mug Neutral 
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134.  NS183   
135.  NS184 Easy life Positive 
136.  NS185   
137.  NS186   
 Thought probe 2   
138.  NS188   
139.  NS189   
140.  NS190   
141.  NS191   
142.  NS192   
143.  NS193   
144.  NS194 Being bullied Negative  
145.  NS196   
146.  NS197   
147.  NS198   
148.  NS200 Nice atmosphere Positive  
149.  NS201   
150.  NS202TARG3   
151.  NS203   
152.  NS204   
153.  NS205 Perfect day Positive 
154.  NS207   
155.  NS209 Opening blinds Neutral 
156.  NS212   
157.  NS213 Lost luggage Negative  
158.  NS214   
159.  NS216   
160.  NS217   
161.  NS218 Tender touch Positive 
162.  NS219   
163.  NS220   
164.  NS221   
165.  NS222   
166.  NS224 Holiday home Positive 
167.  NS226   
168.  NS227   
169.  NS228   
170.  NS231 Beautiful view Positive 
171.  NS232   
172.  NS235   
173.  NS236   
174.  NS238   
175.  NS239 Family get together Positive 
176.  NS240   
177.  NS241 Bad taste Negative 
178.  NS242   
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179.  NS243   
180.  NS244    
181.  NS245   
182.  NS248   
183.  NS249 Miracle Cure Positive 
184.  NS250   
185.  NS251   
186.  NS252   
187.  NS254   
188.  NS256   
189.  NS258   
190.  NS259   
191.  NS260 Successful career Positive 
192.  NS262 Brick house Neutral 
193.  NS263   
194.  NS265 Rocking chair Neutral 
195.  NS266TARG4   
196.  NS268   
197.  NS270   
198.  NS272   
199.  NS274   
200.  NS275 Stubbed toe Negative 
201.  NS276   
202.  NS277 Drying clothes Neutral  
203.  NS278   
204.  NS279   
205.  NS282   
206.  NS284   
207.  NS286   
208.  NS287 Sense of humor  Positive  
209.  NS288   
210.  NS290   
211.  NS291   
212.  NS292 Sleeping bag Neutral 
213.  NS294   
214.  NS295 Middle of the week Neutral 
215.  NS297   
216.  NS299   
217.  NS300 Winning a prize Positive 
218.  NS302   
219.  NS303   
220.  NS305 Muddy shoes Negative 
221.  NS306   
222.  NS307   
223.  NS308   
224.  NS310   
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225.  NS311 Personalised Cue or “Asthma attack”  Negative  
226.  NS312   
227.  NS313   
 Thought probe 3   
228.  NS314   
229.  NS315   
230.  NS317   
231.  NS318   
232.  NS319   
233.  NS320 Aiming high Positive 
234.  NS321   
235.  NS322   
236.  NS323   
237.  NS324   
238.  NS326 Post office Neutral 
239.  NS328   
240.  NS329   
241.  NS330 Sunny day Positive 
242.  NS332   
243.  NS334   
244.  NS336 Computer desk Neutral 
245.  NS337   
246.  NS338   
247.  NS339 Car seat Neutral 
248.  NS340   
249.  NS341   
250.  NS342TARG5   
251.  NS343 Exquisite dinner  Positive  
252.  NS344   
253.  NS345   
254.  NS346   
255.  NS347 Putting up a tent Neutral 
256.  NS349   
257.  NS351   
258.  NS352   
259.  NS353 Painful toothache Negative 
260.  NS354 Christmas decorations Positive 
261.  NS355   
262.  NS356 Quick progress Positive 
263.  NS357   
264.  NS358   
265.  NS359   
266.  NS360   
267.  NS361   
268.  NS363   
269.  NS365   
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270.  NS366   
271.  NS367 Sofa-bed Neutral 
272.  NS369   
273.  NS370 Excellent singing  Positive  
274.  NS371   
275.  NS372   
276.  NS373   
277.  NS374   
278.  NS377   
279.  NS379   
280.  NS380   
281.  NS381 Losing your home Negative 
282.  NS382   
283.  NS383   
284.  NS384 Best friends Positive 
285.  NS385   
286.  NS387   
287.  NS388   
288.  NS389 Personalised Cue or “Feeling afraid” Negative  
289.  NS391   
290.  NS392   
 Thought probe 4   
291.  NS393   
292.  NS394   
293.  NS395   
294.  NS396   
295.  NS397 Picture frame  Neutral  
296.  NS398   
297.  NS400   
298.  NS402   
299.  NS404 Summer barbeques  Positive  
300.  NS405   
301.  NS407   
302.  NS409   
303.  NS411 Mixing paint  Neutral  
304.  NS412   
305.  NS413   
306.  NS415   
307.  NS416TARG6   
308.  NS417 TV presenter  Neutral  
309.  NS418   
310.  NS419   
311.  NS420 Shopping list Neutral 
312.  NS421   
313.  NS423   
314.  NS424   
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315.  NS425   
316.  NS426   
317.  NS428   
318.  NS429 Bells ringing Neutral 
319.  NS430   
320.  NS431 Children playing Positive 
321.  NS433   
322.  NS434   
323.  NS435 Oppressive regime Negative  
324.  NS436   
325.  NS439   
326.  NS440   
327.  NS441   
328.  NS443 Lottery win Positive  
329.  NS445   
330.  NS446 Being helpful Positive 
331.  NS448   
332.  NS449   
333.  NS451   
334.  NS453   
335.  NS454   
336.  NS455   
337.  NS456 Chased by police Negative 
338.  NS457   
339.  NS458   
340.  NS459   
341.  NS461   
342.  NS462   
343.  NS463 Satisfied client Positive 
344.  NS464   
345.  NS465   
346.  NS466   
347.  NS467 Daily routine Neutral 
348.  NS468TARG7   
349.  NS469    
350.  NS470   
351.  NS473   
352.  NS474   
353.  NS476   
354.  NS477 Self doubt Negative  
355.  NS478   
356.  NS480   
357.  NS482 Good luck  Positive  
358.  NS483   
359.  NS485   
360.  NS486   
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361.  NS487   
362.  NS489   
363.  NS490   
364.  NS491   
365.  NS492 Black stapler Neutral  
366.  NS493   
367.  NS494 Receiving flowers Positive  
368.  NS495 Personalised Cue or “Excessive 
sweating”  
Negative  
369.  NS497   
370.  NS498   
 Thought probe 5   
371.  NS499 Good health Positive 
372.  NS500   
373.  NS502   
374.  NS503   
375.  NS504   
376.  NS505 Being tormented Negative 
377.  NS506   
378.  NS508   
379.  NS510   
380.  NS511   
381.  NS512   
382.  NS514 Unable to concentrate Negative 
383.  NS515   
384.  NS516 Chatting with friends Positive 
385.  NS517   
386.  NS518    
387.  NS519   
388.  NS520   
389.  NS521   
390.  NS522   
391.  NS523 Racist comment Negative 
392.  NS524   
393.  NS525 Toiletry bag Neutral 
394.  NS527   
395.  NS528   
396.  NS529 Being loved Positive 
397.  NS530   
398.  NS531   
399.  NS533 Terrible nightmare  Negative  
400.  NS534   
401.  NS536TARG8   
402.  NS537   
403.  NS539 Ink pen Neutral 
404.  NS540   
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405.  NS541   
406.  NS543   
407.  NS545   
408.  NS546 Engagement party Positive 
409.  NS547   
410.  NS548 Being undermined Negative  
411.  NS550   
412.  NS551   
413.  NS553   
414.  NS555   
415.  NS556   
416.  NS557 Long weekend Positive 
417.  NS558   
418.  NS559   
419.  NS560   
420.  NS563 Expensive gift Positive 
421.  NS564   
422.  NS565   
423.  NS566 Receiving praise Positive 
424.  NS568   
425.  NS569 Salt & pepper Neutral 
426.  NS570   
427.  NS571   
428.  NS573   
429.  NS574   
430.  NS575 Broken jaw Negative 
431.  NS576   
432.  NS577   
433.  NS578 Black socks Neutral 
434.  NS579   
435.  NS580 Helpful landlord Positive 
436.  NS583   
437.  NS584   
438.  NS588   
439.  NS589   
440.  NS590 Sleepless night Negative  
441.  NS591   
442.  NS593   
443.  NS594   
444.  NS595   
445.  NS596   
446.  NS597   
447.  NS598 Personalised Cue or “Social outcast”  Negative  
448.  NS599   
449.  NS600   
 Thought probe 6   
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450.  NS602   
451.  NS603   
452.  NS606   
453.  NS608   
454.  NS609   
455.  NS610   
456.  NS611 Going blind  Negative  
457.  NS613   
458.  NS614TARG9   
459.  NS615   
460.  NS617   
461.  NS618   
462.  NS619 Flip flops Neutral 
463.  NS620   
464.  NS621 Lucky charm Positive 
465.  NS622   
466.  NS623 First kiss Positive 
467.  NS624   
468.  NS625   
469.  NS626 Broken leg Negative 
470.  NS627   
471.  NS628   
472.  NS629   
473.  NS630   
474.  NS632 Short hair Neutral 
475.  NS633   
476.  NS634   
477.  NS636   
478.  NS638 Bad movies Negative 
479.  NS641   
480.  NS642   
481.  NS643 Lukewarm water Neutral 
482.  NS644   
483.  NS646 Dry mouth Negative 
484.  NS647   
485.  NS648   
486.  NS651   
487.  NS653 Being robbed  Negative  
488.  NS654   
489.  NS655   
490.  NS657   
491.  NS658   
492.  NS659   
493.  NS660   
494.  NS661   
495.  NS662 White board  Neutral  
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496.  NS663   
497.  NS664 Sneaking around Negative 
498.  NS665   
499.  NS666   
500.  NS667   
501.  NS668 Collecting laundry Neutral 
502.  NS670   
503.  NS671 Bad luck Negative 
504.  NS672   
505.  NS674   
506.  NS675   
507.  NS676   
508.  NS677TARG10   
509.  NS681   
510.  NS682 Dinner at a restaurant Positive 
511.  NS684   
512.  NS685   
513.  NS687   
514.  NS688 Sibling rivalry Negative 
515.  NS689   
516.  NS690 State of turmoil Negative  
517.  NS692 Great idea Positive 
518.  NS693   
519.  NS694   
520.  NS695 Fear of spiders Negative 
521.  NS696   
522.  NS697   
523.  NS698   
524.  NS699   
525.  NS701   
526.  NS702   
527.  NS703   
528.  NS704 Water jug Neutral 
529.  NS705   
530.  NS706   
 Thought probe 7   
531.  NS707   
532.  NS710 Opening door Neutral  
533.  NS714   
534.  NS715   
535.  NS716 Breaking up Negative  
536.  NS718   
537.  NS719   
538.  NS720   
539.  NS723 Flooded home  Negative  
540.  NS725   
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541.  NS726   
542.  NS728   
543.  NS729   
544.  NS731   
545.  NS732   
546.  NS733   
547.  NS734   
548.  NS735 Brick wall  Neutral 
549.  NS736   
550.  NS739   
551.  NS740 Talk show Neutral  
552.  NS741 Subway station Neutral  
553.  NS742   
554.  NS743   
555.  NS744   
556.  NS745   
557.  NS746   
558.  NS747   
559.  NS748   
560.  NS749   
561.  NS750 Hand towel Neutral  
562.  NS751   
563.  NS752   
564.  NS753 Good company Positive  
565.  NS754 Feeling trapped Negative  
566.  NS755   
567.  NS756   
568.  NS757   
569.  NS758   
570.  NS759   
571.  NS760 Daydreaming  Positive  
572.  NS763   
573.  NS766   
574.  NS767 Offending a friend  Negative  
575.  NS768   
576.  NS769   
577.  NS770   
578.  NS771 Buying your first home Positive 
579.  NS772   
580.  NS774   
 Thought probe 8   
581.  NS775   
582.  NS777   
583.  NS778 Goldfish bowl Neutral  
584.  NS779   




















586.  NS781 Priceless comment  Positive  
587.  NS782   
588.  NS784TARG11   
589.  NS786   
590.  NS787   
591.  NS788 Insect bite Negative 
592.  NS790   
593.  NS791 A funny joke Positive  
594.  NS792   
595.  NS793   
596.  NS794   
597.  NS795   
598.  NS798   
599.  NS799   
600.  NS800   
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2a) Was the thought you described above: (Please tick appropriate answer) 
 
Deliberate            Spontaneous 
 
 




Triggered by the enviroment                 Triggered by own thoughts 
No trigger  
 






3) How much were you concentrating on the task? (On a scale of 1- 5. Please 
circle your chosen response.)  
 
 Not at all ___1________ 2________3________4_______5____Fully Concentrating  
                                                                                                 
 




 Very vague,___1_____ 2______3______4______5______6______7__Very vivid, 
almost no image at all                                                                         almost like    
                                                                                                                 normal vision 
 
 
After completing the questions, please return to the task. 
 
Please go back to your description of your thought and read it carefully. Once 








5) Categorise your thought into ONE of the following: (Please tick appropriate 
answer) 
 






6) If you ticked Past memory or Future event, indicate how long ago the 






7) How frequently have you had this thought prior to the experiment? (On a 
scale of 1- 5. Please circle your chosen response.) 
 
______1___________2_____________3_____________4_____________5______ 
          Never             Once or            A few times            Several                 Many 




8) How pleasant would you rate this thought? (On a scale of 1- 5. Please circle 
your chosen response.) 
   
______1___________ 2____________3____________4____________5_______ 





9) How specific was the thought/memory? (Please tick appropriate answer) 
 
One-off event/thing  General thought about a repetitive event 
 
















































Clinicians are aware that emotions play an important part in most illnesses. If your clinician 
knows about these feelings he or she will be able to help you more. This questionnaire is 
designed to help your clinician to know how you feel. Read each item below and underline 
the reply which comes closest to how you have been feeling in the past week. Don’t take 
too long over your replies, your immediate reaction to each item will probably be more 
accurate than a long, thought-out response. 
 
I feel tense or ‘wound up’:  A  
Most of the time  3  
A lot of the time  2  
Time to time, occasionally  1  
Not at all  0  
  
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy:  D  
Definitely as much  0  
Not quite so much  1  
Only a little  2  
Not at all  3  
  
I get a sort of frightened feeling like something awful is about to happen:  A  
Very definitely and quite badly  3  
Yes, but not too badly  2  
A little, but it doesn’t worry me  1  
Not at all  0  
  
I can laugh and see the funny side of things:  D  
As much as I always could  0  
Not quite so much now  1  
Definitely not so much now  2  
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Not at all  3  
  
Worrying thoughts go through my mind:  A  
A great deal of the time  3  
A lot of the time  2  
From time to time but not too often  1  
Only occasionally  0  
  
I feel cheerful:  D  
Not at all  3  
Not often  2  
Sometimes  1  
Most of the time  0  
  
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed:  A  
Definitely  0  
Usually  1  
Not often  2  
Not at all  3  
 
I feel as if I am slowed down:  
 
D  
Nearly all of the time  3  
Very often  2  
Sometimes  1  









Not at all  0  
Occasionally  1  
Quite often  2  
Very often  3  
  
I have lost interest in my appearance:  D  
Definitely  3  
I don’t take as much care as I should  2  
I may not take quite as much care  1  
I take just as much care as ever  0  
  
I feel restless as if I have to be on the move:  A  
Very much indeed  3  
Quite a lot  2  
Not very much  1  
Not at all  0  
  
I look forward with enjoyment to things:  D  
A much as I ever did  0  
Rather less than I used to  1  
Definitely less than I used to  2  
Hardly at all  3  
  
I get sudden feelings of panic:  A  
Very often indeed  3  
Quite often  2  
Not very often  1  
Not at all  0  
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I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV programme:  D  
Often  0  
Sometimes  1  
Not often  2  
































































The PC-PTSD is a 4-item screen that was designed for use in primary care and other medical 
settings and is currently used to screen for PTSD in veterans at the VA. The screen includes 
an introductory sentence to cue respondents to traumatic events. The authors suggest that 
in most circumstances the results of the PC-PTSD should be considered "positive" if a 
patient answers "yes" to any 3 items. Those screening positive should then be assessed with 





In your life, have you ever had any experience that was so frightening, horrible, or upsetting 
that, in the past month, you: 
1. Have had nightmares about it or thought about it when you did not want to? 
YES / NO 
2. Tried hard not to think about it or went out of your way to avoid situations that reminded 
you of it? 
YES / NO 
3. Were constantly on guard, watchful, or easily startled? 
YES / NO 
4. Felt numb or detached from others, activities, or your surroundings? 
YES / NO 
 
Current research suggests that the results of the PC-PTSD should be considered "positive" if 





























































Please read each of the following descriptions and indicate the  
degree to which each is appropriate for you. Do not spend a lot of  
time thinking about each one, but respond based on your thoughts  
about how you do or do not perform each activity. If a description is 
always completely appropriate, please write "5"; if it is never 
appropriate, write "1"; if it is appropriate about half of the time, write 
"3"; and use the other numbers accordingly. 
 
_____ a. When going to a new place, I prefer directions that  
include detailed descriptions of landmarks (such as the size,  
shape and color of a gas station) in addition to their names. 
 
_____ b. If I catch a glance of a car that is partially hidden behind 
bushes, I automatically "complete it," seeing the entire car in my mind's 
eye. 
 
_____ c. If I am looking for new furniture in a store, I always  
visualize what the furniture would look like in particular places in my 
home. 
 
_____ d. I prefer to read novels that lead me easily to visualize  
where the characters are and what they are doing instead of novels  
that are difficult to visualize. 
 
_____ e. When I think about visiting a relative, I almost always  
have a clear mental picture of him or her. 
 
_____ f. When relatively easy technical material is described  
clearly in a text, I find illustrations distracting because they  
interfere with my ability to visualize the material. 
 
_____ g. If someone were to tell me two-digit numbers to add  
(e.g., 24 and 31), I would visualize them in order to add them. 
 
_____ h. Before I get dressed to go out, I first visualize what I will 
look like if I wear different combinations of clothes. 
 
_____ i. When I think about a series of errands I must do, I  
visualize the stores I will visit.  
 
_____ j. When I first hear a friend's voice, a visual image of him  
or her almost always springs to mind. 
 
_____ k. When I hear a radio announcer or DJ I've never actually  
seen, I usually find myself picturing what they might look like.  
 
_____ l. If I saw a car accident, I would visualize what had  





















































For items 1-4, think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but who is not with 




1) The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
2) characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body, etc. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
3) The precise carriage, length of step, etc., in walking. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
4) The different colours worn in some familiar cloths.  Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 




5) The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
6) The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
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7) Clouds. A storm blow up, with flashes of lightning. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
8) A rainbow appears. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
Think of the front of a shop which you often go to. Consider the picture that comes before 




9) The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side of the road. Circle appropriate 
answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
10) A window display including colours, shapes and details of individual items for sale. 
Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
11) You are near the entrance. The colour, shape and details of the door. Circle appropriate 
answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
12) you enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter assistant serves you. Money 
changes hands. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
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5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
Finally, think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake. consider the 




13) The colour of the landscape. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
14)The colour and shape of the trees. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
15) The colour and shape of the lake. Circle appropriate answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  
5 - No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object 
 
16) A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing waves. Circle appropriate 
answer 
1 - Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision.  
2 - Clear and reasonably vivid.  
3 - Moderately clear and vivid.  
4 - Vague and dim.  






































































1. When did you have the memory of the film clip?    Time:____________ Date:____________ 
2. When did you record it?                                               Time:____________ Date:____________ 






4. Was the memory triggered by something, for example… (circle as appropriate) 
(g) in your thoughts 
(h) in your environment 
(i) there was no trigger – if so move to Question 6 
 
5. What triggered this memory? 
 
 
6. When the memory was triggered in your mind, where were you, and what were you doing? 
 
 
7. How much were you concentrating on this activity? (Circle as appropriate.) 
  
                           1                     2                     3                     4                     5      
             Not at all                                                                                          Fully concentrating 
 
8. How vivid was this memory? (Circle as appropriate.)   
 
                                 1                 2                3                4                5               6               7         
       Not vivid/vague                                                                                                         Extremely vivid                                                  
                                       
9. What was your mood before experiencing this memory? (Circle as appropriate. In this scale 4 is 
‘neutral.’) 
 
                                 1    2  3  4  5  6  7   
 Extremely negative               Neutral                                             Extremely positive 
 
10. How distressing was this memory? (Circle as appropriate. In this scale 4 is ‘moderately 
distressing.’) 
 
                          1    2  3  4  5  6  7  
           Not distressing           Moderately                               Extremely distressing 
 
11. What effect, if any, did the intrusion of the film have on your mood? (Circle as appropriate. In this 
scale 4 is ‘moderately worse.’) 
 
                                 1    2  3  4  5  6   7  
                     No effect             Moderately                             Made me feel  
                                                                                                                       a lot worse 
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Appendix XVI: Diary of Involuntary Autobiographical Memories (Study 5, 


















































1. (a) When did you have the memory?     Date:____________         Time:____________AM/PM 
(b) When did you record it?                     Date:____________         Time:____________ AM/PM 
 
2. Describe your memory. What was it about?  
 
 
3. How vivid was this memory? (circle as appropriate)   
 
     Very vague,      1              2              3              4              5              6              7         Extremely  
 almost no image                                                                                                        viv id, almost like                           
                                                          normal vision                                                                                                                              
4. Was the memory triggered by something… (circle as appropriate) 
(a) in your thoughts 
(b) in your environment 
(c) there was no trigger – (if c, then skip to Question 6) 
 
5. If you circle (a) or (b) above, please describe what was the trigger.  
 
6. What were you doing when the memory came to mind? (please describe) 
 
7. How much were you concentrating on this activity? (circle as appropriate) 
  
       Not at all      1                     2                     3                     4                     5      Fully concentrating 
 
8. What was your mood before experiencing this memory?  
 
                           1  2  3  4  5  6   7   
 Extremely negative             Neutral                                   Extremely positive 
 
9. How pleasant or unpleasant is the memory that you experienced?  
 
                      1     2      3      4      5       6         7  
           Very unpleasant                  Neutral                                   Very Pleasant 
 
10.  What effect, if any, did the intrusion of the film have on your mood? (Circle as appropriate) 
 
                             1     2      3      4      5       6        7                                          
Made me feel           Had no effect                               Made me feel  
      a lot worse                                                                                                     a lot better 
 
11.  Is the memory of a general or specific event? (circle as appropriate) 
(a) General event 
(b) Specific event 
 
12. When did the original event occur? (please be as specific as possible).  
 
13. Have you ever had a memory of this event before? (circle as appropriate) 
 
 Never            Once or twice            A few times          Several times           Many times      
